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Abstract 
Today's businesses base their operation on their IT infrastructure, which consequently 
demands that it should be protected accordingly. Nevertheless, surveys tend to indicate 
that the number of IT security incidents is increasing, resulting in significant losses for 
the organisations concerned. Leading in poor security practices, and therefore frequent 
victims of related security incidents, are Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Even 
though there are a number of solutions, ranging from baseline guidelines to a detailed 
Risk Assessment (which can be followed to guide organisations through systematically 
selecting appropriate controls and practices to properly secure their networked assets), 
evidence suggests that these are not being employed by SMEs. Constraints such as lack 
of budget, security personnel and awareness are amongst the factors that are deterring 
SMEs from adopting such solutions, and therefore contributing to their continued 
problem with security incidents. 
This thesis specifically targets the problem of security risk assessment within SME 
environments. Following an examination of the aforementioned constraints, the 
investigation considers the existing solutions, establishing the reasons that they are not 
appropriate for SME users. The research identifies that SMEs are in need of a solution 
that represents a progression of current guidelines, but without being as complicated as 
existing forms of Risk Analysis. Therefore a new methodology is designed, known as 
PRAM (Profile-based Risk Analysis and Management), which enables SMEs to analyse 
and manage their risks in a way that is simple to use and understand, as well as providing 
economic considerations on threats, their likelihood, effect and the spending required to 
reduce them to an acceptable level. 
The methodology is then implemented within a working prototype, which is evaluated 
using a series of test scenarios. These scenarios are also used as the basis for evaluating 
existing SME-oriented Risk Analysis solutions, and the findings determine that the 
PRAM approach is able to deliver a more comprehensive solution. In addition, an 
evaluation of the PRAM prototype by a series of end-users suggests that it also succeeds 
in providing a more user-friendly solution than the current alternatives. 
Overall, this thesis presents a solution that can be adopted by SMEs lacking in-house 
security expertise. It can assist them in understanding the threats they are under, while at 
the same time presenting appropriate information to enable management to evaluate their 
organisation's current IT security situation and select appropriate countermeasures. 
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1 Introduction & Overview 
This research presents a novel approach to Risk Assessment which can be implemented 
by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to assess the risks towards their assets and 
select appropriate controls to protect them, this way reducing the high levels of losses due 
to compromise of information security assets reported in surveys. 
1.1 The problem of security risks for SMEs 
"Information can exist in many forms. It can be printed or written on paper, stored 
electronically, transmitted by post or using electronic means, shown on films, or spoken 
in conversation. "ateverform the information takes, or means by which it is shared or 
stored, it should always be appropriately protected " (ISO 17799 2005). 
Nowadays I. T. systems are essential and the vast majority of organisations have networks 
to facilitate their operations, transactions and business functions (Cisco 2006). This 
introduces a significant amount of information that exists within organisations in an 
electronic fonnat (DTI 2005). Having based the operation on networked assets, what is 
even more challenging is maintaining the operational status of such a network, as any 
disruption of the flow of information or any occasion that one of the elements that 
constitute it becomes unavailable, may immediately mean loss of capital and reputation 
(Camp 2006). 
I 
Any part of an Information system (i. e. hardware, software, data) can be the target of an 
attack (Pfleeger 2006) and there are a large number of threats towards information assets 
that can lead to their compromise, but they can all be listed under five broad categories 
(DTI 2006). Those are: 
* Malicious code, which includes Viruses, Trojans and Worms. 
9 Accidental damage, which among others can include hardware failure, faulty 
software, human errors and natural disasters. 
* Staff misuse of Infon-nation Systems, which can be misuse of confidential 
information, web and email access. 
e Unauthorised Outsider, such as attacks on internet or telecommunications traffic, 
attempts to break into and actual penetration into network. 
* Theft of Fraud. For example, theft of computer systems or use of organisations 
systems to commit fraud. 
It is common practice to every home not just within organisations to protect physical 
assets, such as currency or jewellery, from possible threats against them. People 
instinctively hide or protect such assets In safes and banks. Infonnation is a very 
important asset (Buszta 2003) and should be secured like an organization would secure 
their physical assets since these two are nowadays almost completely interdependent 
(Hamilton 2002). 
2 
Information Security is commonly defined as being the protection of infon-nation within a 
business, and the systems and hardware used to store, process and transmit this 
information (Whitman 2003). This is achieved through the protection or preservation of 
three key aspects of infon-nation: availability, integrity and confidentiality (Shaurette 
2003). According to Parker (1998): Protection of information availability means that 
information should be kept accessible and usable (for authorised parties) at any time. 
Preservation of integrity means that the unauthorised modification of information must 
always be prevented. Finally, safeguarding of confidentiality of infonnation means that 
observation and disclosure of knowledge must be limited only to authorised individuals. 
In the market there are a large number of solutions which, if implemented correctly, can 
eliminate the risk for all these threats (Lawlon 2003). However, organizations report 
major losses due to the compromise of security, meaning they are not assessing their 
security properly. Small and medium organisations generally experience common 
problems (Churchill 2006) and, as surveys point out, one of these is that they are leading 
in bad security practices while at the same time report a lot of the significant losses due to 
I. S. incidents (Jennex 2004). 
A key step in securing is performing a Risk Assessment. In short, this means 
methodically identifying an organisations assets, the threats to those assets and selecting 
the best possible controls trying to be efficient in spending the budget (HKCERT 2005). 
3 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
This research investigates the need for and use of RA within SMEs, so as to establish 
why SMEs do not plan their security in a structured manner and are not adopting 
adequate security controls, and therefore, as a result continually face security incidents. 
This is achieved by investigating the available solutions to identify what elements make 
them unsuitable for SMEs and allow the design and implementation of a novel approach 
which addresses these identified issues. 
To establish this, this research has been divided into the following five stages: 
1. To establish the requirement for a method of structured asset-risk valuation and 
management (which is offered at its best by performing a Risk Assessment) for 
every organisation that wishes to effectively secure their I. T. assets. 
2. Investigate whether such solutions are implemented within SMEs and analyse the 
characteristics of SMEs and their personnel which may be prohibiting their 
adoption. 
3. Analyse and critique current solutions and evaluate them to discover what 
elements are prohibiting for the previously established distinctive SME 
enviromnent. 
4. Design a methodology based specifically on these identified needs of SMEs, 
making it free of all the prohibiting elements associated with existing solutions. 
5. Implement this methodology into a prototype which will allow the testing of this 
novel framework so as to establish its effectiveness. 
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In order to achieve the first stage, a literature review is performed, providing an insight to 
the area of RA, its importance to organisations, how security is not thorough without 
having perfonned one, as well as proof that in real life it is not being adopted. This leads 
to the second stage where through the use of survey findings a set of requirements, which 
make RA solutions suitable, of SMEs from such solutions is established. In the third 
stage a detailed investigation of the available solutions, to SMEs wishing to plan their 
security in such a way, is performed. This investigation includes a rating of these 
solutions against the characteristics SMEs desire (as identified in the third stage) and 
from them establish the reasons that make them inappropriate. Having established what 
SMEs need and what makes current solutions inappropriate, allows the research to 
proceed to the next stage which is to design a novel methodology which surpasses the 
identified setbacks. Finally the novel methodology is used to produce a prototype which 
can be tested in SME scenarios and against the existing solutions to prove that the 
identified setbacks have been surpassed. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 discusses the current problems faced in the I. S. sector and investigates what 
solutions are available for organisations wishing to overcome these problems. The 
discussion focuses upon Risk Assessment, which is widely recognised as the first step 
that organisations need perform towards a structured and systematic approach to I. S. 
After analysing the details of these solutions the focus is on survey data that points out 
they are not being implemented. The main industry sector that has the problem is shown 
to be Small and Medium Enterprises. 
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Having established there is an I. S. security problem and it concentrates on SMEs, the 
third chapter investigates the characteristics of SMEs that may prevent them from 
properly planning and organising their I. S. To achieve this, the deterring characteristics 
of SME security environments are identified through existing surveys and a survey 
conducted by the author establishes whether these initial assumptions stand. Identifying 
these characteristics enables this research to proceed and evaluate the existing solutions 
based on the requirements of SMEs and identify the reasons why they are not being 
adopted. 
Chapter 4 includes the evaluation of the existing solutions available to SMEs, focusing 
upon selected RA tools that advertise themselves as being appropriate to SMEs. Then 
there is an investigation of the other solutions available to SMEs wishing to structure 
their security but cannot perform RA. This investigation establishes that none of these 
solutions is suitable for the characteristics of SMEs, which is why they are not being 
used, leading to poorly planned security and significant breaches and losses. This leads to 
the formulation of the requirements for a methodology that will match the requirements 
of SMEs therefore enable them to assess security properly. 
The evaluation is based on three scenarios of SMEs (included in Appendix A), one of a 
home office, a small-sized business and one with a middle-sized organisation. For each 
one of these the business ftinctions/characteristics and the security requirements were 
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devised and those characteristics of the tools that this research is concerned with (i. e. 
those that correspond to SMEs requirements) were rated. 
Chapter 5 describes the methodology that has been considered and designed in order to 
address the identified requirements of SMEs from a RA framework that solves the 
existing problems in the area. In this chapter the elements that should be included by such 
a framework, such as the processes and the information inputs and outputs, are analysed. 
Chapter 6 describes how the methodology was implemented into a working prototype. 
Profile-based Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) uses background ftinctionality 
and intelligence offered by spreadsheet, database and word processing software, all 
automated and handled by an easy to use profile-based interface programmed in Visual 
Basic, to produce a novel software tool which addresses all the identified requirements of 
SMEs. 
Chapter 7 evaluates PRAM to assess whether it has achieved the desired goals for an 
SME RA tool. This is achieved by running the prototype with the three scenarios 
proposed in Chapter 4 and rating the performance on the same criteria as the other tools. 
This allows comparable results between PRAM and the existing solutions. The second 
approach selected to evaluate the prototype was to have 3 rd party participants in a 
controlled environment evaluation compare and contrast the existing RA tools and this 
framework based on scenanos they devise. 
7 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions, discusses certain limitations of the research, and 
presents future work that is required on the area of RA. The thesis concludes by 
considering the ftiture outlook for Risk Analysis within SME environments. 
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2 SMEs and Security Planning Methodologies 
This chapter identifies the existence and investigates the nature of the problem of SMEs 
having security issues and losses. The investigation considers the options available to 
organisations wishing to assess and minimize the information security incidents reported, 
and assesses whether these are being implemented, based on survey findings and a study 
of existing literature. 
2.1 Introduction 
Before starting to investigate the I. T. security problem this research will attempt to solve, 
some basic background information will be given on two topics that will be seen 
discussed largely throughout the thesis. This research focuses on SMEs and therefore it is 
worth beginning with giving a clear definition of wl-iich organisations are considered to 
fit within this category. In addition, a large segment of the discussion is based on survey 
findings and therefore some elementary information on the surveys mentioned in this 
thesis is provided at the start of this chapter. 
2.2 What are SMEs 
SME stands for Small and Medium Enterprises, and as explained in the introduction, this 
research focuses on SMEs as they face the same I. S. problems as all organisations but, as 
this chapter proves, usually lack the solutions. Different countries have a different 
perception of what an SME is. As an example, in Germany, organisations with under 500 
employees were defined as medium (the same for the US) while in Belgium this category 
9 
only included organisations with under 100 employees (European Commission 2007). 
For the purposes of this research however the definition given by the European Union 
Commission as of the I" of January 2005 (European Commission 2005) based on the 
criteria of the 'staff headcount' or on the annual turnover. According to this definition, 
SMEs are defined as those organisations that have less than 250 employees or have an 
annual turnover of less than 50 million Euros. In Europe, SMEs comprise approximately 
99% of all firms and collectively employ around 65 million people (European 
Commission 2007). 
Table 1: Definition of SMEs by the EC 
From now on when the term SME is referred to in this thesis, it will be consistent with 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which follows the EU description of 
SMEs portrayed above, and defines it as an organisation with fewer than 250 members of 
staff. 
2.3 The surveys used in this thesis 
Even though a number of documents are referenced throughout this thesis, what was 
chosen to be primarily the basis of the discussion were various I. S. surveys, tl-iis way 
illustrating results that are not assumptions but have statistical basis. An investigation 
10 
was made and appropriate surveys were chosen based on several criteria which are 
discussed in this section. These surveys results are discussed throughout the thesis 
therefore at this stage some infort-nation on those surveys is presented altogether, with 
some special focus on a survey that was conducted by the author focusing on SME I. S. 
issues more specifically for the purposes of this research. 
o The 2006 Information Security and Breaches Survey or ISBS (DTI 2006). 
This survey is conducted by the Department of Trade and Industry every two 
years. ISBS 2006 is the latest of the series and its results are discussed widely in 
this thesis as it corresponds to the purposes of this research for several reasons: 
firstly it is a survey of the practices and problems of UK based organisations, and 
secondly it is the most appropriate of all the widely distributed surveys to 
represent SMEs (i. e. organisations with up to 250 employees) whilst having a 
quite credible number of samples (over 1000 organisations). The breakdown of 
respondent organisations is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Respondents to the ISBS survey by size of organisation 
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* The 2004 SME security survey (Dimopoulos et al. 2004a). The SME security 
survey was conducted in both Europe (mainly the UK) and the US, by the 
University of Plymouth and San Diego State University respectively, in order to 
compare organisations' attitude towards security. The US version (and the first 
section of the European survey) is concerned with security practices within SMEs, 
security expertise within, and the adoption of standards. This survey is described 
in more detail in Chapter 3. The findings of the two surveys were published in 
November 2004 and both survey questionnaires are included in Appendix B. 
9 The 2006 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey (ACCSS 2006). 
An annual survey conducted with the large involvement of the Australian police, 
the AusCERT and the Australian goverranent. It was chosen because it represents, 
As Figure 2 shows, a very wide spectrum of industry sectors and involves a 
credible number of samples (389 organisations). This survey does not focus 
specifically on SMEs but it does have a large sample from that business area, with 
53% of the respondents employing less than 500 employees. 
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Figure 2: Respondents to the ACCSS survey by industry sector 
* The 2006 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (Gordon et al. 2006). 
This is the 11 th version of one of the most widely known and referenced annual 
surveys on computer crime and security, which was the reason it was chosen for 
inclusion in this research. As the name implies, it is conducted in the USA by the 
Computer Security Institute with the participation of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's Computer Intrusion Squad. Like the previous survey the CSI/FBI 
survey includes a very wide sample in tenns of the industry sectors it covers. 
Furthermore the size of the sample used for the findings of this survey is 615 
respondents. As far as the size of the organisations involved is concerned, it 
generally aims more at large organisations (with 63% of the sample having over 
500 personnel). However, this survey was included as it is used to discuss attack 
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trends and threats which are common towards all organisations and not security 
practices which may vary between SMEs and large organisations. 
9 The 2005 Global Information Security Survey (Emst & Young 2005). This 
survey is conducted by Ernst & Young and provides results from a global sample 
of organisations (1300 companies from 55 countries participated). Even though it 
does not address SMEs in particular, it does separate the results of organisations 
with an annual profit of over and under one billion dollars. When discussing 
results of this survey, the latter ones were used as being the nearest to SMEs. This 
survey was chosen as it discusses risk assessment and organisations requirements 
from it. The survey also discusses compliance with regulations and guidelines, 
which is interesting for the purposes of this research. 
o The Symantec Internet Security Threat report, volume VIII (Symantec 2006). 
This survey is issued annually by one of the leading vendors in I. T. security. It 
discusses the status of I. T. threats and attack trends. It was chosen as it is the most 
representative and accurate survey on the issue of threats the organisations face 
and industry sectors targeted, including a massive data sample. It bases findings 
on more than 24,000 sensors, monitoring network activity in over 180 countries, 
making it one of the most statistically reliable surveys. 
* The 2005 Global Security Survey (Deloitte 2005). Another global survey, 
conducted by Deloitte Touche Tolunatsu (or DTT), based on discussions with 
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representatives from the world's top firms. Even though this survey does not 
represent SMEs at all, it was chosen for some of the discussions in this thesis as it 
focuses on the business and financial aspect of I. T. risks and views I. S. from a 
managerial perspective, which is useful for when looking at what the management 
requires as the output of a risks assessment and looking at the financial aspects of 
RA and investments in security. 
* The 2005 Global State of Information Security Survey (Berinato 2005). This 
survey was performed by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the CIO magazine. It is 
interesting for the purposes of this research as it has a very large sample (8,200) 
of respondents from 63 countries that are all managers and directors in their 
organisations. It therefore illustrates the non-I. T. views on I. S. threats and 
practices, which constitutes a very significant element with RA. 
2.4 The Information Security environment today 
Every year more organisations become networked and depend on I. T. to conduct 
business, advertise, and interact with business partners and customers (GAO 2001). 
Nowadays most of the business can be performed online via organisations websites, from 
acquiring goods to paying bills, to filling in tax returns even voting (Labuschagne 2000). 
It is therefore surprising to find out that, according to the 2006 CSI/FBI report (Gordon et 
al. 2006), 95% of the organisations that responded (a total of 258 organisations) have 
experienced 'More than 10' website incidents. 
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However, it is not just the websites that are targeted and face security incidents, as the 
Department of Trade Industry reports in their latest security survey (DTI 2006), 
organisations are having security incidents in all areas of their I. T. infrastructure. To 
illustrate this, according to the aforementioned survey, in 2006 a rather large 62% of the 
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overall organisations that responded reported they had a security incident of some sort. 
Although one could argue that the large reported numbers of security incidents might be 
insignificant and unsuccessful incidents, the same report comes to add that: 'Overall, the 
cost of security breaches to UK plc is up by roughly 50% since two years ago, and is of 
the order of ten billion pounds per annum. ' while at the same time, in the US, CSI/FBI 
reports total losses within the previous year (2005) of 130 Million dollars over 639 
respondents with the greatest causes of loss being by far; malicious code ($43 million), 
unauthorised access ($31 million), and theft of proprietary information ($31 million). All 
three are quite severe threats (as one can judge from their effect) and more importantly 
cannot be characterised as accidental. Instead all three can be blamed upon negligence, 
poor selection of controls, lack of awareness and a variety of other avoidable reasons. 
2.4.1 The lack of structured security 
All these reported incidents and losses signify that there are gaps in the way organisations 
approach and assess their I. T. security. One would wonder however, if I. T. is so 
important to the organisations, and the nature of threats are more or less known, then why 
do incidents continue to occur? The answer is that organisations do not assess their I. T. in 
a correct and organised manner. There is no plan and they rarely assess assets and threats 
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properly (Upfold et al. 2005). Few are aware of guidelines and even fewer have formal 
documented policies and response plans without which "an information system is likely 
to be a disjoint collection of countermeasures that address a variety of threats " (Schneier 
2000). The more one looks at survey data the more this view is strengthened: 
The author's SME security survey (described in full as part of Chapter 3) queried 
whether the respondents' organisations have a documented secunty plan or 
policy. In both continents the majority of the respondents stated they did not 
while, as Figure 3 illustrates, the smaller the orgamsation, the smaller the 
percentage that responded they have a plan. 
Figure 3: Findings of the SME security survey on the use of Plan and Policy 
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- The latest Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey queried whether 
respondents were guided by or followed any I. T. security standards, with only 
47% responding positively. 
- According to the DTI survey, the overall number of UK businesses that have a 
fon-nally documented and defined information security policy is 40% which, 
when considering that the same number for large businesses is 73%, indicates that 
the vast majority of small and medium organisations do not take any action on 
this important issue. 
- Numbers are equally low in the DTI survey when asking organisations about the 
methods they use to make staff aware of their I. S. responsibilities (introducing 
therefore even more risks such as social engineering, material for 'dumpster 
diving' and more (Granger 2001)). Apparently, one in eight organisations does 
nothing to educate their staff about their security responsibilities (e. g. only 38% 
use a staff handbook for this purpose). 
However, as stated by Spinnelis et al (1999): 'One cannot reasonably develop security 
policies andprocedures without clearly understanding the systems that must be protected 
and how valuable they are to the enterprise'. This indicates that thorough security cannot 
be achieved by simply purchasing and implementing random controls and that a 
structured analysis of the system in need of protection is first required which will derive 
the essential controls. 
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Even when looking at the selected controls one can tell that there is something wrong in 
the way organisations plan their security. The DTI survey indicates that, in 2006 alone, 
59% of the respondents have introduced wireless networks within their I. T. enviro=ent. 
Even though security is identified as the biggest liability of wireless networks (Briere 
2003), one in five of these remain completely unprotected (it is again SMEs that 
significantly reduce the percentages, since 86% of large organizations stated they use 
encryption). CSITBI indicates that only 32% of organizations use 'specialised wireless 
security tools'. The same survey has found antivirus (97%) and firewalls (98%) are by far 
the most commonly used security technologies (and most other surveys agree to that). 
However when looking at the threats mentioned earlier, as those that have caused the 
biggest losses last year, they are exactly those that correspond to these controls (i. e. virus 
is the biggest and unauthorised access to information comes second). 
2.4.2 Problem is focused on SMEs 
One other thing that can be observed from all of these survey results is that the problem is 
concentrated among SMEs. According to the DTI survey findings, the total cost of 
security incidents in the overall sample (which mainly consists of SMEs) has increased in 
2006 by as much as 50%. At the same time the survey reports that in large businesses the 
same figure has dropped by 50%. The same applies for the average cost per incident, 
which for the overall sample has risen by 20% since 2004. By contrast this has dropped 
10% for large businesses, as illustrated in Table 2. Contrasting these figures it is clear 
that the I. S. problem is largely concentrated in SMEs. 
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Overall Large Businesses 
Average number of incidents +50% -30% 
Average cost per incident +20% -10% 
Total Cost of incidents +50% -50% 
Table 2: How the overall cost of security incidents to UK plc has changed since 2004 
To complement the previous reference to survey data on the poor approach of SMEs 
towards security, the Symantec, Threat Report VIII indicates that when talking about 
attack activity by industry (successful attacks), small businesses come first with 38%, 
while as far as 'targeted attacks by industry' is concerned, small business comes second 
behind education. The same survey states that 'Small businesses are less likely to have a 
well established security infrastructure, making them more vulnerable to attacks' while 
at the same time small business personnel is known have an "It would not happen to me'" 
mentality (Diamond 2004). This is why this research is going to concentrate on SMEs. 
SMEs are reported as successful attack targets the most, they have significant losses due 
to information security breaches (BBC 2004), the average reported loss from each 
incident according to DTI was f 8,000 to f 17,000 (with the percentage of large businesses 
that responded being 0.7% this amount mainly reflects SMEs), while due to their size 
SMEs are probably the ones that are harder to 'bounce-back' after a successful attack, 
and also they are the ones with the poorest approach towards infonnation security 
according to all surveys. Finally, large organisations are more likely to have response 
plans and personnel that is particularly responsible for security making the recovery from 
a security incident faster and less costly. Therefore we are going to investigate whether 
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SMEs do have a poor security infrastructure and then investigate the reasons behind that 
and suggest a new solution that fits their needs. 
2.4.3 Existing Solutions 
Since the problem is identified to originate from the lack or incorrect planning of 
security, there are certain methods an organisation can use to create a well-thought plan 
and approach security in a structured manner. These will be described in the following 
parts of this chapter. What will be discussed first however is the most widely recognised 
option that organisations have and that is performing a Risk Assessment. 
According to the International Standard Code of Practice for Infonnation Security 
management (ISO 17799 2005), the first source for an organisation to identify its security 
requirements is derived from 'assessing risks to the organization. Through risk 
assessment threats to assets are identified, vulnerability to and likelihood of occurrence 
is evaluated andpotential impact is estimated' 
It is widely recognised. that "institutions should have a sound information security 
program that identifies, measures, monitors, and manages potential risk exposure. 
Fundamental to an effective information security program is ongoing risk assessment of 
threats and vulnerabilities surrounding networked andlor Internet systems. " (FDIC 
1999). The process of Risk Assessment is strongly suggested by almost all government 
organisations, guidelines and standards as the first step for an organisation towards 
achieving thorough information security. In the US, "The Office of Managenient and 
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Budget (OMB), as part of Circular A-130, Appendix III, "Security of Federal Automated 
Information Resources, " requires federal agencies to consider risk when deciding what 
security controls to implement. It states that a risk-based approach is required to 
determine adequate security, and it encourages agencies to consider major riskjactors, 
such as the value of the system or application, threats, vulnerabilities, and the 
effectiveness of current or proposed safeguards. " (GAO 1999), Furthennore, in 
Australia, "The government security policy requires departments to manage security 
risks" (C. S. E. 1996). 
The next section describes what risk assessment involves and how it can be approached. 
However, it will also demonstrate organisations have a poor approach to all the issues 
related to risk assessment. 
2.5 Information Security Risk Assessment 
A key step in establishing appropriate security for a system is to properly assess the risks 
to which it is exposed. Without having done this, an organisation cannot be sure to have 
an appropriate appreciation of the threats and vulnerabilities facing its assets (Noakes 
2003). As such, questions could be raised over the suitability and sufficiency of security 
counten-neasures that they may have introduced (e. g. are they actually providing the 
protection that the organization requires, and to an adequate level? ). A way to accomplish 
this is by conducting a Risk Assessment. By definition, 'Risk assessment is systematic 
consideration of. - a) The business harm likely to resultfrom a security failure, taking into 
account the potential consequences of a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of 
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the information and other assets; b) The realistic likelihood ofsuch afailure occurring in 
the light of prevailing threats and vulnerabilities, and the controls currently 
implemented ' (ISO 17799 2005). The process of Risk assessment can be split into two 
distinct processes, as described bellow: 
2.5.1 Risk Analysis 
The process of Risk Analysis is defined as "the assessment of threats to, impacts on and 
vulnerabilities of infonnation and infonnation processing facilities and the likelihood of 
their occurrence" (ISO 17799 2005), and involves steps such as the identification of assets 
that need to be protected and the identification of threats and vulnerabilities related to 
those assets (Network Working Group 1997). The process includes gathering information 
about the assets of the organization, including all company assets such as networks, data 
centres, computers, hardware, software, data/information; as well as human resources 
assets, such as the personnel who work for the organisation, the network users, and 
finally the physical assets like the physical facility and other physical organisational 
resources (HKCERT 2005). In addition, the risk assessment process includes finding 
sources for comprehensive threat data, which may be gathered from internal sources such 
as incident report data, intrusion detection software and/or threat data such as crime 
statistics, industry standards and benchmarking data, and historical data about what has 
happened in the organization previously. 
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2.5.2 Risk management 
After the completion of risk analysis comes the process of risk management, which 
involves the identification, selection and implementation of countermeasures that are 
designed to reduce the identified levels of risk to acceptable levels, this way controlling, 
minimizing and potentially eliminating the acknowledged security risks, at an acceptable 
cost (ISO 17799 2005). Risk management is therefore very much a matter of compromise 
between what is desirable, what is workable, and what is affordable. It involves both 
technical skill, a good knowledge of the business and its work-force, and good judgement 
(Intosai 1997). 
2.5.3 How risk assessment works 
Figure 4 summarizes the five main elements that need to be taken into account when 
performing Risk Assessment (Hamilton 2003; Pfleeger 2006). This section attempts to 
clarify what each of these involves. 
Risk 
Management 
Figure 4: The Risk Assessment process 
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1. Identify assets. An asset is anything that is of value to an orgamsation. Thus it can 
be anything from physical assets to infonnation assets, even specialised personnel 
can sometimes be considered as assets to the organisation. In this section a risk 
assessment methodology might require the user's input to rate the importance of 
the assets. 
2. Identify and characterise threats. Generally speaking, threats are events that 
could occur and cause loss or damage to the assets that have been identified. Thus 
they should be completely eliminated, or the likelihood of their occurrence needs 
to be reduced, or finally their impact should be mitigated as even the most rigid 
security controls cannot eliminate every threat. Impact of threats to the 
organisation can be based on the importance of the assets that might be 
compromised because of the threat. 
3. Identify vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that would create a 
condition allowing the threat to materialise and trigger a loss of assets. This stage 
of the Risk Assessment attempts to determine how vulnerable the systems are to 
the identified threats. 
4. Analyze the risks for a certain asset-threat-vulnerability scenario to occur and 
cletennine the potential losses that would emerge if it does. Loss categories 
include direct loss, disclosure losses, loss of data integrity, losses due to data 
modification, losses due to delays and denials of service and more. 
25 
5. Identify and select countermeasures to reduce risks. Countermeasures are 
security controls which, when put in place, can eliminate, reduce or mitigate the 
impact of a threat occurrence. 
The points just described are the five traditional steps when performIng a risk assessment. 
To complete the process, organisations also need to: 
6 Document the outputs of the assessment in order to create an organisational security 
policy. 
7 Using information from an information system activity review, track results of 
controls, monitor changes in the environment, information systems, and security 
technology, update the risk analysis and implement any further controls that are 
identified as missing (Amatayakul 2003). 
2.5.4 Collecting the Data 
Based on the process just described, whatever the approach taken to risk management, 
there is always the common initial need for the person or team conducting the risk 
assessment to collect system-related information. Some examples of what this 
information may be are displayed in Table 3, listing an illustrative selection of assets as 
identified in N. I. S. T. SP-800-30 (Stonebumer et al 2002) and ISO 17799 (ISO17799 
2005). 
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Asset Type Examples/Description 
Computer equipment Processors, monitors, laptops, modems 
Software Assets Application software, system software, development 
tools and utilities 
System interfaces Internal and external connectivity 
Data and information Assets Databases and data files, system documentation, user 
manuals, training material, operational or support 
procedures, archived information; 
Personnel who support and use Can be employees or off-site contractors that require 
the I. T. system low-level access to the systems like security guards 
System mission The processes performed by the I. T. system 
System and data criticality The system's value or importance to an organization 
Users of the system Can either be system users who provide technical 
support to the I. T. system or application users who use 
the I. T. system to perform business functions 
System security policies Organizational policies, federal requirements, laws, 
governing the I. T. system industry practices 
Current network topology Network diagram 
Flow of information pertaining System interfaces, system input and output flowchart 
to the I. T. system 
Technical controls used for the Security product that supports identification and 
I. T. system authentication, discretionary or mandatory access 
control, audit, residual information protection, 
encryption methods 
Operational controls used for Personnel security, backup, contingency 
the I. T. system 
Physical security environment Facility security, data center policies 
of the I. T. system 
Environmental security Controls for humidity, water, power, pollution, 
implemented for the I. T. temperature, and chemicals 
system processing 
environment 
Table 3: Examples of assets identified when performing a RA 
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Successfully collecting this data is one of the most important elements of Risk Analysis 
and a person that is not specialised in practising RA could easily overlook many of these 
elements or fail to identify their importance to the organisations operation. RA is a 
process intended to be performed by security analysts who have complete understanding 
of the I. T. system's operation and objectives (Gray 2005), thus being performed by an 
inexperienced user may lead to an inaccurate analysis of the organisations assets. This is 
also the reason why RA usually involves the input of not just one but several key 
personnel in different positions and with different knowledge of the organisation. There 
are several methods to perform the information gathering, but the most common as listed 
by the N. I. S. T. Risk Management Guide for I. T. Systems (Stonebumer et al 2002) is 
using a combination of the following: 
* The use of questionnaires. This process requires applicable technical and 
management personnel to fill questionnaires created by the people performing the 
assessment and which mainly concerns the design and management of the I. T. 
system under assessment. 
* Performing on-site interviews. Such interviews of I. T. and management 
personnel, conducted by the people perfonning the RA, should be performed to 
allow the RA team to gather information about how the I. T. system is operated. 
During these interviews the RA people can also make observations on the 
physical security environment related with the I. T. system. 
9 Conducting a document review. By reviewing all the security and policy related 
documents that exist within the organisation, the RA people can gather 
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information regarding system and data criticality and sensitivity as well as the 
security controls planned and used within the organisations I. T. infrastructure. 
* Use of an Automated Scanning Tool. VVItile no automated tool exists that can 
perfonn the RA without the need of human input, the people performing the RA 
can use automated tools like network mapping tools to obtain the related 
information more rapidly. 
As one can infer from this list, not only is some certain expertise on the area of RA 
required but also a considerable amount of time in order to perform these operations. 
2.5.5 Approaches to Risk Assessment 
After the asset data has been collected, there is the need to measure their value, the 
likelihood of a risk occurring and other key elements. There are essentially two major 
approaches used to achieve this in modem risk analysis, the qualitative and the 
quantitative analysis. However certain papers mention a third approach, the ranking 
method. The quantitative and the qualitative approach that are best described by Wallhoff 
(2002), Intosai (1997), (Lawlor 2003) and Arnatayakul (2003) with the latter also 
covering, the ranking approach. 
2.5.5.1 The Qualitative Approach 
This type of approach can be described as a walk-through different scenarios of risk 
possibilities followed by the rating of significance of the threats and the sensitivity of the 
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assets. This approach uses words or descriptive scales (e. g. low, medium, high) to 
describe the magnitude of potential consequences and the likelihood of these 
consequences occurring (Lawlor 2003). Qualitative methods are based upon scoring 
questionnaires that have been designed to assess the likely levels of a range of threats and 
their associated vulnerabilities. When perfonning this type of risk analysis, the common 
procedure is as follows (Wallhoff 2002): 
*a team that performs the RA is required to write a scenario that addresses each 
major threat; 
9 these scenarios are then reviewed by business unit managers, whose responsibility 
is to weigh up how realistic they are; 
the team that performs the RA recommends and evaluates the various 
countermeasures that correspond to each threat; 
the team that performs the RA works through each finalized scenario using a 
threat, asset and countermeasure; 
* Finally the team prepares their resulting report and submits it to the management. 
In common with any questionnaire-driven approach, the relevance of some of the 
questions will vary according to circumstances, while the questionnaire itself may not be 
sufficiently comprehensive or relevant in unusual situations. This means that the reviewer 
may need to adjust the questionnaire's standards markings, and this could introduce a risk 
of distortion in the method (Intosai 1997). 
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2.5.5.2 The Quantitative Approach 
This approach attempts to assign actual numbers to the amount of damage that can take 
place as well as the cost of countermeasures and when detennining the likelihood of 
threats and risks it usually provides probability percentages (Lawlor 2003). Purely 
quantitative risk analysis is sometimes characterised as not possible as the method is 
attempting to quantify qualitative items (Wallhoff 2002). 
A quantitative risk analysis attempts to assign monetary values to the potential losses that 
might occur as a result of a threat exploiting a certain vulnerability (i. e. requires that 
information assets be valued by some sort of common standard). There are typically three 
elements that determine the value of an infon-nation asset: 
* Initial and ongoing cost of purchasing, licensing, developing, and supporting the 
information asset; 
0 Value of the information asset to the organization's operations, research, and 
business model viability; 
9 The value of the asset is established together with additional elements like the 
estimated value of intellectual property, such as trade secrets, patents, or 
copyrights (Amatayak-ul 2003). 
Quantitative methods aim to balance the costs of implementing security against the 
possible cost of failing to implement it (which is a similar element to a Return on 
Investment metric, which will be discussed in Chapter 5). A problem with this approach 
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is that, to be effective, a comprehensive history of security incidents and their related 
impacts is required, but measuring impacts in financial terms may not necessarily always 
be realistic (Intosai 1997). If this does not exist, the calculations have to be based on the 
experience of similar organisations, but this may not always be representative or even 
available. 
2.5.5.3 The Ranking Approach 
The ranking approach may be more encouraging to budgeting than, for example, a 
qualitative approach alone. In a ranking approach, each vulnerability/threat pair can be 
rated as high-medium-low on a probability scale and a criticality scale. Together the 
ratings combine scores that can be used to prioritise the risks and therefore identify where 
the organisation's security needs to concentrate (Amatayakul 2003). 
Figure 5 summarises the main points of each of the three available approaches that an 
organisation can make on risk assessment. 
Approaches to Risk Assessment 
Qualitative Quantitative Ranking 
- Significance of Threats - 
Assign Numbers to Losses - Vulnerability - Threat Pairs 
- Sensitivity of Assets - 
Requires Assets to be Valued Rated 
- Scoring Questionnaires - 
Reauires History of Security - Probability, Criticality Scale 
I Incidents II- 
Priontise the Risks 
Figure 5: Approaches to Risk Assessment 
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2.5.6 Do Organisa tions perform RA ? 
Having identified the importance of performing a RA, looking at survey data we realise 
that many organisations do not perform it. 
The DTI has queried respondents about whether they perform risk assessments, the report 
comments that: "Many UK businesses are a long way ftom having a security-aware 
culture. Security expenditure is either low or not targeted at key risks. To justify 
expenditure and spend effectively, businesses need to carry out security risk assessments. 
However, only 44% of companies have done this in the last year. " It should be noted that 
this is 44% of the overall respondents. Thus, if this figure follows the trend of the other 
results previously examined then SMEs should fall well behind from this number. The 
author's SME security survey has specifically investigated whether SMEs perform RA, 
the results, illustrated in Figure 6, show that the larger proportion (60% of organisations 
asked) do not. 
Figure 6: Do SMEs perform RA? 
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2.5.7 The characteristics of a typical RA too/ 
The common way to perform a RA is by the use of one of the commercially available 
specialised RA tools. The principle of how the RA is approached is usually the same as 
what has been described in section 2.5.5, however where they mainly differ is in the way 
the tools gather the information. This section will give some details on RA tools, focusing 
on the most widely recognised of all, CRAMM. CRAMM is a qualitative risk analysis 
and management tool that was initially developed in the United Kingdom by the Central 
Computer and Telecommunication Agency (CCTA) and is nowadays developed by 
Insight Consultancy owned by Siemens (CRAMM 2006). The most recent version is 
CRAMM 5.1. 
The reason why CRAMM is going to be discussed as an illustrative example of RA tools 
here is because CRAMM is a software RA tool which has been extensively used since 
1987, and is considered an effective and reliable method. CRAMM can also be regarded 
as a benchmark for RA to organizations because of the input of a number of government 
and private sector security experts to the tool (Yazar 2002). It is the mandatory security 
analysis method for UK governmental organisations (Spinnelis et al 1999), and is also 
used by large organisations that are in need of effective security such as IBM, Royal Air 
Force and the Swiss Bank Corporation (www. cramm. com). Perfonning RA with such a 
recognised tool is quite a lengthy process (full-reviews can sometimes take days or 
months according to the size and the geographic spread of the organisation (GSSL 1997)) 
which involves having to fill lengthy questionnaires, interview a number of users of the 
system and, for the person who performs the assessment, have specialist training in the 
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field. To use CRAMM one should undertake a training course which would cost f 1200 in 
addition to the fee of purchasing the actual tool, which when quoted was approximately 
f 1500 (www. cramm. com). 
This is not only the case with CRAMM but with most of the RA tools on the market. 
Risk analysis is a very complex discipline that should be left to professional risk analysts. 
Few organisations can afford to have a dedicated, full-time risk analyst on their staff. A 
good risk analyst must have experience in many disciplines, for example information 
security, network architectures, hardware, software, and business strategies (Labuschagne 
1999). 
So even though such a tool offers a structured approach to risk assessment and a detailed 
countermeasures list, there are three major setbacks related with its use. (GSSL 1997, 
SANS 2002, Labuschagne 1999): 
- The process is very lengthy and might take up to months; 
- There is particular expertise and specialist training required by the person 
perfonning the analysis; 
- The tool produces too much hard copy output; 
The high cost of such a solution; 
CRAMM is further analysed in Chapter 4 where the existing solutions are discussed. 
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2.5.8 Other Solutions 
Besides RA, the literature review identified certain other solutions that are often 
suggested for SMEs wishing to plan their security. 
2.5.8.1 Baseline guidelines 
According to IS017799, after Risk Assessment, the second and the third sources for 
organisations to identify their security requirements are respectively 'the legal, statutory, 
regulatory and contractual requirements that an organisation, its trading partners, 
contractors and service providers have to satisfy' and 'the particular set of principles, 
objectives and requirements for information processing that an organisation has 
developed to support its operations'most commonly referred to as baseline guidelines. 
Guidelines essentially "Provide hest practice recommendations on information security 
management for use by those who are responsible for initiating, implementing or 
maintaining information security management systems " (ISO 2006) and provide an 
alternative solution that can be followed in order to achieve security at a baseline level, 
but not as complete as the one accomplished after performing a risks assessment. A 
classic example of such documented security guidelines is IS017799 itself, the 
International Standard Code of Practice for Infon-nation Security Management 
(IS027001 2005). Unfortunately, only a small proportion of businesses are aware of the 
contents of such standards. As the DTI survey points out, only 38% of large organisations 
are aware of the contents of the standard, medium and small organisations once again fall 
significantly behind with 24% and 10% respectively. 
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Figure 7: Awareness of the ISO 17799 Standard 
As Figure 7 illustrates, there has actually been a fall in the number of organisations that 
adopt the standard compared to previous years (apart from medium enterprises where 
there has been a slight increase from the 2004 version of the survey, still lower than 2002, 
but nonetheless the numbers in all three categories are significantly low). Similar figures 
come from a survey performed by Ernst & Young (2005), which recognises that 
standards can provide a much needed framework for deploying effective I. S. practices, 
bringing out better alignment between I. S. and organisational objectives. However, 
according to this report, only 34% of large organisations and 18% of smaller have 
adopted the standard, while at the same time, looking at other similar guidelines, only 
12% have become certified by the I. S. forum, 18% by CobIT, 23% by ITIL and 34% 
have adopted other standards. The statistics from this survey shown in Figure 8 are 
disappointing when looking at the percentages of organisations that have not adopted 
such a standard/certification. 
37 
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Figure 8: Organisations are not adopting I. S. stand ards/ce rtifi cations 
2.5.8.2 Outsourcing - thirdparty security 
Another alternative suggestion is for SMEs to implement third-party managed security 
services (Paraskevas and Buhalis 2002; Spinellis et al. 1999). This involves providing 
outside expertise and specialised support to organisations that do not employ security 
specialists. However as Figure 9 (including data from the DTI 2006 survey) illustrates, 
such solutions have not been significantly adopted either, even though they have more 
than doubled from the 2004 version of the survey. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have established that although Risk Assessment is necessary, many 
organisations do not employ it. The required steps to be taken now in this research are: 
- Identify the I. T. characteristics of SMEs. By doing so we can understand who has 
the problem, whom we are developing a solution for, and how the solution should 
be structured in order to cover their requirements. 
- Use surveys and RA tool evaluation to determine what elements of RA and 
guidelines makes them unsuitable for SMEs, and also devise the requirements for 
a new tool that covers the needs of SMEs (i. e. what specific elements it needs to 
have). 
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Figure 9: Adoption of external guidance 
RA is the number one practice when making a security strategy, but because of the 
characteristics of the SMEs described we need a mixture of the three solutions for an 
SME, a RA tool which can give assistance like guidelines but does not require a 
security expert to run or implement the selected controls, and which SME's budget 
can afford. 
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I Security Requirements of SMEs 
Based on survey findings, this chapter analyses the reasons why the existing solutions 
and particularly RA are not being implemented by SMEs. Having established that SMEs 
do not use RA, this section identifies those characteristics of SMEs that prevent its 
adoption. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we established the importance of approaching I. T. security in a 
planned and structured way, such as by consulting guidelines or perfortning a risk 
assessment, before acquiring and implementing any controls. What was also identified is 
that, even though a number of solutions exist, the large ma*onty of organisations do not 3 
perform any of the operations that are recommended in order to achieve this approach to 
security, leading to large losses due to I. S. incidents. SMEs are the ones mainly facing 
both the security incidents and the non-adoption of the solutions. The purpose of this 
chapter is to investigate what the I. T. security characteristics of SMEs are, based on 
survey data. By identifying the characteristics of SME I. S. environments, the 
requirements of these organisations from an RA methodology can be established, leading 
this way to the investigation into the non-adoption of the existing RA solutions in the 
following chapter. More specifically, findings from the third-party surveys described in 
Chapter 2 will be used to identify the problem. Then the SME security survey conducted 
by the user will look to confirm these problems exist within SMEs and investigate their 
details. Having established the requirements of SMEs based on how the survey results are 
interpreted, this investigation will proceed to the identification and discussion of those 
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requirements that SMEs declare themselves they are in need of Identifying the 
requirements of SMEs is the first step in identifying characteristics upon which existing 
solutions can be evaluated (in order to prove that it is these characteristics that existing 
solutions lack) and can also set the basis for the development of a novel methodology 
which shall cover these requirements. 
3.2 Information Security Characteristics of SMEs 
By looking at survey data on I. S. issues in the industry, certain aspects of SMEs can be 
identified that make the use of RA, as well as the other solutions, inappropriate for these 
organisations and deter the use of such methods. 
3.2.1 Low budget for security 
To corninence this analysis, what is potentially the most prohibiting characteristic of 
SMEs will be discussed. All the SME problems start from here as all the other problems 
discussed later in this section are somewhat related to not having enough I. S. funding. 
Lack of infon-nation security funding not only affects the ability of an SME to purchase a 
RA tool, but also to train or hire someone to use it and even purchasing the appropriate 
controls for a nsk that has been identified. 
However, purchasing an RA tool alone only helps organisations plan their security. There 
is still the cost of acquiring the controls and SMEs devote a very low budget to do so. 
According to the findings of the ACCSS survey in Australia, 43% of the organisations 
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spend up to 5% of their I. T. budget on security and another 23% invest up to 10% of their 
budget for the same purpose while amazingly there are 4% that stated they do not spend 
any money on I. T. security (that is 16 organisations out of the 389 questioned that do not 
have any security at all). This leaves only a minor 30% that spend a somewhat significant 
proportion of their budget on I. T. security. According to data from the DTI survey 
(Figure 10), 'The average UK company now spends 4-5% of its LT budget on 
information security. Roughly two-fifths of businesses spend less than I% of their LT 
budget on information security' (DTI 2006). According to figures from the same report, 
out of the overall number of respondents (which are mainly SMEs), only 10% of the 
respondents spend more than 10% on security (Figure 10). It is somewhat surprising that 
a considerable 14% of the respondents have stated they do not invest any money on 
security while, another 26% invest less than 1% of their overall I. T. budget. 
Figure 10: SMEs under-invest on security (source: DTI 2006) 
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A survey by Deloitte (2005) across a wider geographical sample, has found that the 
figures are similar throughout the world. Even though it does not address SMEs in 
particular, the figures are similar to the ones from the previous two surveys mentioned 
and therefore it cannot be very far off for the rest of the world. It is worth mentioning that 
the one that copes better here is USA with approximately 31% of organisations spending 
more than 10% of their I. T. budget while for the rest of the world the percentage of 
organisations that spend more than 10% are 23% for Europe, Middle-east and Africa, 
12% for Canada, I I% for Asia Pacific (which includes Australia, Japan and China), and 
approximately 3% for Latin America and Caribbean, 
Finally, an interesting statistic is provided by Department of Trade and Industry survey 
which indicates that 'Only 44% of companies have carried oul any security risk I 
assessment in the last year. Those that assess the risks tend to spend more on security, 
suggesting the others are under-investing. ' 
Therefore a requirement of an SME from an RA methodology is to inform organisations 
of the benefits of spending for security, be comprehensive to the management that 
decides what is spent, at the same time provide cost effective controls to take full 
advantage of the available budget, and finally be at a low cost itself (which of course is 
irrelevant as far as this PhD research prototype is concerned, but says something when 
evaluating existing solutions later on in chapter 4) 
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3.2.2 Lack of expertise 
Another key characteristic of SMEs from an I. T. perspective is that within these size 
organisations there rarely exists a full time security expert. Not having a person that is 
suitably qualified on the field and specialises in practicing I. T. security leaves great gaps 
in terms of planning and implementing security, and responding to incidents. As the DTI 
survey reports, "There is still a shortage of security qualified staff; only one in eight 
companies has any" (DTI 2006). Availability of qualified I. S. staff was one of the issues 
that considered by the SME security survey 
More specifically, the DTI survey has also asked the question about whether the person 
responsible for security has formal I. T. security qualifications, from the whole range of 
respondents, only 2% said both the person responsible as well as others have 
qualifications, 3% stated that the person responsible has qualification and 7% responded 
that others in the team are fon-nally qualified. This leaves 88% of the respondents with 
someone responsible for security who has no qualifications. Judging by these responses, 
an image is starting to build that I. T. security within SMEs is a task left to an employee 
who may either have some knowledge on the issue or even have more spare time than the 
rest of the staff, they do not however have any formal qualifications on the area which 
raises serious questions. 
Therefore, as another requirement of SMEs, a methodology which aims to be used by this 
person and provide useful results will need to be easy to use and comprehensive enough 
to allow anyone within the organisation with some knowledge of the business or the I. T. 
functions to use it without however getting into very technical details as this person might 
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well be a manager with no technical knowledge. The results produced by the tool should 
also be comprehensive enough for the same purpose and, considering there is no I. T. 
secunty expert within the organisation, it should provide guidance on how to deploy the 
recommended countermeasures. 
3.2.3 Poor selection of controls 
What comes naturally after establishing that the majority of SMEs have a quite low 
dedicated security budget and very few have security staff employed, is wondering about 
the appropriateness of the controls they are implementing. Guiding an organisation 
towards selecting 'successful' and appropriate controls is one of the main purposes of a 
Risk Assessment tool. 
Furthermore, purchasing and installing antivirus and a firewall (or any other control - 
these are simply mentioned because most organisations seem to have them) is not 
enough, correct configuration is also an issue (Chong 2003). The firewall needs to be 
configured to determine program and employee access privileges, and the antivirus needs 
to be configured to update and scan regularly. Having established that within SMEs I. T. 
security is not being handled by specially trained personnel it is logical to argue that 
correct configuration is not being performed. This can also be assumed for most of the 
controls and once again this is proved by the amount of incidents reported. 
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Data from the DTI survey supports the discussion about SMEs choosing controls poorly 
and, more importantly, implementing them incorrectly. More specifically, among the key 
findings of the DTI ISBS 2006 on this issue: 
9A quarter of LTK businesses are not protected against spyware. 
* UK companies are poorly placed to deal with identity theft; only I% have a 
comprehensive approach for identity management (authentication, access control 
and user provisioning). 84% say there is no business requirement to improve this. 
* Three-fifths of companies that allow remote access do not encrypt their 
transmissions; businesses that allow remote access are more likely to have their 
networks penetrated. 
* Three-fifths of companies do not block staff access to inappropriate web-sites and 
only one in six scans outgoing e-mail for inappropriate content. 
0 30% of transactional web-sites do not encrypt the transactions that pass over the 
Intemet. 
* One mi five wireless networks is completely unprotected, while a further one in 
five is not encrypted. Two-fifths of companies that allow staff to connect via 
public wireless hotspots do not encrypt the transmissions. 
* 55% of firms have taken no steps to protect themselves against the threat posed by 
removable media devices (e. g. USB tokens). 
9 Two-fifths of companies that allow instant messaging have no controls in place 
over its use. 
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9 Only half of the companies that have implemented Voice over EP telephony 
evaluated the security risks before doing so. 
These are only some of the findings on the issue but they are sufficient to confirm that 
there is a clear need for providing explanations on what the controls are, how they can be 
implemented correctly, how they correspond to threats, and what savings they can help 
achieve, so the user can select the appropriate ones even with no security expertise. They 
should also provide feedback to ensure any neglecting of appropriate (based on statistical 
data and not a precise figure) controls that the users select can be corrected as soon as 
threats start occurring. 
3.2.4 Awareness 
Even if controls were selected carefully, organisations fail to follow a holistic approach to 
security which will combine technology with awareness (Munley 2004). Ignorance of 
even the basics of security is a very big threat itself (Sustaita 2001), so it is even worst if 
this lack of awareness on security issues is encountered on an organisations management. 
This lack of managerial awareness on I. T. security issues is seen in the CIO survey where 
executives of organisations that have reported they have been attacked were asked to 
identify how they were attacked, where from and by whom. As Figure II illustrates, a 
quarter of the respondents, was not aware of any of the details that caused losses and 
potentially damaged reputation and disruption of operations to the organisation. At the 
same time 47% of the executives that responded stated they were not aware of what 
damages were caused by the security incidents they had. These figures shown in this 
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survey mainly correspond to large organisations. As the trend of all the survey findings 
normally show, it would be expected SME executives to fare even worse in this area. 
In the findings of the survey published by DTT, respondents from the managerial level of 
organisations where asked their view of I. S. A massive 82% responded that it is 
4somewhat appreciated', while only 18% stated it is highly appreciated. This again 
illustrates the lack of managerial awareness on the importance of properly securing their 
I. T. infrastructure and what losses a security incident may cause their organisations. 
This lack of managerial awareness also justifies the lack of funding towards I. T. security, 
meaning that it is the management that funds these operations and it must therefore be 
inforined enough on the threats and possible losses to proceed to spending the appropriate 
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Figure 11: Executive's awareness of attack details (Berinato 2005) 
amount of funds towards purchasing and implementing controls. As the previous part 
found, SMEs spend 5% of their budget on securing (incompletely as survey data on 
annual losses indicates) critical infonnation assets that cost thousands. This illustrates 
they most likely do not build a formal business case to estimate Annual Loss Expectancy 
(ALE) because of risks and the Return on Investment (ROI) offered when spending on 
security controls to eliminate these risks. Therefore one of the primary purposes of an RA 
methodology aiming at SMEs should be to offer ROI considerations by quantifying what 
assets need protecting, what their cost is and how likely they will be subject to a threat, 
what this threat occurring may cost them (Hoo 2000) and contrast that to the cost of 
securing each asset with the appropriate number of controls (Cisco 2001). The absence of 
an accepted industry-wide measurement system that would enable managers to judge the 
importance and the effects of the threats (Robins 2001) (i. e. a well-understood economic 
model exists for evaluating the benefits of reducing the risks versus the investment in 
security technology and management) makes the output of RA's hard to be understood by 
the management. Therefore it would be preferable for the case of SMEs if this data was, 
at the end of the RA, presented to the management in the form of a comprehensive report 
that attempts to raise awareness by contrasting both the effect of controls to the threats 
the organisation faces together with the cost of the controls against a threat versus the 
cost of a breach because of that threat. This way the management would be aware on all 
three issues of the I. T. assets of the organisation, the threats the organisation faces and the 
benefits offered by the controls. 
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3.2.5 Disruption of operations 
By definition, SMEs have a relatively small number of employees, making it more likely 
that conducting RA would disrupt staff that may have other significant responsibilities to 
attend to. Consequently assigning a member of personnel with the task of performing a 
Risk Assessment would be likely to involve the time consuming tasks of identifying the 
assets, the details for these assets, rating their importance or value, selecting and 
implementing the controls. Such a task would require significant reading and background 
education on these subjects and even more if the person is performing the assessment 
using one of the automated tools available. A lot of these tools require background 
training for the person using it and normally involves needing the person to undergo 
seminars on how to use the tool as is the case discussed earlier with CRAMM. Moreover 
if the process of the RA involves needing several members of personnel within the 
organisation to undergo interviews or complete questionnaires, such a task would firstly 
cause more disruption and secondly could possibly span over a few days (if people are 
unavailable). This disruption becomes a more significant problem if the analysis points 
out deficiencies that need to be assessed (Federal Aviation Association 2001). 
3.3 The SME security survey 
Having established, through existing survey data, that there are certain setbacks 
associated with the security characteristics of SMEs which may be deterring the wide 
adoption of RA, a further survey was conducted by the author more specific into the issue 
of RA within SMEs. The aim was to confirm the assumptions discussed from the 
previous survey findings and investigate the I. T. and I. S. characteristics of SMEs) 
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examine the adoption of RA and reasons deterring it from being embraced by these type 
organisations. 
3.3.1 Methodology 
As introduced in Chapter 2, this survey was initially conducted in the US and 
subsequently in Europe. The reason for considering both geographical areas individually 
is because different security and data protection legislation apply in each continent as 
May (2004) and Burke (2003) describe for the US and Baker and McKenzie (2004) for 
the EU. The purpose was to investigate to what extent and how these influence 
organisations approaches to security. For the purposes of the survey, organisations with 
up to 250 employees were classed as SMEs mainly to allow for the results to be 
comparable with those in the DTI survey which also mainly assesses SMEs. Figure 12 
illustrates the exact distribution of sizes that responded in the survey. 
Figure 12: Size of the organisations that participated in the survey (US and Europe) 
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As Figure 13 Illustrates, the survey gathered responses from 40 organisations within 
Europe and 79 within the US. 
Figure 13: Where the responding organisations originated from 
In the US, the survey was conducted by San Diego University in early 2004 and was 
distributed by hand to personnel related to the Managerial, I. T. and security operation 
within organisations of various sizes. After a discussion with the creators of this survey in 
April 2004, it was decided to create a European version which would allow the sharing of 
results and establish attitudes towards security in both continents. The European survey 
was conducted subsequent to the US version (took place between the period of II 
th of 
June until the 15 th of August 2004) as an email-based survey. The questionnaire was 
distributed to 500 SMEs and overall 119 responded. Initially, a number of trial 
questionnaires were sent out in order to identify potential problems regarding the 
structure and expression of the questions. The responses resulted in the correction of a 
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few minor points. The next stage was the distribution of the corrected questionnaire to 
selected companies. It was sent out as an email attachment in the form of a Microsoft 
Word document (as shown in Appendix B) accompanied with a cover letter stating the 
purpose of the survey. 
In contrast to the criteria upon which organisations were selected by in the US version 
(primarily distributed by hand to local SME personnel), the SMEs that participated in the 
European version of the SME security survey are selected primarily from related 
directories on the Internet such as www. smedirectory. net and www. ukontheweb. net. 
Certain criteria were considered in order to filter the potential candidates: 
* Their relative dependence on the IT infrastructure (i. e. assuming that 
organisations under categories such as "Builders" are not that dependant on their 
I. T. ). 
* Their size does not exceed 250 employees to be according to the SME definition 
given earlier in this thesis. 
* Avoiding industries that are large by nature such as those belonging to the 
govemment sector. 
Figure 14 illustrates the spread of the industry sectors the respondents of the SME 
security survey (in both continents) originated from. 
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Figure 14: Industry sector the respondents originated from 
The European version was created based on the US questionnaire but with the addition of 
certain questions on issues this research was specifically interested in addressing. More 
specifically, the US version of the survey included three main sections: 
)ý, The first section profiled the respondent as well as the organisation in order to 
provide statistical data on the sectors, sizes etc that were investigated. 
)ý, The second section concer-ned secunty management issues such as security 
planning, policies and employee training. The aim was to establish nifon-nation on 
what the current security education and awareness levels within SMEs. 
ýý Finally the third part focused on the actual security practices orgamsations have in 
place so as to determine whether organisations that do not generally analyse and 
manage their risks (survey data in Chapter 2 already established RA is not being 
used by SMEs) manage to deploy efficient countenneasures. 
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In the European version, the same three sections were investigated so as to provide 
comparable results. However, a further section was included which investigated: 
V 
. o, Issues related with Risk Analysis such as its adoption, organisations view of RA, 
investment in RA and reasons that may deter it. This additional investigation aims 
to provide with further insight into what organisations wish from an RA solution 
therefore lead to the design of a novel methodology (after establishing in the 
following chapters whether or not existing tools fulfil these requirements). 
3.3.2 Survey Findings 
The findings of the SME security survey confinn the issues identified in section 3.2 about 
the characteristics of SMEs. The following sections will describe these findings on the 
same issues. 
3.3.2.1 Lack ofFunding 
As Figure 15 illustrates, the SME security survey queried the respondents to what extend 
they would be willing to invest on purchasing an RA tool if they were convinced it would 
solve all their problems. The majority responded that they are not willing to spend more 
than flOOO, with a considerable percentage declaring they would not even spend more 
than f 100. Just to illustrate, CRAMM would cost an organisation approximately f 1500 
plus another f 1200 for training alone each person who will be using the tool. 
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Figure 15: What are organisations willing to spend for an RA tool 
3.3.2.2 Lack ofExpertise 
What raised questions between the designers of the survey was that the American version 
of the survey found that, as illustrated in Figure 16, quite a lot of organisations stated they 
do have a person who is responsible for security. Of course, more than half the 
organisations having an I. S. specialist is still not a re-assuring figure but it still seems 
higher than what one would expect judging by the amount of incidents and the losses 
reported. 
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Figure 16: Is there a person responsible for I. T. security? (USA) 
Therefore, in the European version of the survey, the same question also queried the 
respondents who the person responsible for security actually is. The responses, which can 
be seen in Figure 17, illustrate that SMEs just do not employee dedicated I. T. security 
officers. Half the organisations responded that it is the I. T. admimstrator that handles 
security and the remaining indicated either a manager, or a director or the owner (all 
possibly with no training on I. T., but with access to funds however) has responsibility. It 
is worth noting that, probably as expected, none of the organisations that employee less 
than 20 employees had a security officer. 
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Figure 17: Who is responsible for security (Europe) 
To look further into this issue, the European version of the survey asked whether the 
person responsible for I. T. security had any I. T. security qualifications. The response, as 
Figure 18 illustrates, was a staggering 75% out of the total number of respondents that 
said 'No'. 
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Figure IS: Formal qualifications of the person responsible 
This leads into two conclusions as far as the characteristics of SMEs is concerned. Firstly 
half of the organisations do not employee anyone responsible for security and secondly 
from the other half that do, three quarters do not have any qualifications. Even though our 
test sample was relatively small, data from other surveys comes to confirm our findings 
3.3.2.3 Poor selection of controls 
The survey looked into SMEs selections of controls both in the US as well as in Europe. 
An investigation into these selections reveals their quality. Figure 19 and Figure 20 
indicate that, despite the different legislation and requirements, respondents in both 
continents have a similar attitude towards I. T. security, and although there are some 
noticeable differences in some aspects (e. g. organisations in Europe appear to be better at 
applying operating system patches, while those in the US are better with implementing 
password policies), the general picture suggests some significant areas of weakness in 
SME security. Even amongst the high-scoring categories (e. g. antivirus and firewalls), 
the results suggest that a fair proportion of organisations have not attended to these issues 
at all. 
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Figure 20: Security Countermeasures in the USA 
Besides antivirus and firewalls, the results of the survey illustrate that a very large 
percentage of SMEs do not take any precautions as far as physical security is concerned. 
Logical IDS systerns as well as logical access (i. e. passwords) also fare very badly with 
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approximately half the organisations not implementing any. Out of those organisations 
that reported they use wireless only a very low percentage (28% in the US and 44% in 
Europe) stated they have wireless security in place. All these leave the I. T. systems 
largely exposed, primarily to abuse by insiders and outsiders but to other threats as well. 
One of the most critical controls against accidental disruption of I. T. activities, UPS, is 
also being used by approximately half the organisations while the percentage of the 
organisations that have a well-thought and documented plan of recovering from a security 
incident is a lot less than half in both continents. Not having such a plan will only 
increase the man-hours required to respond to a security incident and therefore, in most 
cases, increase the financial burden. 
A key point is that these results are particular to the SME environment, and posing the 
same questions in larger organisations reveals substantially different findings. Indeed, in 
the US version of the study, where the questionnaire was also distributed to over 100 
organisations with 500+ employees, the 'yes' responses were an average of 21% higher 
across these ten categories (although in some cases, such as attention to wireless security, 
even the large organisations still faired badly, with only 34% responding positively). 
3.3.2.4 Lack of awareness 
Having established that SMEs do not select the appropnate controls, a question that is 
raised is whether the management is aware of these bad security practices or are the 
managers and owners sitting confident that security is adequate? The lack of security 
awareness within SMEs and their management is obvious when looking at the 
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contradicting statistics that were established from the SME security survey. More 
specifically, even though all the respondents stated they are somewhat or totally 
dependent on their I. T. infrastructure, as Figure 21 shows. 
Figure 21: Organisations dependence on I. T. (Europe) 
The previously discussed (both here as well as in Chapter 2) findings have established 
that: 
- The same SMEs do not employee any security experts 
They do not adopt standards and guidelines like IS017799, or have 
documented security policies 
They do not identify analyse and manage risks and vulnerabilities by 
perfonning an RA. 
- They have deployed insufficient security practices, proved 
both by their 
survey responses as well as from the surveys which illustrate rise of incidents 
and losses particularly SMEs. 
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However, the lack of awareness on I. S. issues is evident when the majority of the 
respondents (62.5%) state they are confident of their security as Figure 22 illustrates. 
Figure 22: Respondents confidence in existing security (Europe & US) 
Furthermore, if one considers the data Figure 23 illustrates on the position of respondents 
within the SME, the lack of managerial awareness is evident. 
Figure 23: Respondents function within the organisation 
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Establishing that the lack of security awareness is on the SMEs management (and not 
simply between employees) is a significant concern. With the management being 
confident of the existing security which is in fact inappropriate, it is unlikely they will be 
willing to invest more on security evaluation, design or controls, leaving this way the 
organisation exposed to the large number of threats out there. This makes the need for an 
SME RA tool to include some method of raising the managements awareness, (i. e. 
illustrate that threats do exist, the level of threat the organisation is under and the 
potential losses due to these, all in simple terms since it is the management it needs to 
address) an essential addition. 
3.4 SME risk analysis methodology requirements 
This section will discuss the requirements of SMEs from a risk assessment methodology 
as they were identified firstly from within surveys findings and then as SMEs have stated 
for themselves. 
3.4.1 Requirements identified from surveys 
Looking at the characteristics of SMEs, they require a RA methodology which will take 
the place of a full time security expert they lack and assist in raising awareness and 
manage risks. Based on these SME characteristics, the requirements of SMEs from this 
RA methodology have been established. More specifically: 
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Lack of Funds. This characteristic of SMEs not only necessitates for the R-A 
methodology not to be costly, but it should also consider the cost of the controls 
to be implemented and offer the best possible choices that the SME budget can 
afford, reducing risks as much as possible. 
Lack of Expertise. With SMEs lacking a full-time security expert, such a solution 
is required to be simple to use, and provide as much assistance as possible to the 
user facilitating both in the selections as well as in the implementation and 
configuration issues. Furthermore it is required to provide the SME with the 
potential to re-address the situation after the initial RA, should threats have not 
been addressed properly or new assets introduced, therefore assist not only in the 
selection of controls but also in their further management. 
)ý, Poor Selection of Controls. The RA methodology aimed at SMEs should either 
automatically suggest or provide sufficient information to enable users to select 
the best controls possible based on their organisations security requirements and 
assets. 
Lack of Awareness. By providing the appropriate inforination, particularly in the 
output report, the RA methodology should assist in raising managerial awareness 
on threats and why considerations and funds should be devoted to manage them. 
The better IS issues are communicated to the management, the more likely it is 
that management will respond positively (Hall 2003). 
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Disruption of operations. Because SMEs cannot afford the disruption of 
operations from a lengthy RA, this process aiming at SMEs should be as short as 
possible, requiring the input of a sole user who is informed on the organisations 
business functions and operation. 
3.4.2 SMEs self-identified requirements 
Having identified certain requirements for a new risk assessment tool which addresses the 
characteristics of SMEs, the next step is to use survey findings to establish what 
organisations themselves declare they require and see if it matches the requirements 
already identified. The SME security survey investigated specifically into this topic 
asking what is missing from RA. In this section, findings from other surveys are also 
discussed which are relevant to the issue and can be used to identify what organisations 
want to achieve better security and see which of these requirements can be included in an 
RA methodology. To start from the basic requirements, as the authors SME security 
survey found when queried the users 'how much they would be willing to spend for 
purchasing an RA tool if they were completely convinced it would solve their security 
problems' (Figure 24). 
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Figure 24: Amount organisations are willing to spend for an RA tool 
This data illustrates a massive (86.5%) first requirement of SMEs for an RA tool to cost 
less than f 1000. Even though this is not relevant for the development of the methodology 
by this research, it needs to be considered when evaluating the reasons for the non- 
adoption of the existing commercially available RA tools in the following chapter. 
Figure 25 illustrates what organisations from Europe identified, as the elements of current 
RA that makes it prohibiting for SMEs. 
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Figure 25: What stops SMEs from performing RA 
The biggest concern of the organisations (30%) was the lack of expertise, an issue which 
as discussed earlier causes a lot of the other problems as well. Then there was the lack of 
awareness, suggesting that SMEs are not aware of the importance and assistance that a 
RA can provide them with securing their organisation efficiently and avoiding unwanted 
incidents. Lack of budget came third on the list with 17.5% of the respondents having 
chosen it. Finally 6.5% (interestingly all out of the 'less than 20 employees' sample) 
declared that perfonning an RA is a disruption to their activities. It is worth noting that 
none of the organisations occupying between 20 to 250 employees said disruption 
therefore confirms that the larger the organisation gets, the most likely it has the ability to 
assign this task to one person for a couple of days. Finally, from the organisations that 
selected 'other' we required that they state what they meant in an attempt to identify 
other reasons that were overlooked until now. However the responses strengthened the 
belief that there is a large lack of I. T. security education and awareness within the SMEs. 
To illustrate what is meant here, a typical example - response was "only a few computers 
connect to the internet so there is no risk". 
The findings from the ACCSS are quite illustrative on the requirements of organisations 
as far as I. S. security is concerned. According to the survey, the most significant concern 
of organisations as far as information security management is concerned is changing 
personnel/users attitude and behaviour regarding information security. There is not much 
that this particular research can do on this, but RA is not completely irrelevant to this 
task. In order to achieve better personnel attitudes towards security, a number of things 
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need to be done such as policy, training, awareness initiatives, disciplinary processes etc. 
An RA tool cannot create all these, but can however inform the user and the management 
of the need to do them. The second biggest concern however is configuration 
management, which is one of the elements previously identified as missing from an RA 
methodology which aims at SMEs. Then there are the concerns about keeping up to date 
with threats and solutions, issues which from an RA perspective have to do with efficient 
support and feedback. Major concerns to organisations are 'getting more support from the 
management in addressing I. S. issues' and 'Lack of management understanding in I. S. 
issues' both discussed when proposing that an RA tool for SMEs should produce 
comprehensive results to the management including financial elements which justify 
spending, so as to ensure that the management is encouraged to invest effort and funds 
towards security. 
A percentage of the respondents do state that they find 'applying risk management 
principles' a problematic area, this is inherently linked with the requirement of SMEs for 
a tool which is easy to use and gives comprehensive results. Furthermore, the DTI 
survey, investigated a similar issue asking their respondents what would help businesses 
manage their risks. A large number of the respondents (second biggest issue after 'more 
education for the general public about I. S. risks' which is not related with RA) stated they 
required the provision of more information security advice or information, once again 
leading us to the issue that organisations would require from an RA tool to present them 
with a useful, comprehensive output which will also provide them with information on 
the issues. The rest of the issues that organisations stated they want are related to more 
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standards and industry initiatives, which again do not correspond to what an RA tool can 
do for an organisation (it can however inform them of the standards they are meant to be 
implementing, according to their industry sector, in case they are not aware). Finally from 
the same survey there was a question on how businesses decide what to spend on 
security. The two issues that came first, with an equal 45% of the respondents, were 
'Formal business case' and 'Quantify the benefits'. Both these issues are in line with the 
discussion made previously about a risk assessment tool for SMEs needing to present 
users with financial elements such as the ROI (ROI being the third and last source 
organisations stated they rely upon to decide spending on security) offered by selected 
controls, and ALE by threats, and generally not making the process too technical for the 
management that decides what funds are invested. 
3.5 Conclusions 
By looking into the characteristics of SMEs, the following were identified as the 
requirements that any solution which attempts to address their security needs should 
address: 
- Because of the lack of secunty expeytise within SMEs, such a solution should be 
easy to use, therefore avoiding as much as possible the need for the user who 
perfonns the RA to have technical knowledge 
- The process of performing a basic assessment of a SMEs' security should not 
be 
lengthy, certainly not span over a period of a day. 
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Such a tool should allow a single user with some knowledge of the organisations 
operation, to be able to perform an assessment (i. e. not require a group input). 
- The assessment should yield financial data, comprehensive to the management 
(including ROI and ALE) to justify spending and help choosing controls 
efficiently (Hamilton 2002). 
SMEs require as much possible assistance in the selection of the appropriate 
controls especially because the person performing the assessment is likely not to 
be security educated. 
For the same reason, SMEs would require certain assistance in the setting up and 
configuration of the selected controls. 
Because of the lack of internal expertise to constantly monitor efficiency of 
countermeasures and alter the controls, it would be useful to SMEs for such a tool 
to provide with feedback on the effectiveness of the selected controls and update 
features. In order not to constitute a disruption to the users activities this 
functionality should allow users to report incidents and update the assets list 
without needing to perform the entire RA process from the beginning. When 
discussing the "effectiveness" of controls, the metric is statistical data (such as the 
frequency by which a security event keeps occurring even though a control has 
been implemented to address it) and not precise figures. 
Having identified the elements that a solution should have for the requirements of SMEs, 
the next step is to proceed into investigating the existing solutions, using these 
requirements as the criteria to discover the reasons why these solutions have not been 
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adopted by SMEs. After evaluating the existing solutions, therefore establishing in 
practice why SMEs do not use them, the requirements for a new methodology that 
overcomes the setbacks can be fon-nulated. 
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4 Evaluation of Existing Solutions for SMEs 
Having established that RA is not being used by SMEs and what the requirements of 
SMEs from an RA tool would be, this chapter presents a practical evaluation of the 
existing solutions, focusing on RA tools for SMEs to establish whether the hypothesis 
that the existing solutions do not address the requirements of SMEs (therefore for this 
reason they are not being adopted) is correct. A preliminary version of the evaluation of 
existing RA tools, including two of the three SME RA tools evaluated here, has been 
published by the author in 2004 (Dimopoulos et al., 2004b). 
4.1 Purpose of this chapter 
Chapter 2 established that performing a proper RA is the primary practice that 
organisations should follow when planning their security. Chapter 3 then identified those 
characteristics that SMEs require from a solution designed to assist them with this task. 
In both these chapters the finding was that SMEs in general neither employ RA nor any 
of the other existing solutions. This section starts by giving a brief analysis of each of the 
other solutions available and will establish whether they are appropriate, leading to a 
proper evaluation of RA tools. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate, not the 'if' 
but the 'why' these solutions are not being used. In this chapter, all existing solutions 
shall be evaluated using as criteria the characteristics identified as required for a solution 
that addresses SMEs in chapter 3. Therefore there are three goals to this evaluation: 
9 Establish how existing solutions cope with the requirements of SMEs therefore if 
this is the reason they are not being adopted. 
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9 Gain Practical knowledge of the existing solutions and particularly of automated 
RA solutions. 
9 Identify certain characteristics of existing RA solutions that are positive and not 
related with the setbacks and which should be included in a future methodology. 
4.2 Evaluation of the existing solutions 
There are two basic paths SMEs can follow to achieve security if they do not perforin an 
RA, the first is outsourcing security and the second is following documented procedures 
like standards, guidelines and checklists. While there is essentially only one approach to 
the first (i. e. an organisation hires external expertise to set up and support everything and 
ideally they rarely have to worry about I. S. issues again) the latter can take many forms 
which are described in this section. 
4.2.1 Outsourcing 
A number of I. S. elements can be outsourced, from personnel training, to policy 
development and the actual practical securing of a network (Corby 2003). However, this 
solution is not preferable for SMEs because of the associated cost. However, since it is an 
option, it will briefly be discussed in this section. 
9 Description 
As described in the second chapter, this solution involves hiring expertise from 
outside the organisation to organise and manage secunty. 
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o Advantages and disadvantages 
The advantage of such an approach is that if the organisation selects well-trained and 
professional outsiders to handle security they can provide excellent I. S. and support. 
However, the setbacks are the cost involved with hiring outside expertise and the fact 
that there is still no pennanent I. T. security person within the organisation. 
e Reasons for lack of adoption 
Outsourcing security is not being implemented by SMEs for the principal reason of 
their cost. This solution is also not appropriate for SMEs as they do not employ any 
full-time security-trained staff therefore an SME would be left with a I. S. system that 
no-one within the organisation can maintain or troubleshoot. The outside experts 
would need to be called upon each time a malfunction has occurred or some 
modification to the protected assets, introducing delays (that get more costly the more 
serious the problem is) and more costs. Outside experts can even be hired to create 
policies and recovery plans but they would not be there to keep track and monitor 
whether users are conforming to these. From these perspectives it would be better if 
SMEs could design and handle their I. S. themselves. The available options for SMEs 
wishing to do this are discussed in this chapter 
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4.3 Self - Assessment Solutions 
The first set of options that are available for SMEs wishing to assess their security issues 
themselves has the form of documents that aim to provide guidance on security issues on 
a generic baseline level 
4.3.1 Documented Procedures and their progressions 
As the simplest form of this solution, there are a number of standards and guidelines 
available for SMEs wishing to assess security themselves. As Tanenbaum (1988) says: 
"The nice thing about standards is that there are so many to choose from". This is the 
case for information security standards as well. This section will attempt to outline all 
these security solutions that can be listed under the 'standards' category, that are 
essentially documented procedures or instructions that guide organisations at a baseline 
level on how to 'orchestrate' and maintain security. The evaluation and comments are 
made after reading the standards and comparing them with the requirements of SMEs 
The evaluation categories used in this section to analyse the characteristics and suitability 
of these solutions are: "Solution Content" which gives a bnef description of what they 
include, then there is a portrayal of how these solutions can be used, followed by the 
"Advantages and Disadvantages" of each solution and finally the discussion of why they 
are not suitable for SMEs. The fact they are not being used has been established already 
in Chapter 2, now we are looking at why. Most importantly even if the solutions are 
ultimately deemed inappropriate for the case of SMEs, at the end of each evaluation 
certain good characteristics are identified as worth using in a new methodology. 
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4.3.2 Guidelines and Standards: 
The solutions discussed here have the form of documents, essentially baseline security 
guidelines that are international standards or issued by local governments. Such solutions 
are ISO 17799, IS027001 , N. I. S. T. SP800-12 and SP800-30 
4.3.2.1 Solution Content 
ISO 17799 (initially published in 2000, updated in 2002 and currently on version 2005) is 
the international standard for I. S. management (ISO 17799 2005); it is 130 pages long and 
includes brief instructions for securing all areas of an I. T. infrastructure such as physical 
security, access control, communications management, personnel security and more. 
IS027001 (IS027001 2005) before becoming an international standard was initially 
published in 2002 as the second pail of BS7799, the British Standard for IS management 
(BSI 2002). This standard is 44 pages long and focuses on the fact that organisations 
should create an information security management strategy and lists a comprehensive 
inventory of available I. S. controls and practices. However there is not much detail on 
how to perfonn the first or how to deploy the latter. 
N. I. S. T SP800-12, also called "The N. I. S. T handbook" (N. I. S. T 1995) is the American 
equivalent of the international standard. N. I. S. T's contents are generally fairly similar to 
ISO's but it is structured differently and presents some more detail to the user on certain 
aspects since this standard is 290 pages long. Among its contents it explains what the 
threats to an I. T. system are, it gives some recommendations on some procedural issues 
(e. g. how to design I. T. security, write policies, promote awareness and security 
education) and also dedicates 20 pages on how to perfon-n an RA. Finally the N. I. S. T. 
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handbook presents its own list of controls for I. T. systems, very similar to I. S. 0 and quite 
exhaustive on this issue. In 2002, N. I. S. T. released another publication which is also 
relevant to the issues investigated in this chapter. That was SP800-30, also known as 
"Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems" (Stoneburner et al., 
2002). This local standard is 41 pages long and is essentially a more detailed version of 
chapter on RA found within the N. I. S. T. handbook. Both these publications focus on 
identifying assets, vulnerabilities and their likelihood of occurrence before proceeding to 
recommendations on how to mitigate risks. 
4.3.2.2 Practical Implementation of Solution 
Like any standard, both these are "Published specifications that establish a common 
language, and contain a technical specification or other precise criteria and are designed 
to be used consistently, as a rule, a guideline, or a definition" (ISO Standards Bookshop 
2002). As such users can refer to them for guidance when designing security, however 
they will never adapt to the specific requirements of one organisation or help in selecting 
and setting up, configuring or maintaining any controls. I. S. 0 also comes with a quite 
costly ($995) 'toolkit' which essentially is a set of checklists that users can print and 
check what practices they have in place for some major security issues like virus 
protection and backup. 
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4.3.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages 
9 Advantages: N. I. S. T. publications are free which is preferable for SMEs, however 
the international standard is more detailed in the way it presents the controls (thus one 
could say that the N. I. S. T. standard is more 'introductory'). Both solutions are very 
methodical in the material they present. Being standards means that all possible I. S. 
objectives and controls are included within, therefore they are excellent for guidance, 
i. e. to ensure that organisations do not overlook certain issues, 
9 Disadvantages: They do require an expert to use them, not in the sense of the 
contents being complicated but because they only provide recommendations and best- 
practices which someone needs to adapt to the organisations' requirements, and also 
implement, configure and maintain the controls without any guidance provided. 
4.3.2.5 "y they are not appropriate 
This makes such standards very usefal to security experts, as they may be used as a 
thorough reference when designing an I. T. system to make sure some controls have not 
been overlooked. However, they will not provide any assistance to someone with no I. T. 
security expertise as the recommendations for controls they provide will be meaningless 
without having a way to identify the specific assets the organisation should protect, and 
indicate what controls match to these and implement these selected controls. 
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4.3.2.6 Positive characteristics identified in solution 
Because of the comprehensiveness of the security issues and practices within such 
guidelines, they can be used as reference to the methodology's databases to ensure issues 
are not neglected. 
4.3.3 Progressions of guidelines and standards 
Solutions like these could be described as a slight progression of the guidelines discussed 
above. They are produced by organisations involved in I. S. and they resemble self- 
assessments of security. Therefore they require user input to produce some result which 
makes them adopt more to the organisation than vague standards. Well known examples 
of such solutions are CobIT (ISACA 2000) and Octave (Alberts et al. 200 1). 
4.3.3.1 Solution Content 
OCTAVE stands for Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
and proclaims to "define an approach to information security risk evaluations that is 
comprehensive, systematic, context driven, and self directed. " CobIT stands for Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology and is advertised to "provide good 
practices for the management of I. T. processes in a manageable and logical structure" 
4.3.3.2 Practical Implementation of Solution 
What OCTAVE essentially does is guide a team of business and I. T. people through a 
process of identifying and rating risks. The methodology provides with diagrams like the 
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one in Figure 26 which the team that performs the analysis can complete themselves this 
way identifying what risks relate to what assets 
Human Actors - Physical Access 
S4-IS 
Figure 26: The OCTAVE risk self-assessment approach 
Then the team is required to rate the impact of the risks that have been identified in a 
qualitative way i. e. as low, medium and high. Finally, they are given a list of security 
practices such as physical security, personnel security and I. T. security practices out of 
which the team needs to distinguish the ones they require and implement them. 
The general idea behind CobIT's operation is very similar to that of OCTAVE, it uses a 
different way of identifying assets to the organization (which in this case are in the fonn 
of the organisations business functions) as illustrated in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27: The operation of CoblT 
More specifically, it presents the user or team of users with a list of business processes 
commonly found within organizations (A), then links each of these functions with certain 
criteria that define how significant this process is (B), and indicates what resources might 
be linked with this business function (C). Finally once the user has identified all the 
applicable functions, they can refer to another section indicated by the code (D) next to 
each function which lists all the controls that are relevant to this function. 
4.3.3.2 Advantages and disadvantages 
9 Advantages: These are very well thought methods for identifying assets, their 
importance and risks towards them; however they require time and I. S. expertise. 
They are definitely a step forward from guidelines since the organisations can 
select from them assets and functions that correspond to them and therefore make 
the assessment more specific to the organisation than with guidelines. 
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9 Disadvantages: OCTAVE requires a team of I. T. and business personnel to 
perfon-n the task, the users still need to judge which controls are appropriate 
themselves from large lists, unless they apply all controls which would not be 
cost-effective, there are still no recommendations on how to select and implement 
countenneasures. 
4.3.3.3 Why they are not appropriate 
Not only do they require the same level of expertise as standards, but even greater as they 
need someone with good knowledge of the organisations' I. T. operations - making it very 
easy to overlook an area at risk if the user does not recognise it formulates an asset. At 
least standards are exhaustive. 
4.3.3.4 Positive characteristics of solution 
Compared to standards that are simply listings, these solutions point the way to 
identifying assets and linking them with relevant controls. In the case of SMEs they 
would however benefit from being automated to make the process shorter and to ensure 
that the assets are identified correctly and linked to the appropriate controls, as well as 
provide some assistance to the user on how this can be achieved. This exists in the form 
of the solutions described in the next part. 
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4.3.4 Automated guideline tools 
A progression of the methodologies just described, these are websites that a user, 
informed on the organisations' operation, can provide with certain details and this way 
obtain recommendations on security practices that should be followed. A lot of providers 
might have similar approaches to this issue but here we will look at how three major 
organisations approach the issue. The three major solutions discussed in this part are: the 
Microsoft Security Guidance Centre (Microsoft 2006), the Symantec Information 
Assurance Risk Model (INFORM 2005) and the McAfee Security Planner (McAfee 
2006). 
4.3.4.1 Solution Content 
Microsoft Security Guidance is a website offering certain online functions, tool 
downloads and support documents all related with identifying vulnerabilities, planning 
and implementing I. S. 
McAfee Security planner for small and medium businesses is another web-based tool, 
which uses a graphical environment which claims to help organisations 'Identify their 
security risks and create a protection plan' 
Symantec offers a solution with the same aims. However, fNFORM does not advertise 
itself as being targeted at SMEs and actually requires a Symantec consultant to be hired 
by the organisation in need of the assessment in order to drive the tool. 
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4.3.4.2 Practical Implementation of Solution 
The Microsoft solution aims at improving SME I. S. and involves a website which 
performs five basic operations. The first is that users can watch a video, illustrating seven 
steps small businesses need to do in order to achieve a secure environment. Secondly it 
provides online details on these seven steps and how to perform them. Essentially it 
provides generic baseline information of the type 'You should install an antivirus' and 
'You should keep automatic updates on' together with some instructions on how to, also 
suggesting certain products and giving the links to other resources one can read on the 
issues, on seven major issues of I. S. security: protecting desktops and laptops, keeping 
data safe, using the internet safely, protecting the network, protecting servers, handling 
PCs from servers and securing applications. The third thing this website does to improve 
security is to provide a free download of the computer security guide for small 
businesses, a relatively short guide (62 pages) to I. S. which gives some recommendations 
on how to implement certain solutions (e. g. how to set-up a firewall) without however 
becoming too detailed or technical. The fourth function this website provides with is a 
tool called Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer, which can be downloaded and installed 
to scan any number of computers within a network to detect a number of known 
vulnerabilities and misconfigurations related with windows systems, like administrative, 
SQL, II. S. vulnerabilities, weak passwords etc and report them to the user as illustrated in 
Figure 28. 
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Figure 28: The vulnerability scanner included in the Microsoft solution 
Finally the last function of this solution is that it provides a questionnaire which tests the 
users knowledge on some classic I. S. issues, such as password selection, and then for 
those that the user has responded to incorrectly the system redirects the user to the 
appropriate chapter in the 'seven steps checklist' mentioned previously. 
The tool offered by McAfee requires the user to provide with some basic information on 
the organisation, mainly the number of employees, and whether certain specific types of 
servers exist (Email, File and Web). It basically creates a network plan based on the 
existence of desktop PCs, the three types of servers, the Internet and remote access, as 
illustrated in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29: Assessing risks to servers with the McAfee security planner 
The user is then required to select from a short list of security solutions that are in place 
for these assets. At the final stage the tool illustrates the risk that the network is exposed 
to, according to the selections of available controls, and recommends certain security 
solutions that are missing. 
The Symantec WFORM solution is mainly concemed with the economics of I. T. 
security, therefore estimates risks according to the users input of estimated losses if a 
threat is reallsed against the identified business functions and inforination within the 
organisation. It then gives a comprehensive report from a business perspective (Figure 
30). However, this has no use in tenns of I. T. security counten-neasure selection or 
implementation. 
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Figure 30: The output of INFORM 
4.3.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages 
9 Advantages: All these solutions address at I. S. from a business/business 
functions perspective, and all three processes are short. The Microsoft tool 
certainly would not do any harm as long as the user is a little bit security aware to 
know that they are far from safe just by following this 7 step checklist. They all 
do not require I. T. experts but mainly business people. With all of these tools, if 
run by a person with knowledge of the organisations business and I. T. functions, 
the process last less than a couple of hours. 
0 Disadvantages: They are all not detailed in how they profile the Organisation and 
the selection of controls, especially McAfee mainly promotes their products. 
McAfee only assesses logical security of desktop PCs and three specific server 
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types. Microsoft only addresses Windows and makes it sound that if you have the 
Windows Firewall on you are safe. All three solutions aim to promote their own 
products and services. Microsoft promotes its O. S. and security features in it, 
McAfee promotes their security solution and Symantec hire their expertise and 
services to organisations needing such a solution. 
4.3.4.4 "y they are not suitablefor SMEs 
Because they only provide guidance, not suitable for SMEs that do not employee security 
specialists, that would not be able to identify assets, risks and appropriate controls, even 
if they did choose some controls there is no guidance on how to implement them. Also, in 
all of these there is no consideration at all about the budget of the organization and what 
are the most cost effective control or solutions should the organization not be able to 
acquire them all. Also there is no help on how to implement and configure the solutions 
4.3.4.5 Positive characteristics ofsolution 
Even though these solutions are judged to be inappropriate to the distinctive enviromnent 
of an SME, there has been a large effort on them by the parties that created them, 
therefore some elements they include should be good and worth identifying, keeping and 
adding to the requirements for a new methodology 
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4.4 Risk Analysis tools 
One of the biggest concerns in I. S. is the need to assist the management and improve 
security decision making (Garrett 2004). Considering however the characteristics of the 
solutions in the previous section that make them inappropriate for SMEs, combined with 
the lack of expertise and security awareness within, SMEs need something to guide and 
assist them with making decisions when implementing security. Therefore what appears 
to be the best solution is an RA tool that is automated and should assist in the decisions 
process. Having identified why RA is often referred to as the first thing organisations 
should do to secure their I. T. systems, this section attempts to discuss the characteristics 
of existing RA tools that make them inappropriate to and not-adopted by SMEs. 
4.4.1 Ma or RA tools j 
Certain RA tools, like CRAMM, are not meant to be for SMEs. However, since they are 
all commercial products (therefore there is nothing prohibiting an SME from using them) 
it is worth briefly mentioning the characteristics that limit its use to this type of 
organisations for this evaluation. 
4.4.1.1 CRAMM 
As discussed earlier CRAMM is the most well known RA solution and some times even 
obligatory to be used (e. g. for UK government organisations). Thus this section will 
discuss CRAMM as an indicative example of major RA solutions. 
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To start at the basic factor potentially prohibiting CRAMMs' use by SMEs, the cost of 
the tool plus the costs of the training seminars required by a selected person from the 
organisation is against the requirement of SMEs for a low-budget solution. The high cost 
of CRAMM is the main reason why it could not be purchased and evaluated for the 
purposes of this research. Instead a brief evaluation will be discussed here, based upon 
evidence from other publications but also on how CRAMM appears to operate and the 
results it provides based on a flash demo of the tool. Furthen-nore considering this person 
needs to leave their regular duties to undertake this training and perfonn the lengthy 
assessment (which includes meetings, interviews and structured questionnaires for data 
collection (Yazak 2002)) creates the deterring characteristic of disruption to the 
organisations (and this persons') normal operations. 
By looking at CRAMM's analysis of threats (Figure 31), it does appear to be very 
detailed but at the same time it is evident that the information on the screen do require 
training to understand, particularly by the SME user. The analysis also appears to be quite 
lengthy since the screenshot only illustrates the risk analysis for a single threat and the 
list of selections required to be made by the user seems rather long. 
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Figure 31: CRAMM analysis of threats 
This confirrns the reports that CRAMM is a lengthy process (GSSL 1997) and cannot be 
perfon-ned without the user having particular expertise and training (SANS 2002). 
By looking at Figure 32 it is evident that the output of CRAMM is also not suitable for 
the SME user. Even though it, again, looks very exhaustive, there does not appear to be 
any details on what the controls actually are (to facilitate the users selections), or any 
assistance on how they can be acquired, deployed and maintained. The impression this 
output of CRAMM leaves is that only a trained user can interpret it, while an I. S. expert 
is required to obtain, implement and manage the solutions. This type of output would also 
not be of any use to the SME management who would not be able to interpret it in order 
to understand risks and justify security expenditure. 
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Figure 32: CRAMM recommended countermeasures 
This strengthens the view that CRAMM requires particular expertise on the area of I. S. 
and risk analysis, as well as training on the specific tool in order to use it (Yazak 2002). 
Furthennore it coincides with other research findings that state the output of CRAMM is 
unnecessarily and prohibitingly lengthy (Labuschagne 1999). 
Overall CRAMM appears to be inappropriate for SMEs as it does not match a number of 
their identified requirements. Since however it is unquestionably not designed (nor 
advertised) for use by SMEs, the next section will look at the appropriateness of RA 
solutions that are. 
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4.4.1.2 RA2 Art ofRisk 
Another major RA tool (at least in the sense that it is developed by BSI, the initial authors 
of ISO 17799 and IS027001 and offers compliance with these standards), which however 
again does not advertise to be designed for SMEs is RA2 Art of Risk (BSI 2006). A demo 
version of this software was acquired for the purposes of this research; its details will be 
discussed here as this tool too does not apply to SMEs. To begin with, a first factor that 
makes this tool inappropriate for SMEs is its cost which being E1300 is prohibiting for 
SMEs as discussed in Chapter 3. Overall RA2, is very systematic and analytical in the 
way it approaches the analysis of risks and selection of controls., At the start of the 
assessment, users are required to select the scales upon which they wish the asset and 
threat to be valuated on (users have the choice between a 3,4 and 5 point scale) and can 
then proceed to the identification of assets and evaluation of assets. The user can select 
from a list of example assets and then values them in ternis of Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability. Where the process itself starts being deterring for SMEs is when the 
threat identification takes place (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33: Calculation of Risk within RA2 
More specifically, the users have to identify threats that apply to their assets themselves 
(Figure 33A) and they are also required to estimate the level and likelihood of the threat 
(Figure 33B). Finally, the users are required to know and select for themselves whether 
each threat has an effect upon the C-I-A of assets (Figure 33C). The next step in RA2 is 
the selection of controls (Figure 34), in this stage the user is presented with a thorough 
list of IS027001 controls that are relevant to each existing threat and they need to select 
which ones they wish to implement. 
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Figure 34: Selection of Controls in RA2 
The final impression of RA2 is that it is a very detailed RA tool, containing a large 
database of threats and controls like the ISO standards. However, it is inappropriate for 
SMEs since it requires particular expertise to be able to identify and rate applicable 
threats and also select appropriate controls without any particular assistance. In its output, 
RA2 provides a 'gap analysis' of security controls that have been applied within the 
organisation being assessed and those available in the ISO standard. Again, thorough as it 
may be, this output is not particularly useful to SMEs as there is no assistance in 
acquiring, implementing and configunng controls. Therefore overall RA2 is a powerful 
RA tool but requires an expert in I. S. who also has very good knowledge of the 
organisation to use it (or a team of experts each from these fields). Leaving the use of the 
tool to someone else would produce inaccurate results and could easily disregard 
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important issues, making it inappropriate for SMEs that have been shown not to employ 
experts. 
4.5 RA tools aimed at SMEs 
Three established RA tools were identified as being advertised to be appropriate for 
SMEs, evaluation copies of these tools were obtained and they were used in this section 
to see whether they fulfil the requirements SMEs expect from a solution aiming to assist 
them with the analysis of assets and the management of risks. It was therefore possible to 
establish if this is the reason RA solutions are not popular with these organisations. 
4.5.1 Evaluation Criteria 
The requirements of SMEs from an I. T. security tool assessing risks have been generally 
discussed across this thesis this far. In this section however, they will be categorised and 
assigned marks to enable a proper evaluation of solutions. According to the 
characteristics of small and medium businesses, there were several criteria identified that 
a RA tool should encompass. These criteria were split into four categories for this 
evaluation, as illustrated in Table 4. There are elements a RA tool should have in general 
(i. e. these are marked after the whole procedure is finished) there are elements that should 
be presented to the user within the assessment process, there are certain elements that are 
necessary to be present at the output of a RA tool aimed at SMEs, and finally it should 
allow the user to perform certain actions after the assessment is finished, this way 
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providing with support. By splitting the criteria this way the evaluation is more 
structured, making the results straightforward to be compared. 
Characteristics Evaluation Criteria 
of SMES General Process Output Support 
Lack of 
Low cost Help with 
Funding selecting cost 
effective controls 
Ease of User assistance Assistance with 
Lack of use/specialty during the setting up of the 
Expertise required, process of the controls 
assessment 
Lack of Economic Comprehensive 
Managerial Elements such as output reporting to 
Awareness ROI and ALE, the management 
Assistance in Feedback 
Poor Selection choosing which allows 
of Controls controls, corrections 
Length of Output report not Update and 
process, unnecessarily feedback not 
Disruption lengthy requiring re- 
running the 
process, 
Table 4: How the evaluation criteria match the SME requirements 
4.5.2 Rating the tools on criteria 
The tools were evaluated on a five point scale that resembles a Guttman scale (O'Connor 
2004). A Guttman scale was judged to be the most appropriate as it consists of a set of 
user defined items, ranked in order of importance relevant to what is being evaluated 
from the least extreme to the most extreme position (Arreola 2005). For example, a 
person scoring a "Y' on a five item Guttmann scale will agree with items I to 3 and 
disagree with items 4,5 (Trochim 2006). When performing an assessment using this 
scale, it is expected to select the list item which describes better what the evaluated items 
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characteristics are. Each of the list items is associated with a mark defined by the person 
that designed the list which corresponds to the score that the evaluated item will receive 
on that issue. In this case the aim is to determine a set of responses/criteria, equivalent to 
characteristics that a tool should have, which will range from good to bad that will have a 
mark associated with them which when added up altogether will give the overall mark for 
each category of characteristics, and eventually the overall mark for each tool. This will 
enable straightforward and comprehensive comparison when later evaluating the 
methodology and application designed and built for this research. Thus for each 
characteristic, a three point scale was determined with three possible elements, one which 
is good, one which is average, and one that is poor. The progression of the Guttman scale 
made here is that 'point fives' are allowed for scoring therefore the scale becomes a five 
point scale which will range from 1,1.5,2,2.5, up to 3. The reason why halves were 
added in the scale is simple, among different tools there are different elements that can 
prevent it from getting full marks on one issue. This makes it impossible to set middle 
values that cover the whole range of tools and their characteristics. Setting the maximum, 
the middle and the minirnw-n allows the sconng to be performed even if an element was 
not initially considered when developing the scale. 
To illustrate this with a simple example from the assessment, in the characteristic of 
"Length of process" tools would score I if the process lasted more than a day and 2 if it 
lasted a few hours. Two of the tools achieved a 1.5 in this issue but each for different 
reasons. One because the process lasted a few hours but it should be run by several 
personnel (which might again last a few hours but it might last days if people are 
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unavailable) and the other because the process lasted a couple of hours but the assessment 
required that a user who does not have the appropriate knowledge might have to do some 
background research before responding on certain issues which could again make the 
process last for more than a day. It would be extremely difficult to research all the 
possible cases between the 2 and the 3 here and they could be numerous. Therefore it was 
judged that the results would be more realistic if a tool gathered .5 marks for a 
characteristic if, anything, prevents it from achieving full marks. 
9 General. This category of criteria includes elements that need be scored after the 
process has finished and the user has a complete idea of how the assessment worked 
and what the output was. These include: 
o Cost. The discussion in chapter 3 established that SMEs are not willing to 
spend more than a certain amount on a RA tool. The ratings on this 
characteristic are based on the SME survey responses on this issue. 
Rating se eme- Cost 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description f 3000+ f]000-f2999 fo - E999 
o Ease of use (expertise required). This criterion has to do with how easy the 
process is to use (meaning the required level of expertise from a user to 
perforin an analysis), since SMEs require for a tool to enable a non- 
secunty expert. 
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Rating scheme: Ease of use 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description Whoever uses it I. T. personnel Anyone with 
needs expert can use it knowledge of 
training on the the organisation 
tool or the area can use it 
o Length of process. How long did the process last? SMEs require a 
relatively short process, but we have seen in this chapter that solutions 
duration can range from less than an hour, (like the web-based tools 
described) to a few days (like the progressions of guidelines). 
Rating scheme, Length of process 
_Mark 
1 2 3 
Description 
I 
More than a day Within a day Less than an 
hour 
* Process. This category refers to elements that SMEs require from an RA 
methodology which are apparent to the person conducting the assessment during the 
actual process. 
o Assistance to user during the process of the assessment. This refers to how 
much the developers have considered that there exists sufficient assistance 
to the person conducting the assessment during the process either by 
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manuals or with help menus within the tool (such as glossaries and help 
icons) to assist the users with their selections with issues like what should 
be done next or tenninology issues. 
_Rating 
scheme: Assistance to user 
Mark 2 3 
Description Neither In the tool or Within the tool 
with documents and with 
(only one of the documents 
two) 
o Risk Impact Analysis. This characteristic refers to whether there is 
functionality in the tool to quantify the impact of a threat being realised, 
and therefore rate the importance of specific assets (by evaluating cost of 
asset, impact of downtime etc) so as to later assess them. This element is 
essential for an SME RA tool so as to assist with raising managerial 
awareness as described in Chapter 3. 
Rating scheme: Risk Impact Analysis 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description Solutions are Cost of assets or Both cost of 
chosen without impact of assets as well as 
considering the breach of the impact of 
importance of assets is breach of the 
assets at all considered assets are 
considered 
o Assistance in selecting controls. A common element noticed during the 
evaluation of the previous solutions is that controls were presented to the 
users in the fonn of lists including all the potential controls for each asset 
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or business function. An SME with no expert to judge and select which are 
appropriate requires from an RA tool as much assistance in selecting 
relevant controls as possible. 
Rating scheme: Assistance in selecting co rols 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description All controls are There exist Application 
the same some way of suggests 
suggesting some controls in a 
controls more clear manner 
than others based on the 
results or the 
risks analysis 
o Cost-effective controls. Having identified and valued assets, does the tool 
provide any assistance with selecting cost effective counterrneasures for 
example if the ROI offered by security solutions considered so that 
organisations avoid investing larger amounts on one asset than its actual 
value while at the same time neglecting other assets that might cause 
greater losses if compromised. 
Rating scheme: Cost-effective controls 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description No Cost of controls Cost of controls 
consideration of or value of & value of 
cost effective assets assets 
solutions considered considered 
0 Output. This category refers to elements which should be included in the output 
provided by the tool to match SME requirements (i. e. a report with appropriate details 
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for the management, and assistance to the person who will then handle the 
implementation of the controls). 
o Comprehensive output. An RA tool designed to match SMEs should 
produce a report that is comprehensive to an end-user who is not an expert 
on the risk assessment area and potentially neither an I. T. security 
practitioner. For this characteristic, RA tools shall be rated in terras of how 
much expertise is required to interpret the results. 
Rating scheme: Co rehensive output 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description RA or 1. S. 
expert 
I. T. security 
staff 
Anyone 
o Deployment assistance. Not employing security experts, SMEs require not 
just a list of applicable controls (no matter how well-thought this list is) 
they also require as much possible assistance on how to set-up and 
configure these controls. 
Rating scheme: Deployment assistance 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description None Some assistance Detailed 
and guidance instructions 
fully relevant to 
the identified 
required 
controls 
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o Length of report. The output report should not be unnecessarily lengthy 
but should still provide the necessary inforination. This helps to avoid 
intimidating the aforementioned parties (management and users) by 
providing too much detail causing unnecessary disruption to their normal 
tasks. At the same time it has been seen, from the papers on CRAMM 
discussed in chapter 2, that a quite large size of the report is always seen 
as a disadvantage. 
. 
Rating scheme, Length of report 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description A lot of the data Includes some Only enough for 
is useless to the data which the relevant data 
end user would not be 
necessary 
o Support. What this category of criteria is concerned with, is what potential a tool has 
for future re-usability by the organisation, and what support it can provide to the SME 
after the RA process is finished. Essentially it concerns whether the elements of 
feedback and update are present. 
o Dynamic Feedback. For a number of reasons (such as the fact that without a 
security expert if the controls selected in the assessment are proved insufficient 
and threats keep occurring) there will be no-one to correct the situation and the 
organisation will then need to start looking for another solution once again. An 
RA tool for SMEs should allow SMEs to perforin two operations: firstly report if 
there are still issues after having implemented the controls, and secondly to allow 
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reporting of assets added or removed. This would cause a re-assessment of the 
situation and provide with security recommendations according to the new 
structure without leaving assets unprotected until a new assessment is performed 
or a threat occurrence exposes that something should have been done when the 
asset was initially introduced. 
Rating scheme Dynamic feedbac k 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description Non-existent User is required Dynamic Feedback 
to re-run the (including 
application reporting breaches 
and changes in 
assets) 
o Dynamic update. This refers to the actual updating of the tool to keep up to date 
with new threats discovered and controls. Therefore eliminating the need for an 
SME without a full-time expert to be on a constant lookout to keep up with new 
threats and technologies. Surveys discussed in Chapter 3 indicate that this is one 
of the most major concerns of the management. It would be useful to update with 
new threats -controls and re-assess the situation without re-running the whole 
process. That is where the dynamic refers to. 
Rating scheme: Dynamic update 
Mark 1 2 3 
Description Non-existent Updating by Dynamic update 
the 
organisation 
and need to 
acquire the 
new version 
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4.6 Evaluated Tools 
For the purposes of this assessment three tools were chosen and evaluated on the 
aforementioned criteria. These are three of the most well known RA solutions tools, 
which were chosen because they are advertised to be appropriate for SMEs. Furthermore, 
the three tools approach RA in three diverse ways, both in the way they collect 
information as well as in the manner they suggest controls, which makes this evaluation 
cover a wide section of the RA sector. The tools are: 
- Cobra Security Risk Analysis & Assessment, created by C&A Systems Security 
Ltd (http: //www. nskworld. net/) 
- The Buddy System, created 
(www. buddysystem. net) 
- Microsoft MRSAT Microsoft 
by Countenneasures 
Security Risk 
(https: //www. secuntyguidance. com/vl/default. htm) 
Corporation, 
Self-Assessment 
The results of the evaluation are presented to the user in the following fon-nat: First some 
general discussion on each tool, then a description of how the tool operates and how it 
approaches the assessment split in two parts (how it analyses the risks and how it 
manages the identified situation), followed by the actual results of the evaluation. Finally, 
summarising the most significant points, there is a discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of each tool and a conclusion on each of the tools. Giving the users a taste 
of how commercial RA tools generally operate is particularly useful for when discussing 
the tool developed later on for the purposes of this research. 
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4.6.1 MRSA T 
MRSAT is a solution offered by Microsoft, available for download for free on the 
Internet, and promoted as being designed for SMEs. 
4.6 ]. 1 Operation: Risk Analysis 
This tool gathers infonnation on the organisation by requiring the user to choose details 
by replying to 'yes' or 'no' questions (Figure 35, Q the details on six different aspects of 
the organisation (Figure 35, A). That is: Basic infon-nation (such as the size and the 
number of PCs and servers); Infrastructure security (e. g. if the company is connected to 
the Internet and for what services does it need to interact with users and partners via the 
Internet); Application security (a section basically concerned with whether the 
organisation develops applications, what privileges from an I. T. perspective does it allow 
to those who develop applications for the organisation and who has access to data); 
Operations security (essentially if critical data is stored and what reliance third parties 
have on data which is stored within the organisation); People security (On what criteria 
and who introduces new technologies in the infrastructure and who has access to data); 
Environment security (number of employees and effect of theft and fraud). A significant 
element is that the questions are not technical and in case the user still finds it 
complicated there is a help pop-up (Figure 35, D) which gives some more detail on the 
question. 
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Figure 35: Using MRSAT to describe the organisations I. T. - based operations 
Having described some of the organisations functions in this part, the tool proceeds to the 
second part of the analysis which is concerned with what security practices are employed 
within the organisation. This second part has the same layout as the first, this section uses 
again 'yes' or 'no' answers to assess existing security practices on the same six aspects 
described earlier. These include all the major security practices, such as use of controls 
(eg antivirus, IDS, firewalls), policies, operational plans and procedures, testing of 
solutions, I. S. training, backups and employment of I. T. security personnel 
4.6 1.2 Risk Management 
Having completed the analysis of the organisation's operation and security practices, the 
next step is to produce the results. MRSAT presents the user with three different outputs. 
First of all there is the 'summary report' which essentially is a, not so comprehensive, 
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graph illustrating the risk the organisation is under. Figure 36 presents this graph together 
with all the data provided by the tool to help the user interpret what it means. 
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Figure 36: All the data presented to the user as the primary output of MRSAT 
Even though this graph is hardly comprehensive, not even including an explanation of 
what the two elements being displayed, BRP and DiDI, are (BRP stands for Business 
Risk Profile, i. e. the risk the organisation is under, and DiDI is the Defence in Depth 
Index, i. e. the controls taken by the organisation), the second of the outputs of the tool is 
far more useful to an organisation assessing risks. There are three key elements included 
in the second part of MRSAT's output: The tool provides a list which, according to the 
users I input in the analysis, priontises the controls that need to be taken care of (Figure 
37, A). Unfortunately doubts can be raised as to why they have been priontised like this 
from an assessment based on yes or no answers, meaning that these elements are there 
because the user has indicated they do not exist within the organisation and they have 
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Risk-Defense Distnbutior, 
been prioritised in a manner probably based on 'Importance scores' pre-determined by 
the developers, however different assets might have different importance to different 
organisations and this tool does not consider which assets are of major importance to the 
organisation being assessed before prioritising what should be secured first. The report 
also includes a list of brief recommendations on how to better secure areas that have been 
identified as problematic (Figure 37, B) and also presents the user with a complete list of 
security areas and controls, indicating which should be improved in the assessed 
organisation (Figure 37, Q without however taking any budget/cost considerations or 
again prioritising according to the organisations needs. 
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Figure 37: Key parts of the MRSAT output report 
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What follows the lists of controls and the brief explanations on what action should be 
taken is several links to a Microsoft database of I. S. security practices, which illustrate to 
the user how to implement solutions (not in very detailed way but comprehensive enough 
to give the user an opinion on the particular area of I. S. ). The only setback is that all 
recommendations presented in this database only consider Windows systems. 
Finally the third output comparison of this tool is a screen which allows the user to 
compare their results (the ones presented initially in the graph of Figure 36) with the 
average results of other organisations belonging to the same sector and size as seen in 
Figure 38. 
Defense-in-Depth Index 
This chart indicates differences in the Defense-in-Depth score, organized by Area of Anatysis, 
Risk-Defense Distribution 
20 
10- 
'3 
-10 
-20, 
Figure 38: MIRSAT compares the results to the industry sector average 
This is quite a useful addition which can help the management see were they are lacking 
in security, however it requires uploading the assessment results to Microsoft, which 
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some organisations might find inappropriate from a privacy perspective (Morgan 
Research 2001) it also raises the issue of the reliability of the results from a tool which is 
freely available to everyone. Furthermore, only a well established organisation which 
gathers results from thousands of clients can incorporate such an element in a tool 
therefore it is not going to be considered as one of the elements that will be included in 
the new methodology. 
4.61.3 Evaluation 
Table 5 summarizes the scores achieved by MRSAT when evaluated against the criteria. 
4tion J 
Cost 3 The tool is free to be downloaded by everyone 
No particular expertise required, but it needs very good I Ease of use 2.5 knowledge of the organisation and potentially some 
research 
Length of Process The assessment lasts approximately two to three hours 2 
Assistance to user 3 There is 
both assistance within the tool as well as a 
user guide 
Risk Impact There is no point in the tool where the user can rate the 
Analysis I assets or functions importance in any way 
There is some prioritisation of the required controls in 
Assistance in the output report without, however, the criteria being 
choosing controls 2 clear since assets importance has not been considered 
Cost - Effective I There 
is no consideration on the value of the suggested 
Controls controls versus the budget. 
Comprehensive The tool output is a comprehensive report with great 
output 3 assistance and links to resources provided to the non- 
expert user 
]Deployment There are links provided which provide basic 
assistance 2 information on the set-up of controls. Not too detailed 
but sufficient to get started. 
Length of Report Very informative with very little unnecessary da a , 2.5 
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There is none provided, no consideration on the 
Dynamic Feedback effectiveness of the solutions, can rerun the tool and 1.5 select the newly implemented control as existent, 
however, there will still be no consideration of threats 
that occurred or losses 
The update is not dynamic; however there should be 
Dynamic Update 2 good support by an established organisation such as Microsoft which shows an interest in the area. Tool is 
already in its second revision 
Table 5: Evaluation Results and Justification for MRSAT 
4.6.1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
9 Advantages: 
A major advantage of MRSAT compared to the majority of other solutions described 
is that it is offered free of charge. Furthennore it provides assistance with their 
selections to users by allowing clicking on the items and providing a pop-up box with 
explanations or examples. MRSAT is not "technical" meaning that it approaches RA 
from a point of view that no particular expertise is required to conduct the assessment 
just good knowledge of the organisations' I. T. functions, features and operations. 
Furthermore among the positive elements identified is the provision of 
recommendations and some assistance (links) on how to implement the appropriate 
controls. Finally, a good addition is the comparison against which areas of security 
other organisations of the same size and sector have already implemented. 
* Disadvantages 
MRSAT does not take in consideration the organisation size and it has no impact on 
the analysis and valuing of threats towards the organisation. The process and, 
particularly, the report are a bit lengthy. MRSAT is good for identifying practices that 
115 
have been neglected when designing security and not yet implemented, but there still 
is the need for an expert to deploy the solutions. Furthennore there is no 
consideration of budgeting or cost effective solutions. Thus there are no financial 
elements, potential losses and other data of this sort, identified as essential for SMEs 
lacking budget, awareness and expertise. There is also no considering of what assets 
are important to the specific organisation; the results are independent of the sector, 
operation and requirements of the organisation on the contrary, the resulting 
recommendations are a listing of practices that in the analysis have been identified as 
not implemented. The only time that MRSAT considers the aforementioned elements 
is in the final output, where the results are compared with that of other organisations 
of the same size. 
4.6.2 Cobra 
Cobra is a commercial RA tool, based on IS017799, which can be purchased from the 
organisations website where an evaluation copy can be downloaded from. This evaluation 
copy was used for this investigation. It offers full functionality, with the only limitation 
being that the output report cannot be printed on paper and may only be viewed on 
screen. 
4.6 2.1 Operation: Risk Analysis 
The Cobra tool approaches the security requirements of the organisation being assessed 
either from, as the developers describe these, an I. T. perspective or from a business 
perspective. Approaching the analysis from the I. T. perspective, the user is required to 
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complete four sets of questionnaires: one on integnty, one on availability, one on 
confidentiality and one on a business impact analysis. The first three essentially 
investigate what controls are in place in order to protect the integrity, availability and 
confidentiality of business assets. The fourth alms to establish what the revenues of the 
organisation are and what the business 1 gn III impact of a breach of inte ity, availability and 
confidentiality of business information would be. In order to achieve the latter the user is 
required to reply to questions assessing financial damage should data be lost, accessed 
without permission or modified. Some of the first observations on this tool are the 
difficulty one gets around the menus and the relatively poor graphical interface. 
Furthermore the system does not rule out questions that contradict each-other meaning 
that straight after the user says there is no continuity plan in place, they still receive two 
questions asking how confident the user is on the continuity plan on which one can reply 
that they are 100% confident. Figure 39 illustrates the graphical interface of this tool. 
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A J; ' 
service unavailability or loss of data. 
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Hardware/E quip ment Malfunction 
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Software Error 
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Intil-0 Of Malicious Coding 
I 
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Figure 39: The GUI of cobra is not as evolved as that of the other tools 
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The listings in Figure 39 are actually how Cobra appears to select what threats the 
organisation is under (i. e. based on the user's judgement of what threats the organisation 
faces) which raises the question of how accurate the results are. Taking the other 
approach i. e. the BIA approach, the tool uses a larger number of questionnaires to 
basically assess certain I. T. security issues from a business perspective (e. g. what plans 
(continuity, backup, audit) are in place and whether or not they include certain elements). 
4.62.2 Management 
Having successfully completed the analysis, the Cobra tool produces the output report 
(Figure 40). The report is well structured and with a clear layout. An interesting feature 
of the tool is that based upon the responses of the user, presumably from the BIA 
questionnaire, the tool deten-nines what the acceptable risk levels are, then according to 
the responses to the rest of the questionnaires the tool presents the user with a graph 
illustrating by how much the organisations risks have exceeded this acceptable level. Of 
course determining the acceptable level of risk is highly subjective and can easily lead to 
misconceptions, however since the mathematics behind how this was calculated are not 
explained, we cannot discuss the correctness of such a result. Assuming it is well- 
considered it does look as an infonnative output to the user. 
118 
Management Suimnary (continued) 
OVERALL AVERAGE 
ý5.2 1 
Ple-e Note: 'I'his overall average should only be used as a guide to the average risk level which 
this assessment has identi5ed Reference should be made to the rest of the 
Management Summary to identify the specific areas vrhich require attention. 
-THE FOLLON-37VG CATEGORIES REQUIRE PARTICULAR A rTENTION 
ANASSESSMENT OF EACHAPPEARS RV THISAIANAGEMENT SUMMARY 
Categoiies Above Tlu*eshold Of Acceptable Risk 
too 
go 
80 
70 
60 
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20 
RISK CATEGORY RISK FACTOR 
1 Avaýabifity 6124% 
2 integnty 51 - 24% 
3 Confidenhaýty 51 15 % 
Figure 40: Cobra Report on the Acceptable Risk 
Moving further down the report however the quality of the results starts going down. As 
Figure 41 A illustrates there are graphs with no clear indications of what they mean. 
Finally there are the suggested countermeasures, which are essentially simply a list of all 
the available countermeasures in the tools database, excluding the ones the user stated 
that they exist within the organisation. Looking at Figure 41B, it is clear that the results 
are poor, providing with no explanations on why, how or where they should be 
implemented. 
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Business Impact Assessment (continued) 
Bidsiness Impact Levels 
A 
B 
Ro 
70 
60 
50 
40 
Cotuiter Meanwes (continued) 
R&kC-&9-IY: Apa! Wi[Uy 
NUMFR ER TEXT 
6106 Urgent steps should be taken to reduce exposure to fire, flooding and explosion 
6108 Urgent steps should be taken to reduce exposure to hardware. equipment and media 
unavailability 
6113 Urgent steps should be taken to reduce exposure to Hacking/Electronic Sabotage 
6114 Urgent steps should be taken to reduce exposure Erom the loss of thud Party Service 
6120 Physical access controls/practices for those areas that may hold sensitive/confident3al 
information should be reviewed and stengthened 
6121 Ensure that specific back-up and recovery measures art in place for both serious 
software error occur and loss of critical data 
Figure 41: Samples of cobra output 
Essentially, disregarding if the I. T. or the BIA approach was taken, the feeling is that the 
tool simply has a database with all the available controls and practices, and the report is a 
listing of all those that were not selected by the user as existing in the analysis. 
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4.62.3 Evaluation 
Table 6 presents a summary and the justification for the marks achieved by Cobra when 
evaluated. 
ON catiotr' "Y" 
Cost 2 The Cobra appl icatioii costs fI 100 
Ease of use 
The assessment is not oriented towards technical users. 
2.5 However, Cobra does not get full marks since the 
wording and menus are sometimes confusingly unclear. 
The assessment takes two to three hours, but due to the 
Length of Process 1.5 
I. T. and Business approaches to the assessment it might 
require more than one person completing the 
questionnaires introducing the relevant risks 
Assistance to user 2 No assistance within the tool, however multiple documents provided including a worked example 
Risk Impact Even though the impact of certain threats realising is 
Analysis I investigated in the analysis, such considerations are not 
really reflected in the report. 
Assistance in There is none, the entire range of controls that 
choosing controls I correspond are presented to the user with no indication 
of order. 
Cost - Effective I There are no 
financial considerations on the value of 
Controls the suggested controls versus the budget. 
Comprehensive The output is very comprehensive in terms of language, 
output 2 will still not get full marks because it requires 
considerate improving 
Deployment Cobra does not provide any assistance on how to 
assistance I implement these controls and hardly even explains 
what they are. 
Cobra gets full marks on this issue since it presents the Length of Report 3 user with the option to select what sections they require 
in the report. 
Dynamic Feedback There is no feedback; the user would be required to re- 2 
run the process. 
Dynamic Update There is no update in place; it is up to the organisation 2 
to release complete updated versions of the tool. 
Table 6: Evaluation Results and Justification for Cobra 
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4.6 2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
9 Advantages 
This tool includes what is missing from the Microsoft tool; it actually evaluates how 
important assets are to the organisation and how much a compromise would affect the 
organisations' operation. 
* Disadvantages 
This information is not utilised in a useful manner in the output section, providing 
control suggestions that are lacking all of the elements we identified as required. 
Again the size of the organisation does not make any difference to the results 
provided to the user since the assessment is based solely on the available controls and 
the impact of breaches to the organisation without considering size neither in terms of 
employees or PCs and servers. 
4.6.3 The Buddy System 
The third and final RA tool evaluated for the purposes of this thesis is the Buddy System, 
a solution created by Countermeasures Inc. The latest version of the Buddy System, 
which was used in this evaluation is "Release 73 1" 
4.6 3.1 Operation: Risk Analysis 
Unlike the other two tools discussed in this section, the Buddy System does not use 
questionnaires to perfonn the analysis of the organisation and its threats. Instead this tool 
assesses certain areas of organisational structure and security (Figure 42, A) such as 
operational data (such as operating period, acceptable down-time), operating environment 
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(open-space office, room etc), types of information (financial, customer, student), uses 
drop-down menus (Figure 42, B) within a well-designed graphical interface. Having 
defined the general business environment the user moves to the 'asset configuration' 
menu where they are required to select from a list of assets (including communication 
equipment such as modems and routers, personnel found within the organisation, vendor 
software (such as Lotus and Corel draw), which the user needs to declare whether they 
exist within the organisation and for each asset whether they are shared and if they are 
considered to be critical. 
A B 
[ý)Sufvey Information System Type Fm -ai or Application [ý]Reýmndent 
Usecuroy Officer Life Cycle Phase Fully operational DPoint of Contact -7i 
System Location Operating Period b. Used during normal hours and then left on 
Iperating Envifonment Acceptable Down-time 
. ype of 
Information 
, Tset Configuration 
hieaýs 
Logical System 
, ornmentz 
5 Mindes or less 
8 hours or less 
24 Hours or less 
7 Days or less 
30 Days or less 
60 Days or more 
-ancel 
C12se 
Figure 42: The Buddy system interface and analysis approach 
Even though up to this point this tool would have looked as the most appropriate for an 
SME, moving away from identifying the assets the user proceeds to the 'Threats' part and 
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this is where this tool loses the game. In the threats part of the assessment, the users are 
actually required to select the threats their organisation and I. T. infrastructure are under 
themselves. As Figure 43 illustrates, a list of threats is presented to the user (such as 
power failure, software failure, theft, terrorist act) from which the user needs to select 
which are appropriate. To start with, comparing the list with the threats listed in the 
various surveys of Chapter 2, the list does not include all the possible threats to the 
organisation. Furthennore, even if we disregard this, what is introduced here is the 
likelihood that the user neglects a threat, either considering it unlikely to occur or simply 
not realising its importance. To take this into extremes but illustrate the problem here, not 
many I. T. users in the WTC would be likely to select they are susceptible to a terrorist 
threat or organisations in New Orleans that would claim they are vulnerable to natural 
disasters. The user also needs to select the frequency of occurrence of each threat they 
select (illustrated within the red circle in Figure 34) which again raises serious concerns 
on the correctness of the results produced by this assessment, the scaling used to select 
the frequency is also somewhat peculiar. 
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Figure 43: Threat selection in the Buddy System 
Finally the user is presented with a list out of which they are required to select what 
countermeasures are already deployed within the organisation 
This concludes the analysis module which ideally should, according to the makers of the 
software, also be filled by at least four other users within the organisation (including a 
secunty person, a manager, and end users). One can however proceed to managing the 
risks even if a single user has performed the assessment. 
4.6 3.2 Risk Management 
As Figure 44 illustrates, the risk management offered by the Buddy System includes an 
analysis of the threat levels (Figure 44, A) and for each of the threats the tool illustrates 
the existing controls and proposes certain other controls as required (Figure 44, B). The 
Buddy System is the only tool from those evaluated that actually recommends controls, 
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(even though the criteria upon which the controls are suggested are unknown) according 
to the needs of the organisation instead of presentIng with a full list of all the controls that 
the user has not identified as already deployed. 
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Figure 44: Proposal of controls in the Buddy System 
4.63.3 Evaluation 
Table 7 displays a listing of the scores achieved by the Buddy System when evaluated. 
The Table also includes a justification of why these scores were assigned to the tool for 
each of the charactenstics. 
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FA 
Cost 2 The cost is unknown, but it will be assumed to be 
priced in the same range as the majority of RA tools 
Ease of use 
The Buddy assessment is not complicated enough to 
2 need I. T. security training. However it mainly includes 
I. T. related elements in the way RA is approached. 
Length of Process 
The process last approximately two hours, but it is 
1.5 recommended that multiple users perform it therefore 
introducing delays 
Assistance to user 2 The Buddy System comes with a user guide 
Risk Impact The tool does consider the actual cost of the assets 
Analysis 2 
Assistance in The Buddy System is the only tool that recommends 
choosing controls 
3 solutions to the user as required. 
Cost - Effective I There is no consideration on the value of the suggested Controls controls versus the budget. 
Even though it is presented through a nice graphical 
Comprehensive 1.5 interface, Buddy does not clarify much about what the 
output recommended controls are, nor does it suggest some 
source that does. 
Deployment I the Buddy System does not provide with any 
assistance information on how to set up the suggested controls 
Buddy does not provide a report apart from the on- 
Length of Report 2 screen display, this makes it actually miss out on 
information that should have been presented to the user 
as there is limited space to provide enough infort-nation 
Dynamic Feedback There is none provided, no consideration on the 2 effectiveness of the solutions, would require to re-run 
the application. 
Dynamic Update 2 There is none suggested. User 
depends on the 
organisation releasing a new version of the tool. 
Table 7: Evaluation Results and Justification for the Buddy System 
4.6 3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
9 Advantages 
No particular expertise is required, just knowledge of the organisation. The analysis can 
be easily perfonned by the management. It is the only one from the evaluated tools that 
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uses some type of asset valuing to then suggest controls. Buddy has a user ffiendly 
graphical interface. 
o Disadvantages 
Software and threat identification is limited to specific assets, For example when in the 
analysis the user is required to select types of software within the organisation, they are 
presented with a very short list which includes 22 specific programmes which can easily 
be questioned in terms of how inclusive it has been. Similarly, 'Essential hardware' 
includes only 12 devices, including CD-ROM, colour printer and scanner, laser printer 
and PCMCIA modem, not really the most essential bits of hardware, finally 'Essential 
information' only includes 4 types of information the user can choose from as existing 
within the organisation: operational, medical records, planning and tactical. Finally this 
tool takes no consideration at any pail of the size of the organisation or the budget 
4.7 Practical Assessment of the SME-oriented tools 
This section will discuss how the tools were evaluated and how they coped with different 
SME organisations. 
4.7.1 The SME scenarios used for the evaluation 
In order to evaluate the tools, three scenarios were created targeting the organisation sizes 
this research is concerned with. The scenarios were based on real life organisations, one 
for a software and website development organisation with a size of less than 10 
128 
employees, one for a small education organisation with less than 50 employees, and one 
for a medium-sized healthcare organisation with less than 250 employees. An inventory 
of assets and applications commonly found within was created for each organisation; 
each organisation's security requirements as well as their main concerns from an I. S. 
perspective were also considered and documented. These scenarios are Included In detail 
in Appendix A. 
4.7.2 How the tools coped with the scenarios 
Before the discussion on the overall scores achieved by the three RA tools for SMEs 
during their evaluation, it is worth analysing the outputs they provided and how each 
coped with the three different organisation scenarios (i. e. how the results of each tool was 
affected by the differences in the organisations size, sector and security needs). Some of 
the tools outputs are included in the discussion that follows while the entire range of 
screenshots of the tools outputs are included in Appendix E for reference. 
4.7.2.1 MRSA T 
This solution provides a prioritisation of controls (Figure 45) and enough links to 
infonnation on what the suggested controls are. 
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Figure 45: Prioritisation of controls in MRSAT 
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A setback is that the tool does not illustrate at its output (nor considers in the assessment) 
the threats that the organisation faces and their levels. Instead, the means of judging 
whether security is sufficient is by comparing implemented security with those of other 
organisations of the same size and sector (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46: Comparison of security practices in MRSAT 
Even so, this looks like a good element if your organisation is under-investing, however 
since it is not necessary that the other organisations have appropriate security it might 
actually lead to a misconception, especially if the organisation under assessment has 
implemented better security than other organisations in the sector (it may lead to a false 
perception that the organisation is safe or even that it is over- investing). Furthen-nore, 
what other organisations of the same size and sector are investing on security is not a 
particularly good justification to the management that they need to do the same. 
130 
On the issue of the three different scenanos MRSAT has suggested different controls and 
prioritised them differently. Figure 47A illustrates the recommended controls for scenario 
1, Figure 47B for scenario 2 and Figure 47C for scenario D. 
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Figure 47: recommended controls for the three scenarios by NIRSAT 
However, during the assessment and due to the nature of the questions it involved, this 
did not appear to have anything to do with the different sectors or sizes. Instead, this 
different output was essentially due to the different choices of the controls that the 
organisations have in place. Thus it appeared that the system suggested to the user those 
controls that they have selected as non-existent within their organisation. Therefore as 
can be seen in the three different 'Risk-defence distribution' graphs in Figure 48 (again 
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A for scenario 1, B for scenario 2 and C for scenario 3), the larger the organisation got, 
the better their security. 
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Figure 48: Risk variations according to the evaluation scenarios in MRSAT 
For the home-office organisation 'Applications' and 'Operations' security is particularly 
bad since there exist no policies, response plans and no passwords or logs are used, the 
small research organisation has all security issues improved apart from 'People' security 
since users have quite high network privileges and access to resources in order to be able 
to perform their research tasks properly and finally the medium sized organisation copes 
better in all areas since physical security is more thorough, access to data is controlled 
here and people are made aware of policies. The only time that it was apparent that the 
system took the size and sector into consideration was at the end of the report were there 
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is the comparison graph with the other organisations (and again that may not be 
applicable to all the organisations, undertaking the assessment as some may have privacy 
issues with sharing this data with Microsoft). 
4.7.2.2 Cobra 
Cobra's identification of the threats was based on the users responses of what the threats 
they are worried about are and the valuing of the risk the organisation is under came from 
the users own estimation of how confident they are of security. It is a logical progression 
therefore that the quality of the controls suggested in the output report would not be 
neither well considered nor thorough. 
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Figure 49: Recommendations in the Cobra output report 
Looking at Cobra's output reports in Figure 49 confirms this speculation since the level 
of detail it went into the suggested controls is for example: 'Urgent steps should be taken 
to reduce exposure to hacking". This type of result might be a bit useful to a user with 
extremely good knowledge of I. S., however it would not be useful to an SME user or 
manager. 
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Cobra's output had absolutely no relevance with what industry sector or size the 
organisation being assessed belongs to since these issues are not needed at all in the 
analysis. Besides the 'required actions' (which as just been described do not depend on 
the organisation at all but on the user's judgement instead) there are essentially three 
figures presented to the user, as illustrated in Figure 50. These are: The level of risk 
(Figure 50A), the Thresholds of acceptable risk level (Figure 50B) and the Business 
Impact of loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (Figure 50C). 
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Figure 50: Risk valuation in Cobra 
Out of these, the first appears to be based on the users response of how worried they are 
for each OCCUITing, the threshold seems to be based on the user's selections of how long 
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after C, I or A have been compromised will the organisation start facing damage, finally 
the last seems to be an output of the users selections of how much a breach would cost to 
the organisation. This explains the rising figures in the 'Business Impact' output of Cobra 
in Table 8 (data taken from the Cobra output reports which can be seen in full detail in 
Appendix E) since the larger the organisation scenario that was assessed, the larger the 
impact of breach and the lesser the acceptable downtime were stated to be. 
S cc I -1, -16-10 
B: Small C: Medium 
Category I IC90r" 
A: Home office Enterprise sized Enterprise 
Confidentiality 25% 44.74% 86.11% 
Integrity 25% 44.74% 100% 
Availability 41.9% 68.23% 78.22% 
Table 8: Impact of C, I, A breach from Cobra's output against the 3 scenarios 
Furthennore it explains the reduction of the risk as the size of the organisation rises since 
the larger the organisation the more confident the user was chosen to appear on the 
possibility of breaches, to illustrate what the output would be if as the organisations 
become larger, the manager who is supposedly performing the assessment is less aware 
of anything related with what is happening in the IT department. If this assessment was 
considered the other way round (i. e. to be performed by a member of I. T., the results 
would probably be more inaccurate since the whole assessment is based on the user's 
perception of the business impact of breaches. 
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4.7.2.3 The Buddy System 
Out of the three evaluated tools, the Buddy System's output to the user was probably the 
most useful to an SME user, based on the fact that it is the only one with the functionality 
which enables the user, after the initial threat has been calculated, to allow the system to 
automatically reduce it to an acceptable level and suggest the controls that would help 
achieve this (Figure 5 1). 
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Figure 51: Automated risk reduction in Buddy System 
The Buddy system also considers both the organisation size in terms of I. T. as well as 
personnel and also requires the user to estimate value of assets in dollars as well as in 
terrns of acceptable downtime and frequency of occurrence of incidents therefore appears 
to have a more credible estimation in its output of the risks the organisation is under 
(especially considering what has just been written for Cobra's estimation and that 
MRSAT does not provide with one). As illustrated in Figure 52 (full scale images of each 
output are available in the Appendix E for reference), the buddy system is the only tool 
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that does provide with different outputs for the three different evaluated organisations 
and, judging by the detail of inforination the user is required to input in the analysis, these 
results do appear more credible and well-considered than those of the other tools. 
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Figure 52: Levels of Risk as presented by the Buddy system for the three different 
scenarios (A: Home office, B: Small Organisation C: Medium Enterprise) 
However where the Buddy system falls behind is the very limited database it provides in 
terms of controls (also in terms of threats and assets as mentioned in the analysis earlier) 
and the fact that it does not provide any infoiTnation on these controls either. Buddy's 
controls are similar to Cobra's, using the following as an illustrative example 'Sensitive 
application systems should have access control implemented' such recommendations 
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would not provide any useful infori-nation to the SME user unless they are trained in I. S. 
which, as seen by the survey findings, is very unlikely. 
4.8 Summary and discussion of evaluation results 
Table 9 presents a collection of all the characteristics of the tools and illustrates what 
elements have made existing RA tools inappropriate to be used by SMEs. 
Categog Criteria MRSAT Cobra Buddy 
Cost 3 2 2 
General Ease of use 2.5 2.5 2 
_ Length of process 2 1.5 1.5 
Assistance to user 3 2 2 
_ Risk Impact Analysis 1 1 2 
Process Assistance in choosing controls 2 1 3 
_ Cost - Effective Controls I I I 
Comprehensive output 3 2 1.5 
Output Deployment assistance 2 1 1 
- Length of Report 2.5 3 2 
Dynamic Feedback 1.5 2 2 
Support Dynamic Update 2 2 2 
Category: General 7.5/9 6/9 5.5/9 
_ Category: Process 7/12 5/12 8/12 
OveraH Category: Output 7.5/9 6/9 4.5/9 
- Category: After 3.5/6 
- 
1 4/6 4/6 
Total (out of 36): 
+ 
- C5. 5 21 1 22 
Table 9: Comparison of the scores achieved by the tools 
As it was apparent from the evaluation, the MRSAT tool was the most appropriate to 
correspond to the requirements of SMEs. This application provides a relatively easy 
analysis process and the most comprehensive results from all tools. However it fails to be 
judged as appropriate for organisations since it does not take any consideration of what 
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assets are important, and how important, to the specific organisation and prioritise the 
suggested controls based on that. It also does not provide with any method of assessing 
whether the suggested controls were successful and what threats still keep occurring and 
causing losses to the organisation. Second highest scoring was the Buddy System, mainly 
because of its nice graphical interface and for being the only tool considering the 
organisations needs and cost of assets when suggesting controls. However the Buddy 
system does not provide any information on these suggested controls or assistance with 
their implementation. There is no feedback and updating it is questionable since the lists 
of assets and recommendations presented by the tool looks rather out of date. Finally the 
Cobra tool has very few good features, essentially only that the terminology is 
comprehensive and that the report can be fitted to the users' needs. However there is no 
suggestion of importance of controls of any sort, which controls are vital, which are 
recommended etc. The applications output is plainly a list of all the possible controls, 
again without any explanations on what they are or how they are used. 
Another criticism is that none of the tools takes into consideration the industry sector, 
organisations from different sectors have different security requirements, (e. g. an 
educational organisation would require less security, but easier employee access, than a 
military organisation. Finally none of the tools produce any different outputs according to 
the size of organisation. Size relates to budget (another element that is not considered is 
the organisations I. T. security budget) as well as costs for controls, these are neglected in 
all tools. The only tool that considers these two elements is MRSAT which only 
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considers them to compare the results with other organisations not to adjust the output to 
these. 
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter the potential solutions for SMEs needing to structure and implement 
security have been investigated. The first category of solutions was judged to be 
inappropriate for SMEs primarily since they only provided guidance without adapting to 
the requirements and characteristics of organisations. By contrasting these solutions to 
the requirements of SMEs from such a solution it was apparent that an automated tool 
that assists users with selecting and valuing assets and then suggests appropriate controls 
was in order. Therefore some of the major RA tools that claim they are appropriate for 
SMEs were properly evaluated and the output proved that they were all lacking in some 
of the major requirements, which is probably why RA is not being adopted by SMEs. 
The requirements of SMEs, plus those that were identified as good characteristics, and 
those identified as missing from the existing tools, will be used in the following chapter 
to constitute the basis for a novel methodology that covers the needs of organisations in 
automated security planning and efficiently selecting, implementing and assessing the 
effectiveness of controls. 
140 
5A New Methodology for SME Risk Assessment 
In this chapter the design and parts that constitute the novel methodology which is suited 
to the needs of SMEs from such a solution is discussed. 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 established RA is not being adopted by SMEs. By then investigating certain 
I. S. surveys and the details of the major possible solutions for SMEs, Chapters 3 and 4 
established that a successful methodology for SME RA has certain requirements. The 
following section summarizes how these requirements, identified in the previous 
chapters, can be grouped together to establish four key aspects necessary in RA 
addressing SMEs: 
9 Focus on the characteristics of the SME users. This means it should be easy to use 
(not getting too technical) enabling a non trained user to perform the assessment, 
provide the necessary assistance to the user and the process to be relatively short 
enough so as not to cause disruption, definitely not require multiple people 
therefore making it expand over multiple days. To provide with the appropriate 
assistance to the user it is necessary that an automated tool assists the user with all 
the selections by indicating relations between assets, threats and controls. 
According to this, the target SME user (and the person described when 
mentioning 'SME user' from now on in this thesis) is a single person who has 
been assigned with perfonning the assessment, coming from the 
'business/management' side of the organisation with certainly no I. S. training, 
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and potentially some limited knowledge of I. T. This user will however have 
knowledge of the purpose of the organisations I. T. system, the existence and 
importance of major I. T. assets such as an Internet connection, a website, a print 
server, a mail server and so on. 
* Adapt to the organisation being assessed. In contrast to baseline guidelines and 
the RA tools evaluated in Chapter 4 that have the similar approach in identifying 
risks, this framework should consider the actual organisation sector, requirements 
and characteristics as the basis of suggesting and selecting controls. This solution 
should address organisation-specific issues that the existing solutions do not, such 
as considering appropriately the size, budget and value of assets to the 
organisation, considering impact of risks to the organisation, the organisations 
desired security requirement s/level s and based on these suggest appropriate while 
at the same time cost-effective controls. 
* Produce a comprehensive output. Care should be given to the final output to the 
user. The framework should provide a concise but comprehensive output report 
which gives the user the no more than the appropriate information to justify risks 
and spending to the management, and to assist the user assigned with the task 
with the setting up of the controls. 
* Manage security weaknesses and risks even after the end of the RA. To be 
successful, infon-nation security solutions need to be managed, not simply 
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deployed (Chong 2003). Management should not end when the appropriate 
controls having been suggested but also provide the SME with support afterwards. 
The framework should allow reporting of the effectiveness of controls and 
appropriate updating of the organisations profile (created by the assessment) in 
case there is a change in the assets. It should also include an administrative 
interface which enables the easy updating of the tools lists of assets, risks and 
controls to ensure an organisations estimated risks and implemented secunty are 
always up to date. 
5.2 Elements used to address these requirements 
There were certain elements conceived which enable this framework to address all the 
requirements. Before discussing the details of the operation of each of the process 
engines in the methodology, those elements that will provide the required functionality 
will be discussed. 
5.2.1 Focus on the characteristics of the SME users 
Instead of "traditional" methods and mainly the use of questionnaires in order to collect 
data from the user, this framework makes use of profiling in order to make the whole 
process more efficient and more comprehensive to the user. The idea of using profiling 
for I. S. purposes has been introduced by Commoncriteria with their 'Protection Profiles 
(PP)' (Commoncriteria 1999). According to Commoncriteria, "A PP is an 
implementation independent statement of security requirements that is shown to address 
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threats that exist in a specified environment ". What profiling means is the grouping of 
similar items with similar requirements together. When designing this methodology 
profiling was used in several occasions: applications that require the same background 
assets were grouped together to make application profiles, threats that have the same 
source and require similar controls to protect against were grouped in to threat profiles 
and finally controls were profiled by including all controls that are essentially the same 
but with slight variations under the same categories (e. g. all controls that assess malicious 
code were grouped under antivirus, instead of including all possible makes and variations 
of antivirUs software). A preliminary paper that discusses how profiling can be used to 
simplify the process of Risk Assessment has been published by the author in 2004 
(Dimopoulos et al., 2004c) 
Finally, an organisation profile is created during the risks analysis which contains all the 
user-selected information regarding the organisation. This organisation profile is used to 
store information as it is identified so it can be used by later modules. 
5.2.2 Adapt to the organisation being assessed 
This is achieved by requiring the user to input specific data which is then used to consider 
what the organisation needs to protect from more (the threats against the organisation and 
their likelihood and impact), what budget should be devoted and so on. Such infon-nation 
is the sector, the size and I. T. budget of the organisation. Another required input is what 
the applications used within the organisation are and a rating of their importance. The 
importance will be rated in terms of C-I-A to the organisations' operation, this type of 
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rating is widely recognised as the basis for valuing inforination (Alred 2001). Moreover, 
specific rating of price may mislead the user into not considering some cost element (the 
cost factors range from physical damage to loss of information and from downtime 
because of a threat occurrence to damaged reputation therefore making the process more 
complicated and introducing grounds for a false input (Pfleeger 2006)) and provide false 
results or may require the user to contact other users who know this information therefore 
introducing delay. To also comply with the first requirement described in this section for 
ease of use, the rating needs to be perforined in such a way that all a user is required to 
know in order to perforin the RA is good knowledge of the organisations function. 
5.2.3 Produce a Comprehensive output 
As discussed earlier the output needs to include certain elements that are required by the 
SME user and the management. Such elements are definitely a projection of the cost of 
controls vs the reduced risk levels to justify such spending to the management if required 
and also appropriate assistance in explaining what the selected controls actually are and 
how they should be implemented successfully. 
5.2.4 Manage security weaknesses and risks even after the end of the RA 
This will be achieved by providing feedback on two issues. The first will enable the user 
to provide feedback on whether the recommended controls are adequate (for instance, has 
a threat kept occuMng after implementing the controls and how often and what losses has 
it caused? ). This sort of infon-nation will adapt the tool more to the organisation by 
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updating the data in the organisational profile therefore re-assess the situation with more 
realistic data providing a more suitable output each time. This constitutes an element not 
offered by existing RA solutions but also very useful to SMEs with no full time expert in- 
house that would not otherwise be able to rearrange their security plan to the new 
situation. The second type of feedback, also useful for the same reasons is feedback on 
applications that have been added or removed from the organisations profile, which 
require re-considering security. 
Finally this lack of security personnel to perform this task necessitates for the 
methodology to be easily updatable so as to be constantly up to date with new 
applications, threats, their effect and controls, without needing the time and effort to have 
a member of personnel who is normally assigned with something else to also be 
responsible for this task. 
5.3 Overview of methodology 
Figure 53 illustrates how the typical RA process as described in Chapter 2 needs to be 
altered to include the elements discussed above and solve the problems prohibiting SMEs 
from adopting RA. 
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Figure 53: The RA process which suits SME Requirements 
The 3 main elements within a risk analysis methodology are Assets (included within 
applications in this case), Risks and Controls. Risk can be the connection between the 
applications and the controls. Certain applications introduce certain risks and then certain 
controls reduce these risks. What is then further needed is to evaluate how important 
these applications are to the organisation to establish which needs more protection and 
what the organisation is spending on security controls to choose the most cost effective 
solutions from the whole list of controls. 
This section explains what the steps in the novel RA methodology actually are and the 
actions they include. 
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5.3.1 Risk Analysis Phase 
This section suggests how the analysis of risks should be approached in the proposed 
methodology. 
Profile the organisation 
The first pail of the methodology aims at gathering the required infonnation on 
the organisation being assessed from the user performing the assessment, such 
infonnation will be general data on the organisation and the applications that are 
used within it. 
- Rank Asset importance 
Having obtained infonnation on the organisation, the user is required to rate the 
importance of the applications selected as existing in order to prioritise the 
applications/functions in order of importance. 
Calculate threat 
The identified and rated applications are subject to certain threats. Having pre- 
determined the threats that correspond to the application profiles the user has 
selected, these threats are awarded points to generate the 'threat scores' that 
quantify how much each threat may affect the organisation 
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5.3.2 Risk Management Phase 
Following the analysis of the risks, the novel methodology should include these steps in 
order to manage them. 
- Suggest Matching controls 
The methodology needs to suggest controls to the user. Therefore in this pail 
controls that correspond to the threats the organisation is under while at the same 
time are appropriate for the selected as available applications need to be pointed 
out to the user 
Cost effectiveness of controls 
Having established which controls are appropriate for the organisations' needs, a 
final criterion assisting the user with the selection of the desired best options is the 
consideration of the cost effectiveness of the controls. The user can here consider 
which controls are cost-effective judging by the suitability of a control to protect 
an asset and reduce a threat (presented to the user previously), the importance of 
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this control and the potential losses by the threats it is under versus the cost of 
implementing the controls. 
Select Controls 
Considering this information, enables the user to select the best options for the 
SME's limited budget. In this section the methodology should illustrate to the 
user how selected controls affect the risk levels the organisation is under, as well 
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as how it affects the budget. Once the user is satisfied with the achieved levels for 
both these, the process is virtually finished and can present an output to the user 
- Report 
Because the report is addressing SME personnel with all the characteristics 
identified earlier, presenting a report with the selected controls to the user does 
not make the end of the risk management stage. To successfully manage risks, 
controls need to be implemented correctly therefore sufficient information to 
realise this should be provided. 
- Feedback 
Managing the risks does not end at deploying counterineasures either, and as 
such, a methodology that aims to overcome problems related with existing RA 
solutions should ensure that, in the absence of a security expert, the organisation 
receives the appropriate level of assistance even after the controls have been 
implemented 
The idea behind how controls are selected is, at a certain stage, similar to the philosophy 
used by CRAMM. CRAMM "uses the measures of risks determined during the previous 
stage and compares them against the security level (a threshold level associated with 
each countermeasure) in order to identify if the risks are sufficiently great to justify the 
installation of a particular countermeasure" (CRAMM 2006b). The difference with 
CRAMM is that after calculating the risk levels the organisation is under, the choice of 
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controls is left to the users' judgement, having presented them with the appropriate data 
to facilitate the decision (risk levels for the organisation, applications found within 
ranked in terms of importance and economic considerations such as ROI and ALE). 
5.4 Process Engines 
This far the requirements and how the methodology was conceived has been described. 
In order however to achieve this desired methodology in practice several process engines 
need to be designed and their inputs and outputs combined together appropriately. The 
following five process engines have been used to create a framework that effectively 
addresses all the requirements. 
- Organisation Profiler Engine (OPE) 
- Application hnportance Rating Engine (AIRE) 
- Risk Ranking Engine (RRE) 
- Cost Effective Risk Management Engine (CERME) 
- Feedback/Update Engine (FUE) 
This section will describe the function of these process engines before moving to the 
discussion on the background components (i. e. those components that perform the 
background calculations that allow for the process engines to present the desired output 
to the user). The databases and other background engines and mathematics used to 
produce results will be discussed in detail in the architecture chapter. For the purposes of 
this chapter, which are to illustrate the functionality of the framework, any input to the 
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process engines that is either created by the framework or predetermined within the 
prototype will be referred to as 'system' and any input required by the user will be 
referred to as 'user'. 
5.4.1 Organisation proffier engine 
This engine is required to perform the initial profiling of the organisation. To achieve 
this, some specific information is required and the input source for this engine is the user. 
The following section will describe what information is needed and how it is used. 
5.4. LI Process Engine's Required Inputs 
The sector an organisation belongs in, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, is inherently 
related with the level of threat the organisation is under. To illustrate this, according to 
tile findings of the Symantec survey, the 'Accounting industry' receives 18% of the 
targeted attacks while at the same time organisations belonging to the arts/media sector 
only receive I% of the entire spectrum of attacks. This methodology attempts to first 
evaluate what levels of threat the organisations are under therefore it is logical that the 
first factor in estimating threat will be the inherited risk due to the industry sector an 
organisation belongs to. 
The size of the organisation is required to determine the cost of controls when examining 
cost effective solutions. Even the simplest of controls is relevant to the organisations' 
size, from physical controls such as safe doors to software controls such as antivirus, all 
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their costs rise according to the size of the organisation since the larger the organisation 
the more of them are required. For the same reasons of evaluating the cost-effectiveness 
of the possible controls, the I. T. budget is required at this stage. Furthermore the I. T. 
budget, combined with the number of employees and certain surveys that point out the 
spending of organisations belonging to specific industry sectors per employee, can 
determine a recommended minimum security spending to the user in case they are not 
sure what percentage of the budget they should devote to I. T. security. 
Another novel point of this methodology is to consider what the I. T. security 
requirements of the organisation are. It has already been discussed that different 
organisations have different I. S. requirements and for instance an academic organisation 
would require easier access for its users in contrast to the more intrusive and need for 
constant security (e. g. identity authentication) within a military organisation. This 
methodology, which aims at assisting organisations structure their security, should 
consider which of the approaches the organisation being assessed desires in order to 
suggest more appropriate controls later on. 
Finally, the main information required from the user here are the applications found 
within the organisation. The user will be required to declare what applications/types of 
data and functions can be found within the organisations' I. T. infrastructure. These 
introduce the corresponding risks towards the organisation.. 
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5.4.1.2 Use of Collected data 
What the Profiler engine essentially does is gather specific inforination about the 
organisation from the user and then store it in specific locations and order (the 
organisation profile) so as to enable the following process engines to later on, when 
required, access and retrieve or update this infori-nation. Figure 54 illustrates what 
information from this first stage is needed by which following stage. 
Organisation Profiler Engine 
Applications Rate 
Importance 
(AIRE) 
User Applications 
I. S. Requirements Profiler 
Size (Employees) Engine 
Industry 
Sector 
Rank 
Risks 
Industry Sector (OPE) (RRE) 
I. T. Budget 
Size (Employees) Manage 
Risks 
I. S. Requirements (CERME) 
I. T. Budget 
Figure 54: RelationshiPs between Profiler Engine and later stages 
To illustrate why this specific data is required from the user, this process engine is the 
product of reverse engineering, meaning that the information needed by the remaining 
modules was identified and this engine provides the interface for the framework to 
acquire this inforination. The user selected applications that exist within the organisation 
will at a later stage be required by the AIRE engine so that the applications' importance is 
rated. The industry sector inforrnation is required by the engine that calculates risks to 
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provide an initial input. The size, I. S. requirements and I. T. budget information are all 
considered when selecting controls in the CERME engine. The CERME engine addresses 
SME requirements of ease of use by not requiring technical details (but instead hiding it 
in the background i. e. recognising technical information according to applications) and 
length of process by introducing profiling instead of lengthy questionnaires 
5.4.2 Application Importance Rating Engine (AIRE) 
The function of this process engine is straightforward: It should first access the 
(organisational profile' and retrieve the selected as 'existing applications' and then 
prompt the user to rate their importance. 
5.4.2.1 AIRE'S Required Inputs 
There are three essential inputs to the AIPE process engine, all related to each other: 
9 First there is the input, from the previous engine, of the applications/functions that 
exist within the organisations I. T. infrastructure. 
* This is complimented with help text. This is predetermined text within the tool 
that is linked to each application, this process engine retrieves the text that is 
relevant to the selected applications and provides inforination on how such 
applications can be compromised and what the results are. Providing information 
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like this to the user makes the scoring of the applications more accurate as it 
ensures the user will not misconceive how a compromise of an application and its 
related assets might affect the organisation. 
The applications and the 'help text' are then presented to the user who is required 
to consider how a compromise of each application may affect the organisation and 
therefore rate the importance of each application on the three fields described 
earlier: what the effect of loss of confidentiality could be, what the results of a 
compromise of integrity, and how the organisation is affected if application 
availability is lost. 
5.4.2.2 Use of Collected data 
The sole output of this process engine is an updated 'organisational profile' where the 
users' ratings of applications importance have been added next to each of the previously 
selected applications. As Figure 55 illustrates, this output provides the basis for two 
considerations in the subsequent engines. 
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Application Importance Rating Engine 
User 
Rank 
Rate Application Risks 
Importance 4-1-1 
Proffler 
(RRE) 
Already CorAains: Engine Scored Mustry Sector 
System (OPE) Applications 
Existing Applications 
Manage 
!! 
Risks 
Application 'Help Texf (CERME) 
Already Contains: 
Size (Employees) 
I. S. RaqiArarrwds 
I. T. Budget 
Figure 55: Scoring applications using the AIRE 
Firstly it constitutes the second element that determines the level of threat the 
organisation is under based on predetennined lists of threats that correspond to 
applications (essentially threats that have been introduce because of the existence of an 
application). Furthennore the output of the AIRE engine provides one of the inputs to the 
CERME, the engine that assists in the selection of controls, since one of the criteria, the 
recommendation of appropriate controls by the framework to the user, is naturally that 
the controls are suitable and applicable to the available applications requiring protection. 
The SME requirement addressed by the AIRE engine is to provide assistance to user 
(partly since at this stage the user is assisted with understanding the importance of 
applications and rating it more accurately). 
157 
5.4.3 Risk Ranking Engine 
This process engine (Figure 56) utillses the data output from the two previous engines 
(Industry sector and existing applications rated in terms of importance to the 
organisation) combined with survey data to establish how much the organisation is at risk 
from existing threats. Risk is what connects the analysis with the management. 
5.4.3.1 Process Engine's Required Inputs 
As discussed earlier, the industry sector that an organisation belongs to generally 
determines how likely it is for the organisation to be the target of an attack. Furthermore, 
each application/function that constitutes the organisations' I. T. infrastructure introduces 
certain threats itself The new element added here is predetermined values for threat 
impact. These are initially (since later on in the feedback they are adapted to the 
organisation according to the users input) taken from survey findings and are a product of 
the reported annual losses due to threats and the frequency of occurrence of a threat. The 
reason behind using all this information for estimating the risk levels is that there was a 
need to adapt these values of risk to the organisation as much as possible since later on it 
is the basis for selecting controls. Using the traditional values on effect of a threat and 
frequency from surveys would give a threat score for each threat which however would 
be the same for all organisations. The requirement for this methodology was to assess the 
requirements of different organisations, operating differently and relying more upon 
different assets (e. g. there is a different dependence, and associated losses, of a bank to 
customer details than of a university). Therefore the specific nsk associated with an 
industry sector an organisation belongs to was considered and fijrthennore the threats and 
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potential losses because of the specific applications and types of data the orgarusation 
being assessed has that make its environment unique from the rest and especially 
differentiate it from organisations from different sectors. 
Risk Ranking Engine 
System 
Threat Criticality 
& Annual Frequency Rank 
Risks 
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is under 
Manage 
Risks 
(CERME) 
Already Contains: 
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I. S. Requirements 
Risk Because of Sector 
& due to Applications 
Figure 56: Risk calculation using the RRE 
The RRE engine addresses the requirement of SMEs for Risk Impact Analysis and 
consideration of threats specific to the organisation. 
5.4.3.2 Use of Collected data 
All these factors sum up to produce a threat factor for each threat which is the main 
function of this module. These threat factors are all progressed to the Risk Management 
engine which is where they find their primary use. 
5.4.4 Cost-Effective Risk Management Engine (CERME) 
The previously described process engines mainly constitute the risk analysis part of the 
framework and gather all the required data and process it so as to feed it to this process 
engine. The CERME process engine is basically the risk management part. 
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5.4-4.1 Process Engine's Required Inputs 
This engine (Figure 57) is the 'heart' of the RA framework, its basic function is to gather 
all the infort-nation from the previous modules and transform it to useful information for 
the user. The information gathered includes, organization budget, size, I. S. requirements, 
all available applications and the risk levels the organisation is under. The reasons why 
all this infonnation has been gathered is clear when looking at the output of this engine. 
Cost Effective Risk Management Engine 
Available 
Applications 
Appropriate Controls 
Manage & Economic Consideration% 
3 
Risks 
(CERME) 
Selected C trol Almdy Contains: on s 
Size (Employees) 
I. S. ReclLdrements 
I. T Budget 
Figure 57: Selecting appropriate controls with the assistance of CERME 
5.4.4.2 Use of Collected data 
As Figure 39 illustrates, the use, in this process engine, of all this collected data is to be 
presented to the user in a comprehensive way, so as to facilitate the users' decision of 
what controls should be implemented (addressing the SME requirements for assistance in 
choosing controls and suggesting cost effective controls). In order to achieve this, while 
at the same time cover all the requirements that have been identified that an RA 
methodology should include, this data presented to the user is: 
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The 'threat profiles' including Annual Loss Expectancy. To begin with, the user 
should be made aware of the level of risk the organisation is under and what the 
likelihood of occurrence is. Also the system should indicate what potential losses 
may result should these risks occur. It is required that this data is presented in a 
comprehensive manner in order to be useftil, therefore the idea conceived here is 
to include a graphical display which progresses from green to amber and then red 
and the threats are illustrated on it being the more into red as the threat increases. 
Equally when controls are chosen later on the threats can decrease into green 
according to the effect of the control on each threat. 
The framework needs not just to present a list of all available controls but should 
distinguish and assist the user by presenting those controls that correspond to the 
available applications and the specific risks the organisation is under. Also before 
distinguishing those controls the framework should consider what the I. S. 
requirements of the organisation are, security or easier access. 
Having presented the user with only the potential losses from threats and a list of 
all the appropriate controls (as indicated in various sources such as ISO 27001 
which includes a comprehensive overview of all controls, Muller (2003) that 
focuses on network security and Garfinkel (1997) focusing on server security), the 
. r__ - framework should also present to the user what the cost of controls is and 
therefore assist them in selecting the most cost-effective options while at the same 
time reducing the risks at the desired levels. Having been illustrated this 
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information, an option for the user is also to accept the risk (Meritt 1998) if the 
level of risk or the ALE does not justify a required high investment for securing 
this risk. Addressing an SME user, the framework should avoid leaving the 
budget allocation entirely up to a user who is not particularly security aware, it 
will be therefore useful to also provide recommendations of what budget should 
be spent on security controls by the organisation. Considering the size sector and 
budget the system can suggest a minimum security spending based on survey data 
of what other organisations with the same characteristics do. 
Therefore the whole concept of the CERME is to display the current risks and risk levels 
to the user, then suggest what controls, based on statistics, correspond to the 
orgamsations requirements by illustrating those that match the specific identified risks 
and applications. The controls will be ranked also after considering the level of 
'intrusive/hard' security the organisation requires. This will have enabled the user to 
select controls that are matching to the organisations characteristics, what the framework 
should now do is suggest what budget should be devoted to I. S. controls and allow the 
user to experiment with different configurations, illustrating each time the cost of 
controls against the budget, the potential loss because of a threat and the effect the 
controls have on the existing identified threats. This should enable the user to eventually 
select the most appropriate controls that reduce the risks to acceptable levels while at the 
same time not exceed a certain budget or the actual losses from a compromise. This 
provides the organisations that will adopt this methodology with a form of ROI 
consideration when selecting security solutions. By establishing ROI data, the 
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management can make more informed decisions regarding which controls to implement, 
based upon initial cost, but also on the current threat exposure of the organization 
(Hamilton 2002). 
There is the possibility for the tool to suggest certain controls according to the highest 
ranking threats and the corresponding controls and budget. However for the prototype it 
was selected not to use this approach, as the appropriateness of its output would be 
questionable, introducing some of the difficulties related with the existing RA tools and 
not considering what the organisation is actually interested in protecting more. Thus it is 
preferred to present the user with as much data as possible to allow them to make the 
selection. Such an addition is still possible, but for the time being it was preferred to use 
human judgement as means of selecting appropriate controls. 
5.4.5 The overall output 
It was identified in the requirements that the output of such a framework should be a 
report with all the necessary elements considering the described characteristics of the 
users that it addresses and aims to assist. 
For this reason, the report of this framework includes certain key elements: 
The applications identified as existing within the organisation and a graphical 
representation of the levels of risk they are under. 
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Naturally this is followed by a list of the selected controls, including their costs 
and another graphical representation of how much the risks have been reduced 
after the controls have been applied. 
Finally another essential element in such a report is the required explanations on 
how to set-up, configure and use these controls. This infonnation will be 
presented to the user as selected links to resources appropriate for the SME target 
user. 
Therefore the SME requirements for a comprehensive output and deployment assistance 
are addressed by this engine. 
5.4.6 Feedback & Update Engine (FUE) 
This engine provides an element identified as missing from the existing solutions to the 
SME that uses this framework. That is the ability to also maintain secure and adapt to 
situations that were not foreseen or did not even exist when security solutions were 
initially considered and implemented. 
5.4.6.1 Process Engine's Required Inputs 
This is a supplementary process engine, as it is not part of the actual RA process and does 
not need to be run when performing the assessment. It is a "support" engine, only used 
after the RA should certain specific situations occur, this is why its function shall not be 
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analysed as with the previous process engines but instead both the input and output 
infonnation is described in brief The FUE perfonns three distinct functions that each 
requires different inputs and produces different outputs. These are: 
1. Assess the effectiveness of the implemented controls. In order to check if the 
implemented controls have been successful, this module requires the user to 
declare what threats have occurred during the period that the controls have been 
applied. The controls have been selected according to the risks the organisation is 
under which in turn are related to survey data on the annual frequency of a risk 
occurring and the potential losses. Here the framework can estimate annual 
occurrence rates and losses due to risks which are specific for this organisation. If 
these exceed the ones that were the basis for the selected controls then the 
framework should re-assess the situation by calculating this time the risks based 
on the actual figures provided by the user. This way selected controls can be re- 
considered based on more realistic data. 
2. Reconsider security if the organisation profile is altered, that is if new 
applications are introduced or old ones removed. Both of these situations can have 
an effect on security. The first might leave new applications vulnerable or 
introduce new risks while the latter may leave the organisations with controls in 
place that are no longer needed. To ensure both these situations are avoided this 
framework enables the user to modify the applications within the 'organisation 
profile' and reconsider the risks the organisation is under and the selected, 
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required controls. A necessary requirement here is to enable the user to do this 
without wasting user time and constituting a disruption to the normal operations 
therefore not requiring the user to go through the entire process from the 
beginning. 
3. Easy update to the framework's data with new information. This is required for 
two reasons. Firstly the data used to perfonn the calculations behind the 
framework is based on the most recent survey data, especially on the risks and 
their likelihood and impact. It would be useful to be able to perform a 
straightforward update to this inforniation when newer is available. Secondly, 
there is the need for the framework to always be up to date with available 
applications and controls since there is no security expert to do this for SMEs. 
Thus the input here is all the aforementioned data but through an easy to use 
administrative interface. The primary goal is to enable the update of the 
framework's data without need rebuilding the whole application, acquiring it, 
installing it and perfonning the whole process again. 
Even though they were not identified anywhere, this functionality should be included to 
any tool that claims to offer management of risks, since management does not end when 
the controls have been deployed. Risks continue to exist even after this and any of these 
three situations described can have a disastrous effect to an organisations security if they 
are not considered. What is stressed here is that risk management should be ongoing and 
occur as threats occur, assets changed or new data becomes available, if instead it is 
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perfon-ned periodically it leaves an organisation vulnerable and exposed from the time 
any of the three happens to the time the re-assessment takes place. 
This process engine even enables SMEs that have already deployed security solutions to 
check the appropriateness of the selected controls by going through the whole framework 
and then suggesting to this engine certain threats that have occurred and see what 
improvements they can deploy to the current security. This engine therefore covers the 
SME requirement for dynamic feedback and update. 
5.5 Other Components 
In order to achieve the desired results, there are some additional engines that need to be 
used in the background by the methodology. These are needed to perfon-n the 
mathematical calculations, the storing of information and the tasks associated with 
creating and printing a report document. Since established programs that perform these 
functions already exist and work well with existing programming languages (using which 
the methodology will be implemented into a prototype), there is no need to produce new 
since there is the possibility to use the existing. Because there is the need for these 
programs to exist within the system that the framework is installed, all three were chosen 
to be elements of MS Office since it is most commonly found on PCs than any other 
similar application. Thus, Access was chosen to be the database engine, Excel was used 
to perfonn all the background calculations, and Word was the tool that provides with a 
report at the end of the assessment. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
This section summarizes how, by using the process engines described in this chapter into 
a framework, all the requirements identified as needed from an RA tool were assessed. 
9 The methodology included many elements throughout to achieve the first 
requirement and enable its use by, non-experienced in the sector, users. The use of 
profiles is the main element which simplifies the process as it eliminates the 
technical part of an RA and also significantly reduces time needed to perfonn an 
assessment. Using applications instead of specific assets as means for identifying 
threats makes the analysis process suitable for every user with some knowledge of 
the organisation. Rating the applications importance in terms of importance of C- 
I-A instead of actual economic value also simplifies the use of the tool and 
widens the spectrum of personnel within the organisation that are able to perform 
the analysis. Furthermore, including graphical displays and maximum assistance 
and backup data to the user throughout the process and particularly with the 
selection of controls, a stage which includes significant decisions by the user, has 
reduced the complexity compared to traditional RA. 
9 Probably the most important addition to this framework that overcomes problems 
related with existing RA methodologies and their suitability for SMEs is the 
inclusion of cost effective considerations when selecting controls and the actual 
suggestion of controls based explicitly on the organisations needs, namely both 
the exact levels of threats the organisation is under (based on both sector and 
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applications within) as well as the actual applications that can be found within the 
organisation (and at the same time considering which applications are the most 
important to the specific organisation). 
9 The output report by this framework is short but practical as it includes all the 
data identified as necessary in the requirements. A graphical illustration of the 
risk and how it can be reduced with the selected countermeasures (and their cost), 
in order to raise awareness and justify spending to the management. A description 
of the nature and operation of the controls, together with external links on how 
they should be implemented, configured and used, will enable the targeted SME 
user to select, acquire and deploy security solutions. 
* The feedback and update process engine enables users to re-assess the 
organisations I. S. situation if the selected measures have not been successful or if 
there is a change in the organisational structure, providing real-time support to the 
SME management that does not employ someone who can otherwise do this. 
Chapter 6 will illustrate how the process engines of the perceived methodology will be 
used in practice to constitute a working prototype RA tool. 
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6A Functional Prototype of the RA methodology 
This chapter will discuss how the novel RA methodology proposed in Chapter 5 has been 
realised, in a framework and working tool. The resulting prototype has been named 
PRAM, which stands for Profile-based Risk Analysis Method 
6.1 Introduction 
A prototype is a working sample system, the visual representation of how the system will 
look and function after it is complete. Therefore the main purpose of this prototype is not 
to have exhaustive databases or precise values for, as an example, costs of controls. That 
would be the purpose of an actual commercial implementation of this methodology. Here 
the aim is to create a prototype that illustrates the effectiveness of the methodology in 
addressing the identified requirements and (at a later part of this thesis) allow the 
comparison of this novel methodology with the existing solutions. 
6.2 The Architecture Topology 
This section describes what operations are performed throughout the prototype in order to 
collect the required data and present the desired output to the user. Figure 58 illustrates a 
top level view of the actions that are performed within the PRAM prototype and what 
data is conu-nunicated between processes. 
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Figure 58: The process used in PRAM 
The analysis begins when the user selects what applications exist within the orgarusation 
on the PRAM interface, based on a database of possible applications. 
As already discussed, using the application profiles, but knowing what assets typically 
lay behind these applications simplifies the RA process. This way it is not required for 
the user to rate the importance of let's say, a web server, the server O. S., and the 
information within, but simply the importance to the organisation of the website (which is 
made up of these assets but is easier to be understood and its importance appreciated by 
the non-security, or even I. T. trained, SME user). 
Having created a list of the available application profiles within the organisation, it is 
required that the user scores each application's importance to the organisation in terms of 
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Confidentiality, fntegrity and Availability, the three recognised, within IS017799, 
measures of valuing asset importance also used to rate assets importance in CRAMM 
(Yazak 2002). The applications are therefore now ranked in terrns of importance and the 
assessment then takes two paths: the first is based on the threats the organisation faces 
and the second on the assets that exist within the organisation. 
6.2.1 Route 1: Threat based, having rated the importance of applications. 
The system looks up a database of 'sub-threats' that correspond to each application. Sub- 
threats are threats that when grouped together will constitute the threat profiles. For 
example, sub-threats virus, Trojan, worms and adware all constitute the threat category 
'malicious code'. Thus by knowing the importance of an application, the system looks up 
in the datatable that links applications with sub-threats which can effect these 
applications and identifies all threats introduced to the organisation because of this 
application. Sub-threats have a score associated with them, based on survey findings, 
therefore the system will then look at the next datatable which will link sub-threats to the 
threat category they belong to and add up each sub-threats threat score to make up the 
overall threat levels for each threat category. As described in Chapter 1, based on the 
definitions of the DTI, there are essentially 5 main threat categories that include all the 
possible sub-threats. These are Malicious code, Insider, Outsider, Theft or fraud and 
Accidental (use main threats for simplicity of the on-screen output the user sees as a list 
of all threats would be inconveniently long). Having identified the overall threat, the 
system proceeds into looking up a datatable which links threats to controls. The user can 
use a visual interface illustrating the risk levels the organisation is under to decide which 
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threats they wish to address and select controls from a list of those that correspond to 
each threat. 
6.2.2 Route 2 Asset based, having rated the importance of the applications. 
Starting again from the applications rated in terms of importance, the system will look up 
at a database which will link each selected application with the assets that typically 
underlie this application. This list of assets does not need to be exhaustive but typically 
each application will have certain assets behind it such as hardware, software and 
information assets. Having built a table with all the existing assets, rated in terms of 
importance (by the user), the system will link these, through another datatable with the 
controls that correspond to these assets. In the same way as in route 1, it is preferable for 
simplicity to the users if the list of assets is not displayed to them but the applications 
instead. This way the user has the option to select applications according to the 
applications/business functions they mostly wish to protect. 
6.2.3 Combining the outputs of the two routes 
Both these routes outputs are graphically illustrated to the users allowing them to select 
from a list of controls that is specifically adapted to the risks and the assets of the 
organisation. The system presents only those applications appropriate and all the 
necessary support material to allow even the non - security trained SME user to select 
and implement appropriate controls. 
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This part aimed to give an overall idea of how the framework operates. Specific details 
regarding how controls are linked to applications and threats, how threat scores have been 
assigned, why five threat categories have been chosen to represent all sub-threats at the 
graphical display and what data is presented to the user which enables the selection and 
implementation of controls will be discussed in the appropriate parts of the following 
sections, where a more in-depth description of the tools modules is presented. 
6.2.4 Linking of threats and applications with controls 
In a fully functional (commercial) version according to the type of assets that are listed 
behind the application-profiles (i. e. information, software and hardware) assets will be 
linked with controls that have an impact upon this type of asset. As an example an 
antivirus has an effect on assets belonging to the information and software categories but 
not to hardware assets (meaning that it has no physical effect upon hardware) (Tipton 
2003). A similar approach will be taken when linking threats to applications. E. g. a virus 
will have an effect on infon-nation and software assets (and therefore to applications that 
have such underlying assets) but not to hardware. Since these compromises have been 
made for the prototype and the underlying assets have not been included, for the 
framework's purposes these specific links have been made based on background 
literature which illustrates which applications are effected by what threats and what 
controls need be applied for each application and threat. 
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6.2.5 Compromises 
Since this is not a proper commercial version of the software but a framework to support 
the PhD research, two compromises have been made when converting the methodology 
into a software tool. 
Threats and underlying sub-threats: For the purposes of this prototype, the sub- 
threats have been left out. The system essentially links applications straight to the 
five main threat categories themselves which does not make any difference to the 
process from the users' perspective since both the user input (applications and 
scores) as well as the output (display with the main threat categories) will be the 
same. It does however simplify, (essentially make shorter) the background 
calculations. If the subthreat data was to be used, survey data for each of the 
subthreats importance would have been used and then all added up to each main 
threat category. For this prototype survey data on the five main threat categories 
was used directly, which saved having to add up all the numerous sub-threats to 
establish the threat levels 
- Applications and underlying assets: The second compromise for the purposes of 
simplicity of the prototype is similar to the first. For this prototype, applications 
are linked straight to controls instead of using underlying assets in between. This 
way for example, a website is linked to an antivirus, firewall, encryption of stored 
data etc instead of linking the website, again for example, with a web server an 
O. S. and customer infon-nation, then the O. S. to a firewall and an antivirus and so 
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on. Again this compromise does not require a different input or present a different 
output to the user, but simply saves from increased complexity in the underlying 
databases. Ideally if a commercial working model of this framework was to be 
created, these compromises would be addressed to get somewhat more accurate 
results. 
Quantifying a lot of the elements related with a RA (such as the effect of threats 
and the cost of controls) is inherently difficult when perfon-ning a RA. There are 
many factors that cannot be calculated as for example when calculating the effect 
of a threat occurring, it is relatively straightforward to evaluate the costs due to 
damaged hardware, software and potentially information can also be assigned a 
price. There are a large number of factors however, such as loss of customer 
confidence and damaged reputation that simply cannot be precisely calculated 
when evaluating the effect of threats (GAO 1999). Furthennore attempting to 
estimate the precise cost of controls is difficult since such costs will change very 
regularly. Therefore in this RA framework when such figures are assigned to 
threats or controls, they are not meant to be precise values, they are however 
designed to inform and illustrate to the user the relative effect of threats and cost 
of controls to infonn and raise awareness on these issues. In a fully-working 
model of this framework care should be taken to match these figures better to 
real-life figures. 
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6.3 Implementing the methodology 
What the user sees when assessing risks and selecting controls is the interface of the 
prototype. This was designed using Visual Basic NET 2005 to provide a graphical, user 
friendly, simple interface. However most of the intelligence of the idea is based on the 
architecture (i. e. the background idea which eliminates all the setbacks of existing RA 
tools) the database structure and the use of Excel and Excel calculations. What the Visual 
Basic coding does is to display these elements to the user, obtain certain selections and 
then display the results again. All the functionality of displaying details on applications, 
assets and controls, the effect of threats and controls etc is purely based on the database 
structure, and all the calculations and results on Excel. The function of the GUI is to 
simplify all this for the user. The database contains all the data and Excel performs the 
calculations. It is, however, the VB interface that ties the whole framework together 
(Figure 59) by acquiring the remaining missing bits of data from the user and perfonmng 
complex database handling and Excel and Word automation. 
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Calculations 
)r., 7 ?a No r, 
User 
Input Data 
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5 
Figure 59: The interaction between processes in PRAM 
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Using technology like Excel and Word for these purposes was simpler from a 
development perspective. A commercial version of PRAM would not use them. 
6.3.1 Data and Report 
Before proceeding to discuss the calculations found in the background of PRAM, this 
section describes what background information is stored in PRAM's database and what in 
the report provided to the user. 
63.1.1 The Database 
The database tables together with a large group of SQL queries introduce a large amount 
of PRAM's functionality. The database includes all the information that at various stages 
of PRAM is presented to the user such as the lists of applications, threats, controls and 
store the user selected applications and controls to new database tables which can then be 
used by the modules. These tables also include the locations in Excel where either an 
applications importance score or a controls effect has been stored in Excel (in order to 
consider its value in a mathematical equation to produce a result visible to the user) 
enabling this way the system to alter the selected applications or controls when necessary 
by knowing where new values should be stored to overwrite the old ones. 
6.3.2.1 The Database tables 
Figure 60 illustrates what tables exist within PRAM's database and how they are related. 
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Figure 60: Tables found within PRAMs database 
As far as the tables are concerned there is one containing all the applications, their unique 
identifier and the location in Excel where the importance score associated with that 
application should be stored. Also as far as the applications are concerned there is a table 
with all the descriptions of the applications and a description of what might breach of C- 
I-A mean for each application, these are used as help material in the handler module. 
The next set of tables in the database is related with the controls, thus we have one table 
which includes all the controls together with their effect, cost and how robust it is (ranked 
from I to 3 in terms of low, medium high). This is used to rank the displayed controls if 
the user has selected productivity, what it means is how easy is it for users to 'live' with 
this control meaning how much in the way of working does it get (e. g. employing a clear 
desk policy will require the user to have to go through the records every time a document 
is required therefore slow them down). Therefore the values can be from I (once 
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configured there is little left to do such as antivirus), 2 (it will keep requiring some user 
input, such as firewall) or 3 (it will always require the user to provide with input such as 
biometrics (Nanavati 2002)). 
Furthermore there is a table with the relations between controls and threats (i. e. what 
controls have an effect upon which threat). Another table includes the implementation 
details for each control, included in the report so as to give some additional assistance to 
the user. Finally there is again a blank database table where all the user selected controls 
are stored together with, the main purpose of this table, a generated by the tool cell 
location where the controls' effect has been stored in Excel element 5 described earlier. 
This table is looked up every time a control is removed in order to have its effect also 
removed from Excel and therefore return the total threat score to its previous value. 
With the use of SQL queries the system is able to join different database tables therefore 
illustrate to the user controls that correspond to selected threats and applications, assisting 
the user with the selection of appropriate controls as described earlier. Finally, using 
databases enables the update of the tool with newer data without needing to make any 
changes in the software which would be more complicated and require a specialist to 
perform as well as more time-consuming. Using databases introduces several ways 
straightforward updating can be perfonned. 
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6 3.1.3 The Output Report 
Since MS Word is a word processor fully compatible with Visual Basic but also that 
exists in the majority of computers today, it has been chosen to be automated by PRAM 
in order to provide the user with an output report against other software that could 
perform the same task (such as 'Crystal Reports', a component of Visual Basic 2005, 
which would however need to reside on the PRAM users' computer). 
63.1.4 Elements in the report 
The report provided by PRAM starts by including a list of the applications found within 
the organisation as selected by the user supplemented by a graph, prepared in Excel 
illustrating the initial threat levels the organisation is under. The second group of 
inforination included in the report are the selected controls together with another graph 
which illustrates how the threat levels have dropped after the controls have been 
implemented. Finally there is the support, to the selected controls, data which includes a 
description of the control together with links to websites describing how to implement 
and configure each control. 
6.3.2 Calculation of results 
Excel is the "heart" of the prototype that performs all the calculations according to 
predetennined or entered by the user, and provides the results which are transfon-ned to 
the graphical illustrations that the user sees on the interface. Furthermore, Excel provides 
functionality in the easy updating of the tool (e. g. when new surveys come out which 
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indicate different attack trends or percentage of threat occurrences) one can easily update 
the tool by altering the spreadsheet values 
6 3.2.1 Handling of equations inputs and outputs by PR, 4M 
Through VB commands the Excel template is opened by PRAM, and for each item the 
user selects or inputs in the interface, the system looks up a database with the cell 
locations this item should be stored and enters it in Excel. Similarly when the output of a 
calculation in Excel is required by the system so as to be presented to the user, these 
locations of the equations outputs are already known to the system and therefore all that 
is required is to open the spreadsheet, acquire the value already in the predetennined cell 
and store it in a variable which can then be utilised accordingly in the software. 
6.3.2.2 Included Elements 
Excel was judged appropriate to be used with PRAM for making financial calculations 
and displaying their results graphically. Furthennore, it is used as it is practical for 
different modules of the prototype to store information which can be accessed and 
manipulated by latter modules. In this case, the software requires some input from the 
user which is then stored in appropriate cells In Excel in such a way that as soon as the 
information is entered it immediately becomes part of certain pre-determined equations, 
producing this way an output at a predetermined cell. The interfaces' function here is to 
know where each bit of information should be stored in Excel as well as where to retrieve 
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the output from. At the same time the system remembers where each bit of information is 
located to enable any changes. 
The following section justifies what information is entered by PRAM at specific locations 
in Excel as inputs to forinulas which in turn provide with the desired outputs. By having 
an Excel template which includes certain predetermined information (such as the threat 
scores from surveys), and adding the organisation-specific information that the user has 
entered in the PRAM interface, six key operations are performed within Excel, each 
providing with different outputs. 
Element 1: The Initial Threat Scores 
This element includes predetermined factors which are the severity of each threat (Figure 
61 A) (based on the impact of each threat from the DTI survey), the annual frequency of a 
threats' occurrence (Figure 61B) (again from DTI) and the financial losses caused by the 
occurrence of a threat (Figure 61C) (As reported by DTI and CSI in their surveys). All 
these factors are used to estimate the threat score for each threat (Figure 61D) (used for 
the calculations in element 2). Furthermore they are used in the assessor to present in a 
pop up display when the user clicks on a threat label the potential ALE by this threat. 
ýý Initial Threat Scores= Threat Effect x Annual Frequency of threat 
)ý, ALEfor each threat =Reported Lossesfor each threat x Annual Frequency of 
threat (Endorf 2003) 
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Even though these factors are all initially predetennined by survey findings, they are later 
updated by the feedback module of PRAM to produce organisation-specific figures. All 
these elements as well as the annual loss are updated after the feedback to adapt 
specifically to the organisations characteristics. 
AB 
Feedback(change causes re-evaluation of the situation): 
Statistics on threats: (DTI 2006) 
fig 54 
D 
Effect x Armal Freqienol Threat Score Percentage 
C 
Amount Losses 
Wriis 394 3 105 23.12775 6700 
kisidef 21 7 147 32.37885 1100 
Wsider 17 ? M 29.95595 1500 
A, midental 29 2 5iý 12.77533 1300 
Theft oi Fiaud 8 1 8 1.762115 13000 
Figure 61: Survey data used to calculate the likelihood of and ALE from threats 
What is achieved in this element is an estimation of the initial level of threat without 
considering any characteristics of the organisation but solely the 'threat that is out there' 
and the potential losses because of each threat and its occurrence rate (one of the 
identified financial elements that SMEs require from an RA methodology). The 
importance of this element however is that it then feeds into element 2 to calculate the 
specific threats to the organisation and secondly that after the users' feedback on the 
particular threat occurrence to their organisation this element provides specific threat 
figures for the organisations employing PRAM to calculate risks. In a commercial 
version including the sub-threats previously mentioned then more exhaustive 
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investigation into the survey results would be made to assign the sub-threats with the 
equivalent reported scores. 
Element 2: The Risk scores. 
Traditionally risk is calculated as the factor of (Gray 2005): 
Risk(to effort, organization, or object)= Threat x Vulnerability(of the threat) xImpact(asset value) 
In this element 'Threat' is the 'Threat Rank to Application' (i. e. a measurement of how 
much each application is endangered by a specific threat), Vulnerability is the 'Initial 
Threat Score' (i. e. the product of each threat's impact and likelihood) and Impact, which 
is the asset's value, is in this case the C-I-A rating of the asset's importance. Another 
factor that affects the risk towards applications is the industry sector the organisation 
belongs to since different types of organisation are subject to different volumes of attacks 
and I. S. breaches. Therefore this was the last factor added to PRAM's formula for 
estimating risk: 
ý;, Risk Scores = Industry specific attack activity x Application Importance (C-I-A) 
x Threat Rank to Application x Initial Threat Score (from element 1) 
This element includes a score stored by the profiler module of the tool based on the 
Symantec threat report results. Data from the Threat Report indicating the 'attack activity 
by industry' (Figure 33 of the report) is used to give a multiplier for the threat score 
(Figure 62A). This illustrates the specific threat the orgamsation faces solely due to the 
industry sector it belongs to. What is stored next in this element is the users' score of 
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each application C-I-A (Figure 62B), including the importance rating. This way the most 
important the application - the greater the resulting threat score is. Threat Rank to 
Application (Figure 62C) refers to a pre-determined ranking of the threats to the specific 
applications. For example while the biggest threats due to the application 'Internet 
connection' might be the introduction of Malicious Code, Insider Misuse and Attack by 
Outsider, for removable backup media the biggest threats are more likely to be 
Accidental Loss and Theft. Finally the threat score for each threat which is produced by 
element I is used in this equation (Figure 62D). 
ABCD 
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15 Application: IndustrgSector App1mpo Threat Rank Threat Name Threat Score TotalScore 
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17 Website 4 Virus 23.1277533 0 
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24 Website 
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-ýi 
Office Applications 4 Virus 23.1277503 323788546 
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3i 2 Outsider 2995594714 2096.9163 
34 57 1 Theft 1.762114537 61.6740089 
35 
Application: IndustrgSector App1mpo Threat Rank Threat Name Threat Score TotafScore 
37 5 Accidental 12.7753304 1916.29356 
, -ýa 
Office Applications 4 Virus 231277533 2775,3304 
33 Word 3 Insider 32.37885463 2914.09692 
46 2 Outsider 2935594714 179735683 
Figure 62: How each application introduces threats to the organisation 
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Element I provides with a generic estimation of the severity of each risk without any 
consideration of specific threat levels for the particular organisation being assessed. By 
adding a threat score because of the industry sector and threats introduced because of the 
applications that exist within the organisation. What is achieved here will enable PRAM 
to produce threat estimations which match the specific characteristics of the organisation 
being assessed, addressing this identified requirement of SMEs of an RA solution. The 
outputs of this element (i. e. the overall risk score for each threat introduced by each 
application) (Figure 62E) are fed to element 4 to produce the overall threat score. . 
Element 3: The Financial considerations/Calculations 
Three bits of data are stored within this element, the organisations size (in terms of 
employees) (Figure 63A) and the organisations I. T. budget (Figure 45B) as entered by the 
user in the profiler module and a value stored by the VB project according to the users 
selection of industry type (Figure 63C), that is the average, according to CSI, spending 
per employee on security according to the industry sector. These elements are used to 
calculate and suggest a minimum security spending to the organisation (Figure 63D) and 
what percentage of the overall budget that is. The size element is also used in assessor to 
provide with a multiplier by which the controls price is multiplied. 
ý, Recommended Budget= Size of organisation x Reported spending per employee 
for industry sector 
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ROI 
DI 
Size 
Spending per emplo 9.32 
Budget 50000 
recommended budge 
(FBI p9) 
Figure 63: Survey Data is used to suggest minimum spending on I. S. 
The recommendation of a minimum budget that should be spent per employee (and 
according to industry sector) on security, by the organisation managing its risks by using 
PRAM, is an essential component for the SME user in need of guidance on what they 
should spend on security. These financial figures are then used in the assessor when 
providing ROI assistance to the user selecting controls, addressing this way the 
requirement of SMEs for assistance in the financial considerations of IT security. 
Element 4: Final threat scores 
The function of this element is to gather all the individual risk scores as they have been 
calculated for each application (in element 2) and add them all up (Figure 64A), then 
divide them by the number of total applications found within the organisation (Figure 
64B) to produce an average of the Overall Threat Score for each threat (Figure 64C). This 
is the actual score that is displayed in the red-amber-green display on the PRAM 
interface. 
ýý Overall Threat displayed to user= Risk Scores lNumber of applications 
188 
TotalThreats 
Virus 363.1009 181.5505 
Outsider 529.2217 264,6109 
Accidenta 225 112.5 
Theft 113.3994 56.69971 
Insider 2318.282 1159.141 
Total: 0 1774.502 
Number of selected Application: 2 = 
Figure 64: Threat by Applications is averaged to give 
the overall threat as illustrated graphically to the user 
By providing the figures that, through the VB interface are then illustrated graphically to 
the user, another requirement of SMEs is addressed by PRAM, that is the need for a 
comprehensive interface which the user can look and immediately reallse what risks the 
organisation faces and how much these are reduced by the selected controls. 
Element 5: The controls effect 
When the user selects a control in the assessor module, there is a 'control effect score', 
which is based on statistical data, already stored in the database which is associated with 
each control. This effect is stored here under the threat it applies to (i. e. the threats this 
selected control has an effect upon e. g. control 'Antivirus' will have an effect of 75% and 
will be stored underneath threat 'Virus') and the threat's score is divided by the controls 
effect (Figure 65A) to provide a threat score after the control has been applied (Figure 
65B). This will happen as many times as long as the user selects controls that apply to 
threats while their score is still over zero. If the threats score reaches zero the user is 
189 
alerted there is no need to select more controls for this threat. At the same time, the 
change on the overall threat score is displayed to the user in the red-amber -green display 
of the assessor every time a control is added and the user can make the decision of 
whether the threat has been reduced to acceptable levels. 
ý, Threat after applying control= Old Threatl Controls effect (Allard 2003) 
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Figure 65: The predetermined effects of controls are 
used to reduce the threat scores 
The output of this element achieves in illustrating the effect of the user-selected controls 
on the already calculated overall risk that the organisation faces. Every time the user adds 
a control and the related threat scores are reduced, this reduction in threat is illustrated to 
the user on the assessor display allowing the comparison between the effect of the control 
and its cost achieving this way the requirement of SMEs for assistance in selecting cost- 
effective controls with as much impact on threats as possible. In a commercial version 
one would wish more accurate scores on the effect controls have on threats. This would 
ideally be achieved by conducting an investigation and querying people involved in the 
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I. S., RA and countermeasures industry what percentage effect they judge each control to 
have. Then for each control calculate the average, from the responses, score and include 
that in the database. This is what was meant earlier when saying that the effect of controls 
is based on statistical data. In the case of the prototype however, where the purpose is to 
illustrate the functionality of the framework, the effect of the controls has been estimated 
either from personal experience having used certain controls for some of the applications 
or from survey data and reading material. 
Element 6: The threat score graphs 
In this element the initial (Figure 66A) and final (Figure 6613) (i. e. after the controls have 
been applied) threat scores are displayed, these are then used to create two graphs in 
Excel 
initial: Virus 181.5505 
Outsider 264,6109 
Accidenta 112.5 AE Theft 56.69971 
Insider 1159.141 
Total: 1774.502 
with controls: Virus 9.077523 
Outsider 21.8304 
Accidenta 112.5 
B Theft 56.69971 
> 
Insider 463.6564 
Total: 661764 
Figure 66: The initial and final threat scores assist 
in drawing graphs for the final report 
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These are used in the report and their purpose is to illustrate to the user conducting the 
assessment and to the management what the threats (and how high) towards the 
organisation are and the effect of the selected controls. Including these graphs of how 
much threats are reduced, together with information on the selected controls and 
primarily their cost is useful information to raise managerial awareness and justify the 
expense for securing assets. 
6.4 The PRAM Risk Analysis prototype 
Having discussed how results are created in the background, this section will describe 
how the interface works to obtain and display information to and from the user. 
Essentially, to perforin the operations identified in the requirements and discussed in the 
methodology, there are four modules that should make up the PRAM interface. 
- The Organisation Profiler for profiling the organisation. 
- The Application Handler used for rating the applications importance. 
The Assessor which addresses identified threats with the appropriate controls. 
- The Feedback and Update module. 
6.4.1 The Organisation Proffier 
As the name implies, this module creates the initial profile of the organisation. PRAM 
requires the user to input specific data on the organisation at this stage which will be 
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stored and utilised by the modules that follow. As Figure 67 illustrates, fl-iis module has 
two main displays: the Initial Profiling display and the Applications/Departments display. 
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Figure 67: The initial profiler interface 
6.4. ]. 1 Initia / Profiling Display 
More specifically the user is required to enter the nature (industry sector) of the 
organisation, which this detennines one of the factors used to estimate the threat score for 
the organisation. Also required here is the size of the organisation in terms of employees, 
used to suggest the recommended I. S. spending and also calculate the cost of controls at 
the final stage which is also where the I. T. security budget required input is later used. 
The final required user input is setting the value of the Security vs. Productivity bar 
which will detennine the way controls are displayed to the user later on. This bar enables 
the user to select from three settings: security, productivity or both. 
193 
6 4.1.2 ApplicationsIdepartments Display 
The goal here is to simplify the user input and avoid the lengthy questionnaires and other 
input methods found in risk analysis tools. For this, a tree-view control is used which 
presents the user with a list of all possible applications that can be found within an 
organisation. Approaching the analysis this way eliminates the need to identify specific 
assets, the basis of the tool are the Risks that the organisation faces and these can be 
scored just as well according to the applications used. Nevertheless, and because the aim 
is not to be exhaustive, a lot of the assets found within the organisation can be guessed 
according to the applications (eg if local email is used there will be hardware assets such 
as a server and clients, software assets such as specific server O. S., and information 
assets such as the actual messages which travel through the network and the internet and 
are stored somewhere within the server or the desktops (Buchanan 1999)). Here is the 
first use of profiles we have in the tool, where the assets are hidden behind the 
applications and as the user selects applications, a list of more specific assets can be 
populated. Every application selected by the user is copied to a list-view display, from 
there the user can then remove applications, clear the list and start over. If the user is 
happy with these selections they can proceed which will store in a database all the 
selected applications data. It will also cause the values entered by the user for 
organisation size, budget etc to be stored in Excel. 
6.4.2 The application handier module 
The handler (Figure 68) is a straightforward application which lets the user score the 
importance of the previously selected applications. 
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Figure 68: Rating the selected applications importance 
What is meant by straightforward is that there are no assumptions made or survey data 
used in this part in order to obtain results. The database where all the user selected 
applications have been stored by the previous module is opened; the applications are 
displayed to the user one by one and the user who is required to score these applications 
importance. That is done by the user rating on a0 to 10 scale, 0 being minimum and 10 
the maximum, what the effect to the organisations operation would be if the each of the 
three factors determined by IS017799 occur to the application. That is breach of 
confidentiality, compromise of integrity and loss of availability. The 10-point scale (also 
used by CRAMM (Yazak 2002)) was selected to allow the user a more precise rating 
than, for example, if it was a low-medium-high scale. However what scale is used here is 
not the essence as the overall importance score provides a multiplier (described in section 
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6.3.2.2) for the overall risk scores, therefore whichever the scale was, the output risk 
scores introduced by each application would still be likewise proportional to the 
importance of the applications as rated by the user. A progress-bar and a label at the 
bottom of the module illustrate how far down the list of all selected applications the user 
is in tenns of scoring. When all applications have been scored, PRAM utilises the user 
ratings to calculate the level of risks the organisation is under. To achieve this, two 
different displays are used within the module: the Assets Display and the Impact Display. 
6 4.2.1 The assets display 
The application name and details are displayed at the top half of the module together with 
some infon-nation on the application. There are also controls which allow the user to 
navigate, so as to view and score, through the selected applications and at the top right of 
the display the average score of the applications importance can be seen, if the user has 
already scored that asset, or is updated in real time while the user uses the bottom 
'impact' display to score it. 
6 4.2.2 Impact display 
This is the bit of the module where the scoring of the application takes place, it includes 
three slide-bars by moving which the user determines the imPact of the C, I or A element 
occurring, and three text-boxes which provide the user with useful information in order to 
achieve the most realistic score possible. Having used the slidebars to score the 
importance of the application, the user can press 'set' to move to the next application.. 
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When the scoring process for an application is finished, the average value of the user 
scores is stored next to the corresponding application in order to be used for sorting the 
applications in later parts of the tool and in the appropriate locations. 
6.4.3 The Initial threat display 
When the user is done with scoring the assets they can press 'Done' which will present 
them with the 'initial threats display' shown in Figure 69. 
Theft 
AppiNam ApplDetal AppScoie 
Backup On PC's Individually 10 
Welpsite E-Commerce 9 
E-mailing Using Web Applications a 
Pfinting Locally on each PC 8 
Internet Connection Always On 7 
3[d pafty access f... Logical Access IT rachng p. -7 
--------------------------- 
Change Pioceed 
. ..... ........ .. 
Figure 69: The initial threat display 
As the threats are calculated in Excel, their final scores are obtained by this part of the 
tool and the threats are displayed graphically against a red-amber-green display which 
illustrates, as a threat moves more towards the upper bit of the display (the more into the 
red section it is) the more the likelihood and damage that may be caused by that threat. A 
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data-gridview style table undemeath displays at the same time the lists of all the selected 
applications together with their scores, all ranked in terms of importance. 
For the purposes of simplicity required from this framework, instead of using exhaustive 
lists of threats as found in the various surveys, all the threats have been categorised under 
five main categories, forming this way the basis for the 'threat profiles' (which will 
mainly be used in the next part). Table 10 illustrates the categories under which all major 
threats have been grouped in a similar way as the DTI 2006 survey groups them. 
Malicious Code Insider Misuse Unauthorised Theft or Fraud Accidental 
of information Access by involving Systems Failure 
systems Outsiders computers or data 
corruption 
Virus 
Misuse of web 
access 
Actual penetration 
into network 
Financial Fraud 
Power supply 
failure 
' 
Physical theft of Misuse of e-mail Den al of service 11 Environment Trojans 
11 
access attack 
computer control failure 
equipment 
Unauthorized Company 
Ad-ware access to systems impersonated on Telecoms fraud Network Overload 
data Internet 
Table 10: Threats with similar characteristics grouped together form threat profiles 
6.4.4 The Assessor 
This is the module that makes the decisions, fed with the level of risk the organisation is 
under and the significance of applications to the organisation, the controls that 
correspond to the organisations profile and needs are chosen and prioritised accordingly. 
The following Figure shows the decision process that follows: 
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Figure 70: The decision process for selecting controls 
As described earlier, this constitutes the management fragment of the RA. The aim is to 
achieve simplicity and assist the user by using multiple graphical displays. There are 
three main displays, one about the budget, one on the current threat, and one about the 
available and selected controls. Three displays are used to achieve this: the Threat 
Display, the ROI display and the Threats - Applications - Controls Display. 
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Figure 71: The Assessor GUI presents the assistance an SME 
user needs when selecting controls 
6 4.4.1 The R. 0.1. display 
This display shows to the user what the minimum recommended security budget is and 
also presents it as a percentage of the overall security budget (Figure 71 A). Here the user 
has the option to decide whether they want to invest more or less on security. When 
controls are selected a progress bar illustrates to the user what proportion of the selected 
I. T. security budget they have spent, if the entire selected by the user budget has been 
spent, the user is not allowed to selected any more controls unless they Mcrease the 
selected budget by selecting 'invest more'. 
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A subroutine here considers the cost of controls in relation to the size of the organisation 
as specific prices for the controls are not being used, and because not all controls need to 
be applied for as many PCs the organisation has. For example if there are 50 computers, 
the antivirus control needs to be multiplied by 50. At the same time, controls like 
physical security, biometrics and hardware firewall will still need to be more than one in 
a home office but not as many as 50. Therefore a multiplication factor is used which will 
be roughly 5 for a small organisation, 10 for a medium and 25 for a large to illustrate 
differences in controls prices relevant to the organisation size. In a proper commercial 
working model of course with some altering of the database the controls can be 
distinguished in software, hardware and physical and then use this rough approximation 
for hardware and physical while multiply all the software controls with the number of 
pc's, while this will make the output a'bit more specific, it will still not be 100% precise. 
Therefore for the prototypes purposes the approximate multiplier based on the number of 
employees is chosen to be used simply to illustrate to the user how the cost increases with 
the size of the organization. 
A known vulnerability of the tool that has not been addressed here but is crucial to be 
tackled in a "full" version of PRAM is that the control selection process ignores possible 
overlaps or/and conflicts between different security measures. 
One last issue for a full version of PRAM is the actual cost of the controls, and since it is 
not the purpose here to include actual brands and prices of countenneasures, the prices 
for a number of products from each control category could be gathered and averaged to 
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provide the input here. For the purposes of this prototype however, approximations were 
made according to the typical prices expected for each product category. 
6.4.4.2 The Threat Display 
This display (Figure 71 B) is the first thing the user sees when the module loads, it 
graphically illustrates the threat scores for the organisation that, according to the user 
inputs, have been calculated in Excel. Another important feature of this display is that by 
clicking on any of the threat labels on the display, a pop-up presents the user with the 
'threat profile' of this threat. The threat profile includes statistical and financial data 
which aims to assist the user with the selection of countermeasures. Particularly the 
financial data, as part of the tools ROI feature, calculates the ALE by each threat, 
ALE = Annual Frequency x Losses occurred 
As discussed earlier, the actual figures that make up the factors for this calculation have 
initially been devised from survey data, However as will be seen later in this chapter, if 
the user has used the feedback module they can return and re-evaluate the selection of 
cost-effective controls based on expected ALE, however this time with the numbers 
adapted to specific figures from the organisation. 
Figure 72 illustrates how PRAM informs the user of these financial issues related with 
the threats the organisation faces as part of the assistance in raising awareness and paying 
appropriate attention to where the organisation is really at risk when selecting controls. 
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Figure 72 : PRAM assists the Cost-effective 
selection of controls 
PRAM allows the user to view a threat that is undesirably high on the coloured display 
seen in previous figures, click on it to view what losses may result from this threat and 
then from the bottom display select the corresponding controls, even considering the 
application that requires more protection. When controls are added, their cost is added in 
the ROI display, and the user has the option to contrast the cost of controls against the 
estimated loss due to a threat and therefore select the most cost effective controls. 
6 4.4.3 The Threats -Applications - Controls Display 
This is the main display at the bottom of this module; it enables the user to select the 
controls which match more the threat and budget requirements of the organisation. To do 
this the user can look at the threat display and decide which threat they wish to decrement 
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on the display. By selecting the name of that threat from a drop down list (Figure 71C) 
the tree-view control of the display is populated with the corresponding controls, then the 
user can populate a check-box display with all the applications that have been identified 
as existing within the organisation (sorted in terms of importance) (Figure 54D). By 
checking any of these applications the controls that correspond to it and that already exist 
in the tree-view under the threat's being assessed name are highlighted green (Figure 
54E) to make the users choice of controls easier. Furthermore by clicking on a control 
once the system displays a short description and details of this control to assist the users 
with their selection (Figure 7 IF). 
When a control is selected its cost is subtracted from the remaining budget and its effect 
upon the threats can be viewed in the threat display. If in the first module the user has 
selected 'productivity', the controls are listed in tenns of intrusiveness but in an 
ascending order, otherwise they are listed in tenns of effectiveness (i. e. security) they 
provide. 
In addition, an option provided to the user here is to select certain controls as controls 
already been implemented within the organisation (Figure 54G). When the application is 
selected, its effect is illustrated on the 'Threat Display' without however its cost being 
reduced from the remaining suggested security budget (Its cost does however appear 
inside the 'Total Cost of Protection to Date' display). This feature enables the user 
performing the assessment to visually establish what effect the existing controls have on 
threats, add controls to supplement existing ones that have not eliminated a threat, even 
204 
remove existing controls and replace with more efficient potentially even at a better 
overall cost. This feature can therefore be described as a tool to evaluate the effectiveness 
of existing organisation security. 
Finally, when the user is satisfied with the selected controls in tenns of cost and effect on 
threats, they can end the assessment and create a report in Microsoft Word (Figure 73) 
which, besides other data, includes the selected control names and implementation details 
as a form of assistance to the user. 
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Figure 73: A part of PRAM's output report 
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6.4.5 Feedback 
This is the module which manages the efficiency of the suggested security plan and 
controls produced by the previous modules. To do this there are three displays used: the 
Control Box Display, the Threat Occurrence Display and the Handle Applications 
Display. 
Having the information from each stage stored inside specific locations in Excel this 
allows us not to have to re-run the whole application from the beginning, but instead store 
all the new information from the feedback halfway through and therefore asking the user 
to re-run the RA application from the middle (or the appropriate point) in order to re- 
assess new threats or changes to applications 
Therefore: 
If the user simply reports threat occurrences and the system suggests adding 
controls, then they only need to re-run the assessor module and select more 
controls for an application. The assessor will check whether this is after the 
feedback and if this is the case will open a database and highlight existing 
controls so that the user can select additional 
if the user removes applications the system deletes them from the database and 
their values from Excel and therefore the user again only needs to run the assessor 
only to remove controls (which however is not recommended) 
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if the user adds applications they need to re-run the application from the asset 
handler so as to also score the newly added controls importance (or we could 
score the assets here and run it from the assessor again) 
6.4.5.1 The Control Box Display 
The control box display in this module provides with information initially on what the 
user is expected to do and subsequently, according to the users input, what actions should 
be taken after the feedback. 
6.4.5.2 The Threat Occurrence Display 
Figure 74 illustrates the display which enables the user to assess the effectiveness of the 
controls already implemented. 
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Figure 74: Feedback evaluates effectiveness of controls 
The user is required to state the period the controls have been applied and the number of 
threats that have occurred during that period. This allows for the system to predict the 
annual occurrence of each threat. When controls were first suggested, survey data was 
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considered for estimating risks and therefore select appropriate controls. Through this 
module PRAM can establish whether that data was accurate or if the specific organisation 
has different needs. Before storing the new annual occurrence, the system grabs the old 
and compares it, if the new is larger, the system suggests that more controls should be 
applied for this threat, if it is smaller or zero no action is taken as it is better to consider 
that the applied control are successful than that the threat was overestimated and 
therefore controls are removed. Since the initial controls where considered for the threat 
occurring x number of times in a year if the newly calculated number of annual 
occurrences is smaller it means the controls are sufficient but since the threat still occurs 
the organization might benefit from trying to apply the controls better or configuring and 
updating them better. If however the new annual rate is larger it means that we need to 
apply more controls that are appropriate for this threat. The user can then re-run only the 
last pail of the methodology (i. e. the assessor) and with new data this time on annual 
occurrence and losses due to threats re-consider security. 
6 4.5.3 The Handle Applications Display 
In the lower part of the interface the user can add or remove applications to or from the 
existing applications that were chosen during the assessment process. The user first 
selects which of the two actions they wish to perform. If the user selects to remove an 
application, first the system populates the list-view display in the interface with all the 
previously selected applications from the database. Then the user can select the 
application they wish to remove and the system first deletes the score of the application 
from the location it has been stored in Excel, then another query deletes the application 
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from the selected applications database. This way the threat scores are re-calculated 
according to the new situation and the user can assess the controls again. 
Similarly the function that allows the user to add applications to the existing organisation 
profile, populates a list of all the available applications and the list of existing 
applications (Figure 75A). The user can move the desired application from the first list to 
the second. When adding applications the user can also score them (Figure 75B) and 
therefore avoid having to re-run the Handler module but instead proceed straight to the 
Assessor to select controls. 
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Figure 75: The Feedback module enables 
the update of the organisations profile 
6.4.6 Administrative Update 
The administrative update of the software is mainly based upon updating the applications 
and controls database, including descriptions and the links between tables and the threat 
scores in Excel when new survey data becomes available. The purpose of this part is to 
allow the easy update of the tool each time an application, threat or control is added or 
needs to be removed. This interface will simply update the database if we are updating 
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applications or controls, or updates the scores in Excel if we are modifying threat scores 
e. g. due to new survey data. This interface will allow the user to be able to update the tool 
themselves. As an example, if we are discussing a commercial application a designated 
user of the tool can be notified by email or even by text message of a control ID and 
delete it or of a new control together with an effect score and cost to add. For the 
purposes of this prototype this interface is not operational since there is no actual need to 
update the tool this way. It is however as a GUI to illustrate the concept. 
6.5 Conclusions 
To conclude this chapter, the requirements that have been assessed by this prototype of 
PRAM are: 
No use of questionnaires, but on the contrary a straightforward input of data by 
use of profiling i. e. similar assets are grouped together under the applications 
where they may be found and the threats that belong to the same category also 
grouped under their main threat group 
- Easy selection of controls and assistance to selecting, both from a 
fmancial 
perspective as well as from what control matches what applications 
Simplistic (i. e. easy to understand and use) graphical display and 'tip' text-boxes 
- Incorporation of financial elements: ALE, ROI 
- Assistance on implementation by giving a few words and appropriate 
links in the 
report 
211 
Active feedback which adapts the tool to the organisation more closely and also 
does not require running the whole application from the beginning (existing tools 
do not even have feedback anyway). 
- Easy update of PRAM with new applications, threats and controls. 
Therefore, in theory PRAM should eliminate the main setbacks associated with existing 
RA solutions. The following chapter investigates whether this is the case by comparing 
PRAM to the already evaluated existing RA tools for SMEs 
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7 Practical Evaluation of Prototype 
Having designed and built a prototype approach to risk management which is suitable for 
SMEs, an evaluation is in order which will prove whether firstly, it surpasses the 
prohibiting characteristics of existing RA tools which should make it appropriate in 
theory, and secondly, evaluate it in practice by seeing whether it is actually suited for the 
needs of SMEs. This chapter presents the different ways in which the novel methodology 
was tested and evaluated. The evaluation is intended to confinn the suitability of the 
proposed approach above the current state of the art. 
7.1 Methods of evaluation 
There were two approaches to validating that PRAM does what it has been designed to 
do and addresses the requirements of SMEs from an RA perspective. The initial 
evaluation aimed to assess the operation of PRAM (how it copes with the characteristics 
the other RA tools have been evaluated upon in Chapter 4) and how the output it 
produces compares with that of the commercial tools (in terms of which is more 
appropriate for SMEs). A further evaluation aimed to investigate how 3d party users 
perceived PRAM and its functionality (and therefore has it achieved the requirements for 
ease of use, assistance to user, requiring less time etc that PRAM has been designed for). 
- In order to validate the performance of PRAM and ensure it appropriately 
addresses the requirements of SMEs, the PRAM prototype was evaluated upon 
the three SME test scenarios upon which the existing RA solutions were evaluated 
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were again used. The prototype was used to assess the risks and controls 
corresponding to the cases of the three SMEs in question which provided 
information that allowed comparison with the available solutions. More 
specifically, PRAM was evaluated in the exact same way as the existing RA tools 
were in Chapter 4, firstly the risk analysis and management processes are 
discussed; this time the feedback process is also discussed (an element not seen 
previously, as it was not existent in the other RA tools. Furthermore, in the case of 
PRAM, to initiate the evaluation against the other tools, instead of simply listing 
the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology, there is a comparison and 
discussion on these against those of the other tools. Then PRAM is evaluated 
upon the same characteristics that were used in Chapter 4, essentially those that 
were discovered to be necessary so as to cope with the identified requirements 
and distinctive environment of SMEs. 
What has also been judged appropriate was to have P parties compare and 
contrast the existing RA tools and this prototype framework based on scenarios 
they devise, encouraging the subjects to consider and devise a realistic scenario of 
an organisation they have preferably been involved with, document this scenario 
and perforin an analysis with all the available tools, then rate them on specific 
aspects that this research is interested in. Assessing the tools functionality and 
whether it fulfills the desired requirements by having a group of students evaluate 
it in the lab against the rest of the RA tools. The group of students belongs to an 
information security MSc which is annually being taught the concepts of risk 
214 
analysis and a demonstration of the existing RA tools as part of an MSc-level 
module on Infon-nation Security Management. 
7.2 Practical evaluation of PRAM's performance 
The performance of PRAM was validated in the same way that existing tools were 
evaluated in Chapter 4, in order to provide results which are comparable with the ones on 
that chapter. Using the same scenarios and evaluation criteria as with the commercial 
tools allowed to successfully evaluate the usability of the system relative to the other 
solutions claiming to target SMEs. The scenario-based evaluation of PRAM is the 
decisive evaluation method which aims to prove that the developed methodology 
addresses the identified problems of existing solutions and suits the needs of SMEs for 
which it was designed. 
7.2.1 PRAM Operation 
PRAM has been evaluated using the same 3 test scenarios that were used in Chapter 4 
with the existing RA tools. The analysis, management processes and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the prototype are then discussed before scoring PRAM on the same 
criteria as in Chapter 4. 
7.2.1.1 Risk Analysis 
Performing the risk analysis using PRAM is similar for all three scenarios, in the first part 
the user is firstly required to input the general infonnation on the organisation including 
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the applications/business functions/types of data existing in the organisations. Then the 
user is required to score the importance of these to the organisation by considering the 
impact of breach/loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability to the organisation. 
This concludes the risk analysis part of the module by estimating the levels of risk the 
particular organisation is according to its characteristics and operation (as Figure 76 
illustrates for the organisation in scenario 1). 
E nwbri ý. -1 i 
-------- -- 
P-4 
.............. ..... 
20/20 
Figure 76: The Risk Analysis output 
7.2.1.2 Risk Management 
When using PRAM to manage the risks an organisation faces, firstly the user is provided 
with the capability, by clicking on threats on the coloured display, to graphically see what 
potential losses each threat might cause (Figure 77), this should help in choosing which 
threats should be given more attention to, judging by the likelihood/threat score (the 
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position of the threat on the coloured display) and the potential costs to the organisation 
of the threats' occurrence. 
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Figure 77: PRAM demonstrates ALE because of Insider Misuse 
Having established the importance of each risk, the user can then proceed to the selection 
of controls, as discussed previously, the system recommends what the minimum budget 
devoted to security should be. Based on the threat the user wants to address and the 
application needing to protect the most Oudging by the importance ratings in the previous 
part), the user is presented a list of all the controls that will decrease each threat with the 
corresponding ones to the selected applications highlighted. In the case of organisations 
with existing security controls that want to assess their security (which is the most likely 
case), the user can select what controls have already been implemented by the 
organisation and can visually judge which threats are still high and need more controls 
implemented (Figure 78). By selecting additional controls, the user can reduce all threats 
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to minimum levels while at the same time ensure that they remain within the desired 
budget (Figure 79). By contrasting Figure 76 and Figure 78, one can see how the initial 
threat levels the organisation faces are being reduced with the existing solutions, but 
leaving a couple of risks still at notable levels. These are then minimised by the addition 
of new controls, without however surpassing the recommended budget. This process is 
how PRAM will ideally operate in all scenarios. Among the benefits of using the PRAM 
graphical countermeasure selection approach the user can even remove controls that 
already exist from the organisations profile/secunty plan and add others which are more 
appropriate to reducing the existing threats and to the I. S. budget of the organisation. 
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Figure 79: The main controls selection process -B 
The difference that the diversity in size and sector of the organisations makes is visible in 
PRAM during the risk management process. Firstly in the risk levels which are partly 
equivalent to the sector, and subsequently in the recommended I. S. budget and cost of 
countenneasures that both consider organisation size. By looking at the coloured threat 
displays in Figure 80 (A for the small research organisation and B for the medium 
healthcare), the diversity of results according to the size, sector and organisational 
charactenstics in PRAM is obvious. 
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AB 
Figure 80: In PRAM threats vary for different organisations 
Finally, by comparing Figure 81 and Figure 82, it is apparent that for the three different 
organisations, that have different security requirements, even though the essential 
countermeasures (such as the antivirus and firewall) remain the same, PRAM makes a 
clear differentiation on the required spending for I. S. countenneasures and to the required 
countermeasures themselves. 
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Figure 82: Variation of required controls for different scenarios -B 
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7.2.1.3 Feedback 
As described in the previous chapters, the feedback module is essentially a progression of 
the Risk Management, acting as a dynamic I. S. support module to the SME. Even though 
none of the evaluated tools performs this function, it is considered to be one of the most 
useful features of PRAM. For the purposes of evaluating PRAM, the feedback module 
was used for fictitious scenarios of threats occurring to the selected organisations causing 
losses. As expected, when the losses and annual occurrence rates of threats were higher 
than the ones considered when first assessing the organisation's security' the tool 
suggested reconsidering security controls, this time having more realistic (to the specific 
organisation) figures. 
Figure 83A illustrates how the third scenario of the medium sized healthcare organisation 
was reassessed to produce different threat levels and selected controls after reconsidering 
the case with the new data illustrated in Table 11. 
Threat Occurrence Period controls have Cost per 
WENNEM 
PRAM 
been implemented Incident recommendation 
Reinforce 
Malicious Code 3 5 months 500 
security 
Reinforce 
Theft or Fraud 2 6 months 2000 security 
No action Insider 1 7 months 500 i d requ re 
Reinforce 
Accidental 2 12 months 3000 
security 
Table 11: Information input during feedback 
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By reporting these and re-running the assessor module, when selecting the existing 
controls, this time threats of accidental, theft or fraud and malicious code are not 
eliminated therefore as Figure 83B illustrates certain additional controls are required 
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Figure 83: Assessing the threats after having reported flows in the existing security 
This is illustrated as in Figure 83B, the addition of 4 new controls was required (the ones 
which add extra cost to the 'overall security to date') in order to minimise the threat that 
was reported in the Feedback as one that kept occurring and only after this addition did 
the system notify the user that the organisation is now safe. 
Most importantly, as Figure 84 illustrates, this time the ALE is adapted to the specific 
numbers for the organisation. 
FEE 
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Figure 84: After feedback the threat ALE display is 'fitted' to the organisation 
As discussed earlier the feedback module also provides the option to update applications 
however, apart from the already discussed benefits of this feature, this would not 
contribute anything to this evaluation so is not discussed here. 
7.2.1.4 Advantages - Disadvantages against the existing tools. 
e Advantages: By using the applications profiles, the analysis process is made 
notably shorter, eliminating the setbacks associated with the questionnaire based 
approaches other RA methodologies use. The analysis process concludes with a 
useful graphical illustration of the risks and risk levels the organisation is facing, 
raising the user awareness towards this issue which is the main purpose of a risk 
analysis but which the evaluated tools fall to address. PRAM offers addressing of 
the existing security practices, implemented controls and cost of security to date, 
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elements that other tools do not consider but simply address what controls are in 
place and recommend those that are missing from lists of all possible controls. 
Furthermore the existing tools do not recommend controls based on the specific 
organisations needs and budget. PRAM provides the option for dynamic feedback 
on the effectiveness of recommended controls, a feature which satisfies the 
requirement for complete management of the risks and which other tools do not 
address at all. PRAM offers the functionality for the user to build security from 
scratch or assess existing security, either by only complementing it or by also 
changing the existing measures 
9 Disadvantages: Using profiles shortens and simplifies the RA process; however it 
has an effect on the level of detail upon which the organisation is 'described'. 
However, since the requirement was not to produce a detailed RA methodology 
but a framework which lies between this and the baseline guidelines, this 
disadvantage has a minor effect upon the operation and ability of PRAM to 
perforrn what it was designed to (i. e. inform, guide, assist and raise the awareness 
of SMEs). 
7.2.1.5 Evaluating PRAM's technical characteristics 
During the evaluation of PRAM, no technical issues occurred, the prototype was tested in 
several computers both desktops and laptops (all Window-based) and there were no 
programming or interoperability issues recorded. Both the Visual Basic interface as well 
as the data interactions with MS Word, Excel and Access did not present any problems. 
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Finally, the software is small in size and does not occupy much space on the target hard- 
drive, installation is simple and short and there are no additional software or hardware 
elements required to be purchased or present for PRAM to operate apart from the NIS 
Office components previously mentioned. 
7.2.2 Discussion on the characteristics of PRAM 
In this section PRAM will be evaluated on the same characteristics the other RA tools 
addressing SMEs were judged upon in Chapter 4. These characteristics represent the 
requirements of SMEs from an RA tool therefore will indicate if the PRAM framework is 
suitable for the purposes it was designed for. 
7.2.2.1 Characteristics evaluation 
Table 12 presents the scores achieved by PRAM after evaluating it on the same criteria 
as the RA tools in Chapter 4, together with a justification of why these scores were 
assigned to each feature of the framework. Considering these criteria constitute teh 
identified needs of SMEs from a RA tool, the following results aim to illustrate how 
appropriate PRAM is for these organisations and how it addresses the purposes it has 
been designed for. 
I MOMM WR 7 IS4 li 
W T- 'tion T 3,1 
M, 
- Cost 3 PRAM is not a commercial product 
Virtually anyone who has been involved in the organisation Ease of use 2.5 enough to know very basic inforniation on the applications 
found within can use it. 
Length of Process 3 The assessment can 
be completed in approximately one 
hour. 
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AI isikafice to user 
The prototype is accompanied by a user guide including a 
3 worked example, there is also adequate assistance within the 
tool. 
PRAM suggests controls based on the organisations 
requirements for security vs productivity, on the importance 
Risk Impact of the applications and also on the threats the organisation is 
.5 
under, demonstrating elements such as the ALE to the user. 
Does not get full marks since initially (before running the 
feedback) the outputs and recommendations are based on 
survey data therefore might not be 100% appropriate to the 
organisation in question. 
The controls are listed in order of priority in terms of price, 
Assistance in intrusiveness or effect according to the organisations needs. 
choosing controls 3 Furthermore controls are filtered and recommended to the 
user based on the identified threats the organisation is under 
and the existing applications. 
Cost of controls, increased costs due to size of the 
Cost - Effective 2 organisation is considered and ALE to assets 
because of 
Controls threats occurring is considered, the user is then required to 
make the decision. 
Comprehensive 3 The tool presents the user with a comprehensive report 
output illustrating only the required data to understand and face the 
problem. 
PRAM provides details on threats and how they have been 
Deployment decreased, information on what the controls are and 
assistance 2.5 carefully selected links to more information on 
implementation and configuration issues. Does not get full 
marks since it is provided via external links 
The tool presents the user with a comprehensive report Length of Report 3 illustrating only the required data to understand and handle 
the p oblem. 
There is none provided, no consideration on the 
effectiveness of the solutions, can rerun the tool and select Dynamic Feedback 3 the newly implemented control as existent, however, there 
will still be no consideration of threats that occurred or 
losses 
The dynamic update requires the users input which might 
introduce errors and disruptions. However if update 
Dynamic Update p erformed by the programmer, it is quite straightforward 2 
since no changes in the tool are needed, only changes to the 
database which can easily be located and replaced by the 
user if provided with the updated version 
Table 12: The evaluation characteristics of PRAM 
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7.2.2.2 PRAM'S output and how it compares to that of existing tools 
Section 7.3.1 has described how PRAM's output differentiates according to the different 
organisational characteristics such as size, sector, budget and applications. Before 
proceeding to the discussion on the scores PRAM has achieved against the other tools on 
the evaluation, a brief comparison of the prototype's output with that of the existing tools 
will be discussed. PRAM's outputs for each of the three scenarios are also included in 
Appendix E. Comparing the output of PRAM with that of MRSAT, the Microsoft tool 
provides a longer and more detailed report, however PRAM's output simply illustrates 
the elements that needs to be included and a working version could easily be updated 
with more descriptions and additional links to information. What is most important here 
is that PRAM includes much more justification on why the controls should be 
implemented and what they will offer, being more useful to justify such investments to 
the management. Compared with Cobra's report, the layout of the report gives a more 
ýprofessional' impression and allowing the user to select the elements they wish to be 
included in the report is a useful addition to avoid lengthy reports. However, the quality 
of the recommendations is not appropriate for SME's requirements as identified and 
therefore PRAM, at least naming the countermeasures required and providing some 
information on what they are and how to implement them, does provide a more useful 
output to the SME user. Finally, the automatically generated countermeasure list in the 
Buddy System is a good element, however the automatic suggestions are not necessarily 
always correct and furthennore as discussed in Chapter 4 the recon-unendations are too 
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vague and in a similar way as with Cobra, PRAM's output is again more useful to the 
SME user. 
7.2.2.3 Characteristics comparison table and discussion against the other tools 
As means of comparing the appropriateness of PRAM for SME use, and Table 13 
illustrates the marks achieved by PRAM when evaluated against those in Chapter 4. 
Category Criteria MRSAT Cobra Buddy PRAM 
Cost 3 2 2 3 
General Ease of use 2.5 2.5 2 2.5 
Length of process 2 1.5 1.5 3 
Ass istance to user 3 2 2 3 
Risk Impact Analysis 1 1 2 2.5 
Process Assistance in choosing controls 2 1 3 3 
Cost - Effective Controls I 1 1 2 
Comprehensive output 3 2 1.5 3 
Output Deployment assistance 2 1 1 2.5 
Length of Report 2.5 3 2 3 
Dynamic Feedback 1.5 2 2 3 
After Dynamic Update 2 2 2 2 
W20M 
Category: General 7.5/9 6/9 5.5/9 8.5/9 
Category: Process 7/12 5/12 8/12 10.5/12 
OveraH Category: Output 7.5/9 6/9 4.5/9 8.5/9 
Category: After 3.5/6 1 4/6 4/6 5/6 
Total (gut of 36): 25.5 21 1 2,2 ... 
32.5 
Table 13: PRAM scores against the commercial tools 
This result illustrates the appropriateness of PRAM for addressing SME inforination 
security assessment and planning needs. The final score as well as the individual scores 
were expected to fair better from those of the existing tools, since the factors upon which 
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the tools were evaluated are the requirements of the SMEs from an RA tool and therefore 
the requirements that this methodology were designed to address. 
7.3 User evaluation of PRAM 
Following the evaluation of PRAM in a similar way as with the previous tool, further 
testing was conducted to investigate whether the goals for ease of use, assistance to the 
user etc that PRAM was designed to address have been successful. Thus this evaluation 
needed to be performed by objective users. 
7.3.1 Background 
This section provides information on the background of the evaluation, such as, the users 
attended and the methodology of the evaluation. 
7.3. LI The users 
The practical evaluation of PRAM was performed under 'controlled conditions' within 
the University of Plymouth in a laboratory were the MSc Information Systems Security 
students were asked to attend. These students were asked to attend since they had been 
presented with the basic concepts of RA in the past and as part of their course material 
they had been demonstrated the use of Symantec's fNFORM method. They therefore had 
some understanding of RA and an organisations requirement for planned secunty, 
without however being security experts. Invitations were issued to approximately 30 
potential participants, overall 9 users participated in this evaluation: 
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The users were aged between 22 and 27 years old. 
-1 
, o- 6 of them had been employed by an organisation before, out of which 4 were in 
I. T. related positions. 
6 stated they have some information security knowledge, only 2 had used RA in 
the past. 
These fulfil the overall goal that the participating users are sufficiently informed on how 
an organisation operates and on basic security issues and also have some understanding 
of how organisations operate. The participants were not I. S. experts since they were only 
in the second month of their MSc education, they do however have some basic 
understanding of risk and certainly because of the area they chose to study they have the 
motivation to consider and study the RA tools offered to them for this evaluation in a 
mature and careful manner. Ideally it would have been preferable for SME members to 
have participated in the evaluation of PRAMM against the commercial RA tools; this 
however was not possible due to two reasons. The main reason had to do with time 
constraints associated with this project and the second with the likely unwillingness of 
SMEs to participate in such an evaluation, justified by the previously identified 
characteristic of SMEs that they cannot afford disruption to operations but also in the 
identified reluctance of SMEs to even participate in the SME security survey that was 
conducted by the author, a procedure much less time consuming than this evaluation. The 
MSc students are not comparable to the sort of people likely to be using such a system 
within an SME, they were however judged to have the appropriate knowledge so as to 
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evaluate whether these RA tools are user-friendly and easy to use which is the purpose of 
this second evaluation. 
7.3.1.2 Methodology 
The process the users were required to go through during this evaluation is described in 
detail in Appendix C, which includes the handout they were given. The two-hour lab 
session for evaluating PRAM required the users to select one of the three conunercial 
SME RA tools available to them (essentially because of the time limit of two hours it was 
decided that it would be preferable for the users to perform a thorough RA using one of 
the commercial tools and PRAM, devoting an hour for each, rather than briefly going 
through all the solutions). Then they were asked to devise a scenario of an organisation 
they would assess the risks of, similar to the three scenarios used in the author's 
evaluation (this option was mainly intended for those that had industry experience; those 
that did not could use the existing scenarios). Following that, the users were required to 
assess the risks of this organisation using firstly one of the commercial tools and then 
using PRAM on the same scenano. Finally the users were asked to complete a 
questionnaire (a copy of which can be found in Appendix Q provided which investigated 
the issues this evaluation is concerned in. More specifically, after collecting information 
on the user and their background, the following issues were investigated: 
ýý The 'Use of the tool' (ease of use, interface, better approach for analysing the 
organisation), to address what the users perceived of the operation of the tools. 
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The 'Output' (assistance with implementation of controls, which would be more 
useful to the management), to address the user's opinion of the appropriateness of 
the tools on the requirements of SMEs. 
The user's opinion on the Feedback feature, to investigate whether this is a useful 
addition to the RA process. 
Finally the questionnaire considered adoption of RA issues such as whether the 
users would use such a practice in their organisation, which and why or what 
would deter them from the adoption of RA, in order to consider whether PRAM 
has achieved what it was designed for and therefore the new approach to RA is 
more appropriate for use than the existing tools. 
7.3.2 Findings of the evaluation 
This section presents a discussion and an analysis of the evaluation results. In the graphs 
provided, the results are illustrated according to the commercial tools the users have 
evaluated against PRAM, before presenting the overall outcome in each issue 
investigated. 
7.3.2.1 Use of Tool 
This investigation began by considering the users perception of the ease of use of the 
tools, all 9 users stated that PRAM was easier to use than the commercial products they 
evaluated. Figure 85 illustrates the users view of the user friendliness of the RA tools 
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interface, as the results illustrate the majority preferred PRAM's GUI while a user also 
favoured the MRSAT interface. 
User Friendly 
9-- 
7- 
6- 
v5 13 PRAM 
0 
4- E Other 
3-2 
2 
1 
0- 
PRAM vs PRAM rs PRAM,, s Total 
Cobra Buddy MRSAT 
RA Tool 
Figure 85: The user's views of the RA tools interface 
Figure 86 illustrates the users view on which tools provide the better assistance to the 
user perforining the RA. According to this, the majority of the respondents (8) judged 
PRAM provides the user with more assistance while the Buddy System came second with 
one preference. 
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Figure 86: Which of the tools provided more assistance to the user 
The users also favoured the use of profiling compared to questionnaires for analysing the 
organisation and its assets (Figure 87). It is characteristic that many of the users were 
dissatisfied with the amount of time required by the commercial tools and commented 
upon this negatively (as can be seen in the quoted comments in Appendix D) while on the 
other hand the majority of the users stated they preferred profiling because of its ease of 
use and much shorter period required to complete the process. 
Analysis Approach 
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Figure 87: Preferred method for the analysis of assets 
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Finally, one of the elements that do not exist in the evaluated tools but is a novel feature 
of PRAM, the financial considerations of ROI of security solutions and the illustration to 
the user of the ALE because of the threats the organisation faces, were also perceived as a 
good addition by the majority of the users (Figure 88). 
Figure 88: Users perception of the financial considerations in RA 
7.3.2.2 Output 
This part of the evaluation aimed at gathering user opinions on the appropriateness and 
usefulness of the output reports provided by the RA tools used. As Figure 89 illustrates, 
the users were first asked to state which, in general terms, output they found to be more 
useful. PRAM's output was judged to be better than Buddy's, slightly better than 
MRSAT's but not as good as Cobra's report. 
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Figure 89: Which output was most useful 
When queried the users which output they judge as to contain the better inforniation on 
issues about the implementation of the suggested counten-neasures, PRAM's approach of 
providing external links to information was perceived as somewhat more appropriate that 
that of the other tools (Figure 90). 
Helpful Implementation Information 
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RA Tool Used 
Figure 90: Users view of the offered guidance to implementing controls 
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However, when the users were required to state their view on which output was more 
useful to illustrate to the management, all 9 of the respondents favoured PRAM 
confirming this way that the required objective of creating a methodology whose output 
can raise managerial awareness on security issues and justify security spending has been 
achieved. 
7.3.2.3 Feedback 
This section of the evaluation basically addressed how the feature of feedback and 
subsequent threat management, which was conceived as an essential part of an RA too] 
for SMEs, is viewed by the users. The results illustrated in Figure 91 were satisfactory as 
none of the respondents found this addition unnecessary. Most users (7) considered the 
feature useful, and one regarded it as imperative for RA tools. 
NeedforFeedback 
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0 Unnecessary Useful ImperatNe 
User Opinion 
Figure 91: User opinion of the feature of feedback included in RA 
238 
7.3.2.4 Final Thoughts 
Concluding this evaluation, this final part investigated what final impression the RA tools 
and PRAM have left with the users. Overall, as Figure 92 illustrates, the users were 
positive both in the appropriateness of PRAM for use by an SME as it was favoured by 8 
of them. The number of users that stated they would use a fully working version PRAM 
over the other RA tools in real life was 7, which is also a positive outcome. 
Overall view of Tools 
9- 
8 
7 
7 
6 
-a 5 C 
0 
0- 4 
3 
2 
Im 
0- 
Use by SME Choose in Real-life 
Situation 
Figure 92: Overall opinion of RA and PRAM 
Finally, having used the RA tools, the users were asked to state what characteristics they 
perceive as deterring for the widespread adoption of RA tools. As illustrated in Figure 93 
most of the users selected the ease of use as a deciding factor and the time needed to 
perform the RA as major reasons. One user stated that cost might be a deterring factor. 
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Factors Detering Adoption 
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Figure 93: Factors which might deter the adoption of RA by SMEs 
It is worth noting that, as also confirmed by the user quotes in the Appendix, the users 
were mainly disenchanted by the commercial tools complicated approach and long period 
of time required to perform the assessment. As also stated by the users these issues are 
not valid to the case of PRAM. 
7.4 Discussion on the evaluation results 
Overall, the greatest concern with the users evaluating the tools was ease of use, time 
required to complete the process and the difficulties faced by the quest ionnaire-b ased 
approaches that the users perceived negatively. One can say that as students cannot afford 
to devote enormous period of time to perfon-n such an assessment, similarly an SME 
manager (or even employee) cannot afford such a disruption to their everyday tasks. 
Overall PRAM was preferred, with only minor hesitations on the output, which however, 
is simply illustrative of what it should include. In terms of ease of use, and all the 
additional features of PRAM compared to the other tools, like feedback, profiling and 
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ROI were received very positively and gave PRAM a clear advantage from the users that 
evaluated the tools. 
Interestingly, (as can be seen in the user quotes section in Appendix D) some of the users 
that stated they would use PRAM in real life also stated they would use PRAM for an 
SME and one of the other tools for a large organisation or that they would use PRAM as 
an introductory RA tool and then use one of the rest for a more detailed assessment. This 
is not a negative for PRAM, as firstly, as has been largely discussed throughout this 
thesis, PRAM has been designed not to be a thorough RA methodology but a progression 
of guidelines raising SME awareness and providing as much simplicity and assistance as 
possible instead. Secondly, it has also been made clear that this prototype version of 
PRAM is not as detailed as a fully functional version but aims to demonstrate the novel 
features and the functionality of the approach. Therefore these comments simply illustrate 
that PRAM has achieved the purposes it was designed for. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The evaluation of PRAM established it has achieved the aims and objectives upon which 
it was designed. The first evaluation proved the PRAM process and output surpass those 
of the existing RA tools on the issues SME's are mainly concerned with and have been 
deterring such organisations from adopting RA. During that first stage of the evaluation 
PRAM has shown to be good at assessing different scenarios of organisations and 
provided adequate results according to the size, sector and assets compared to the tools 
evaluated in Chapter 4. Furthermore the second, practical, part of the evaluation of 
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PRAM has illustrated that it has surpassed the issues SME's are concerned with when it 
comes to RA. With the attention to ease of use, assistance to user and user-friendly 
interface, having profiled assets behind applications thus allowing the simple analysis of 
the organisation, and allowing subsequent management of threats, the users that 
evaluated PRAM have shown a significant preference to this prototype over the existing 
tools. Their responses illustrate that this approach would be preferable for adoption by an 
SME. 
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8 Conclusions and Future work 
To conclude this thesis, this chapter summarises the achievements of the research, then 
proceeds to discuss the limitations that were faced during the study and ends by 
discussing the areas of RA for SME that require further development in the future. 
8.1 Achievements of the research 
This research has achieved all the aims and objectives specified in Chapter 1. 
Specifically, this research has: 
1. Established the importance of RA for organisations, and particularly to those of small 
and medium size which do not tend to employ trained security specialists to handle 
the task of securing the network, The research has identified that SMEs tend not to 
follow either the path of RA or other solutions available to them, with the 
consequence that they face avoidable security issues. 
2. Analysed current solutions (e. g. outsourcing, guidelines, and their automated 
progressions) and established that they inappropriate for use by SMEs. These 
solutions are simply a guide through all the available controls and security practices 
without either any assistance in selecting countermeasures or implementation details 
of controls. By contrast, SMEs require a solution that can be used and interpreted by, 
as well as provide useful assistance with selecting controls and a comprehensive 
output to, the non-trained SME user. 
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3. Identified the requirements for RA methods in SME scenarios. By examining survey 
findings and conducting a practical evaluation of existing RA solutions (focusing 
upon those that are designed for use by SMEs), the current limiting factors were 
identified. This led to the identification of those elements that a novel RA solution 
should include in order to successfully address the requirements of SMEs. 
4. Specified a novel RA methodology based upon the aforementioned requirements. A 
progression of the traditional RA process has been designed and the Profile-based 
Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) architecture created. The main 
characteristics of this architecture are the use of Protection Profiles, inclusion of 
financial elements, and a comprehensive user interface and output. 
5. Implemented a proof-of-concept prototype which illustrates how the previously 
conceived features have been implemented in practice. The resulting RA tool consists 
of four different modules: the Organisation Profiler which assists the user in inputting 
the organisations details to the system, the Application Handler which assists the user 
with valuing the importance of the identified assets, the Assessor module provides the 
SME user with all the required details to select appropriate countenneasures and the 
Feedback module which provides the subsequent risk management. 
6. Evaluation of this prototype against the existing solutions, establishing that PRAM 
surpasses the characteristics of existing SME RA solutions, leading to the conclusion 
that such an approach is suitable for use by this type of organisations. 
244 
The importance of RA to SMEs and the concepts behind PRAM's architecture (such as 
the PP's, the necessity of included financial elements and the need for a more 
comprehensive output to the user) have been presented in a number of academic 
conference papers (listed in Appendix F). These concepts have received a number of 
positive comments from reviewers therefore it is believed that a significant contribution 
to the areas of I. T. security and RA have been made by this research. 
8.2 Limitations of the research 
This section analyses what limitations occurred during the research into, and the 
implementation of the prototype. 
As far as practical limitations are concerned this prototype was developed only for 
windows based systems which might not be a problem in most cases but would 
still deter a small number of organisations from adopting it. 
- There has been insufficient data from existing surveys on SME characteristics 
in 
tenns of specifically discussing SME I. S. practices and needs, surveys focus on 
large organizations. Most major and credible surveys do make a differentiation 
between large organisations and the overall sample of respondents which gives an 
idea of the SME side of the story. However, there is none dedicated to SME 
characteristics, needs and practices to provide with appropriate data for this 
investigation. 
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Appropriate testing on organisations was not performed due to time constraints, 
selecting contacting and awaiting results from a number of appropriate 
organisations from each sector would significantly delay the completion of this 
research. Furthermore judging by the degree of participation from the MSc 
Students, who should have a somewhat large interest in the issue, in this 
evaluation it is likely that SMEs would be even harder to persuade to participate. 
Unfortunately the group of students was relatively small for such an evaluation, 
but the results were nonetheless indicative. Furthermore, since the ftinctionality 
and outputs of PRAM were primarily evaluated in the scenario-based evaluation 
against the commercial RA tools, it has been shown practically in this thesis that 
the developed RA methodology surpasses the existing ones. 
8.3 Suggestions and future work 
In this section suggestions are made as to what future work should be done on PRAM to 
allow the conversion of this framework to a full-product which will effectively address 
the requirements of SMEs in the area of I. S. management and RA. 
A more detailed database and realistic figures on controls effect, intrusiveness and 
cost is required. For the first two perform a survey among a number of security 
educated individuals who can rate these elements and the average rating can be 
used in the prototypes database. To complement this database of controls, a 
further consideration of what controls may be overlapping or contradicting with 
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each other is necessary, so as to alter the PRAM software and avoid the selection 
of such controls being possible by the user. 
- In a commercial version of PRAM, the association of "Threats" to "Applications" 
(and therefore assets) should continue to be automatic but it should also allow for 
"user interventions" (e. g. add a Threat). In this way peculiarities of the application 
environment (context) can be taken into account. 
Add the underlying assets under the applications in the Profiler engine and adapt 
the 'sub-threats' under threat profiles to these assets on the rest of the modules as 
described in Chapter 5. 
Further assistance to the user is required; PRAM includes a list of links to useful 
and selected websites on each of the controls. Nevertheless it would be useful to 
include details on the selected controls, assisting the user with appreciating, 
acquiring and implementing them, within the report. This sort of inforination 
would still be collected from extemal sources but it would save the user from 
making the effort to collect all this information from the recommended websites. 
Having perfon-ned these revisions to the prototype, perfonn a wider practical 
implementation and testing of the resulting prototype with SMEs participants to 
strengthen the general usability of the work. The evaluation subjects should 
include both organisations that have not implemented RA before to evaluate 
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PRAMs appropriateness as well as organisations that have perfonned one in the 
past so as to compare results. 
- Another issue which was not addressed in the evaluation of PRAIM due to time 
constraints and should therefore be considered in future work on this project is 
that the actual results (security measures) produced by the proposed methodology 
should be compared with the respective results of a conventional RA 
m-ethodology as an supplementary way to assess their appropnateness. 
In the prototype was chosen for the user to have the capacity to select controls. 
However when PRAM is updated with more realistic figures on controls costs and 
effects, the option can be added that, if the user wishes, the system can suggest 
certain countermeasures for them. That could simply be based on the number of 
controls the organisation can approximately purchase according to the I. S. budget 
combined with the levels of threats. Therefore if the budget approximately allows 
for the purchase of 7 controls, two controls can be chosen for the two largest 
threats, then one control for each of the other threats. The user should then be able 
to add, remove or modify as desired. This would offer some further assistance to 
the user, however the selection of controls would simply be based on which 
controls come first on the list of controls for each threat according to their effect 
or intrusiveness (relevant to the users earlier selections) and would not overcome 
most problems related with traditional RA. The current approach was preffered 
for the prototype since human intelligence, when presented with the appropriate 
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information of threat scores, effect of controls on threat, ALE and budgeting 
issues, would produce more suitable selections of controls. These two approaches 
should be practically evaluated to establish which produces more suitable results 
but this would ideally involve implementing the suggested controls, by both the 
automated and the human - based approaches, within existing organisations and 
identifying which would produce the better results ie in time reduce threat 
occurrence. This process would require significant resources and time. 
Having perforined the appropriate testing to ensure the PRAM prototype, with 
these additions, is suitable for the requirements of SMEs, transform it to an online 
application so as not to require any modifications or data stored on users' 
individual computers, provide with additional assistance and allow more proper 
updating of the tool and its databases. By having the tool online, it enables 
updating databases with new threats controls etc, leading to automatic re- 
assessment of the situation organisations are under and then notify the 
organisations that they are in need to re-assess their security as new threats 
occurred. Furthermore, by allowing users to come online and perforin feedback 
will lead to database with more informed data on SMEs. Finally among the 
benefits of having it online is that it is not dependant on the characteristics, the 
O. S. and the software residing on the organisations computers. 
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8.4 The future of RA in the SME sector 
As identified from the survey data in Chapter 2, SMEs constitute a very large percentage 
of the overall number of organisations worldwide; therefore they are also a major part of 
the economy and require sufficient and appropriate protection. RA is an essential part of 
organising and implementing effectual and cost-effective I. T. security. As this research 
established, SMEs are more in need of such practices than other organisations 
particularly as their majority does not employ any full-time I. S. security specialists to 
analyse risks, implement and manage security countenneasures. It is unlikely that 
organisations will stop facing I. S. threats, and therefore SMEs will always be in need of 
such a practice. However, as long as the solutions face the setbacks discussed in this 
thesis they will continue not to be adopted by SMEs. The methodology discussed in this 
thesis embraces those characteristics that an SME would require from such a solution. 
With the additions discussed in the 'future work' section, a fully operational RA solution 
can be produced which can be widely adopted by SMEs leading to improved 'full-time' 
security, with significant savings both from the selection of cost-effective controls as well 
as from thoroughly addressing the specific threats an organisation faces. 
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Appendix A: Test Scenarios 
About the scenarios 
Three different organization profiles chosen, wanted to cover, firstly all cases (sizes) of 
SMEs. The second criterion was to deal with diverse organizational requirements. Firstly 
the industry sectors and secondly the physical envirom-nents are appropriately diverse. 
Secondly the focus of the organization from a security perspective is diverse. The first is 
primarily concerned with accidental loss of data on the computers, the second with 
modification of data and downtime of hosted applications and the third with 
confidentiality of customer data and physical theft of equipment. 
Scenario 1: Home office 
My Home Office: Software Programming & website development 
Sector: IT 
Organization Size: 2 (1 Programmer, I Admin) 
IT Size: I Pc, I Laptop, I print server 
Applications: Office, prograniming, IM, Video, image, audio processing 
Internet Connection: DSL 
IT Budget (per year): 2000 
Organization Budget (per year): 15000 (3 projects of 5000 profit per year) 
Networking LAN, Wireless LAN 
Who created the IT 
infrastructure? 
Organisation owner 
Security Requirements 
The organization considers itself low risk 
Consists of a single room home office including wireless LAN and 2 computers both 
connected to the internet. 
2 people personnel with full access to all data, access to anyone else is highly controlled 
since it is a home. 
Main security concerns: 
The organization is mainly concerned for availability and integrity of backed-up material 
and information within computers not as much for website, print servers etc. second main 
concern is availability of email and applications within computers. 
Delays in project completion etc due to loss of availability, loss of prototype software etc 
either accidental or theft. 
Loss of customer confidence, since small organization cannot afford this 
Scenario 2: Small organization 
The Network Research Group 
Education on the area of networking 
Due to specialty on the sector occasionally handles web hosting other small commercial 
projects on the area. 
Sector: Education 
Organization Size: 20 (14 researchers, 6 Admin) 
IT Size: 20 Pc, 4 Laptop, mail server, web server, backup server, 4 pdas 
Applications: Office, programming, IM, Video, image, audio processing, 
database applications, web browsing 
Internet Connection: DSL 
IT Budget (per year): 7000 
Organization Budget (per year): 30000 (through university, conferences, independent projects) 
Networking LAN, Wireless LAN 
Website With personal information (staff login and contact details) 
Who created the IT 
infrastructure? 
Organisation staff 
I 
Security Requirements 
Small office consisting of 3-4 rooms with somewhat controlled access, within a large 
open area with students and staff roaming around. 
Accessible to cleaning and security personnel who are employed by the building (ie for 
many offices) not specifically by the office. 
Can have explicit security to the orgatuzation areas etc however is preferable not to have 
it limit legitimate user access. 
Since the organization is concerned with IT and security reputation is very important and 
also it is highly targeted, however on the pluses, staff is quite security aware. 
Main concerns: 
Breach of confidentiality of commercial projects and hosted websites can lead to 
damaged reputation which the organization is concerned about. 
Loss of availability of research data, a small concern for theft, mainly accidental loss 
however would have great impact on work progress cause delays misses of project 
submissions etc 
Integrity of Student data is of medium importance and a bit likely to be targeted by 
disenchanted students. 
Scenario 3: Medium organization 
Medium- sized Medical Center 
Sector: Healthcare 
Organization Size: 60 
IT Size: 60Pc, 1 Olaptops, 10 pdas 
Applications: Office, web, databases 
Internet Connection: DSL 
IT Budget (per year): 15000 
Organization Budget (per year): 500000 (through services to patients) 
Networking LAN 
Website Transactional (Displays infonnation only) 
Who created the IT 
infrastructure? 
Extemal Provider 
Security Requirements 
Organization spans over a small building with about 30 rooms, access to the building is 
fairly controlled. However patients/emergencies can be overlooked there is high degree 
of people in and out. 
The organization does not consider themselves to eb at a great IT security risk, however 
unlikely, any breach could have dear consequences since customer (patient) records is 
highly confidential and protected by a number of legislations. It is highly confidential 
information 
It is however imperative that this information is highly available at any time especially to 
key hospital staff. 
Even though information is highly confidential, security cannot be 'intrusive' since 
authorized people require easy access both to the building as well as the information and 
because of high numbers of customers in and out. 
Main concerns: 
Availability of information at any time is crucial 
Breach of confidentiality could cause high fines i. e. financial losses 
Breach of Integrity may prove crucial patient records should never be unauthorized 
tempered with 
Theft of expensive equipment 
After the assessment 
Since SMEs need support and proper management of risks instead of simple controls 
selection, after the assessment there needs to be a check on how the tools evaluate the 
selected controls effectiveness and appropriateness. 
Appendix B: SME Security Survey 
US IT Security Survey 
Mark the title that describes your job function: o Owner/CEO/President 0 
Manager o IT Specialist o other: 
Is your company connected to the Internet? o Yes o No 
What operating systems do you use? (mark all that apply) 
o Novell Netware o Microsoft Windows o Linux o Unix 0 
Macintosh o Other: o Don't know 
How many people does your organization employ? oO-4 o5-20 
o 21-250 o 251-500 o 500+ 
Choose the industry that best describes your organization (choose only one): 1: 1 
Accounting o Computers/IS/IT E: i Professional 
o Construction/Real Estate o Education o Entertainment 0 
Financial o Healthcare o Marketing 
Ei Manufacturing o Food Service o Retail c Telecommunications 
o Misc Services o Wholesaler o Non-profit 
Does your company have a documented security plan or policy? oYes oNo 
o Don't know 
Is there a specific person responsible for security at your organization? Ei Yes Ei No 
o Don't know 
Is the company's security plan reviewed, modified, or updated at least once a year? 
o Yes E3 No Ej Don't know 
Are employees trained on the security plan? o Yes o No El 
Don't know 
Are there consequences for not following the security plan and are employees trained on 
them? -o Yes o No ci Don't know 
Has an inventory of assets been conducted (data, confidential info, servers, anything that 
needs protection)? o Yes o No o Don't know 
Has a threat analysis been conducted to identify internal or external threats to company 
assets? o Yes o No o Don't know 
How often is data backup done (check all that apply)? o Daily o Weekly 
o Monthly o Don't know 
Are data backups stored at a location other than company premises? o Yes o No 
o Don't know 
Are back-ups tested periodically to ensure operability (i. e. test restoring files)? o Yes 
o No o Don't know 
Are user accounts deleted/disabled immediately following an employee 
resignation/termination? o Yes Ei No o Don't know 
Please indicate if the following activities are implemented: 
Security Item Im plemented? 
Physical security (i. e. access badges, keys to secure areas o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
or server rooms) 
Firewalls (software or hardware) are installed on all o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
external network connections 
Intrusion Detection System or other forms of network o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
level protection 
Anti-Virus software for servers and workstations installed o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
and periodically updated 
Operating System Patches and Updates are checked and o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
installed periodically 
Password Policies requiring minimum lengths and o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
periodic changes are in place and enforced 
Network user accounts to control access to network [: i Yes o No o Don't 
know 
resources 
Uninterruptible Power Supplies for critical IT equipment o Yes o No o Don't 
know 
are installed and tested 
Wireless security (ex: WEP) is in place* o Yes o No ii Don't 
know 
El Mark here if no wireless technology used 
Disaster recovery plan in place and tested o Yes Ei No o Don't know 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements 
Item Agree Somewha Neither Somewhat Disagree 
t Agree Agree/Disagr Disagree 
ee 
I am comfortable our 
security plan protects our 
critical data 
We have adequate 
knowledge about IS security 
I am confident my company 
won't have a IS security 
problem 
We rely on one or two key 
people to manage our IS 
security 
Our security rules are a 
burden to follow 
I stay awake nights worrying 
about my company's data 
and networks (I worry a 
I great deal about our security) 
Any additional comments you wish to make: 
European IT Risk Analysis survey 
Section 1: General 
1. Please indicate the size of your organization: 
R1 -4 employees 
F15-20 employees 
F121-250 employees 
R251-500 employees 
R500+ employees 
2. Mark the title that describes your job function: 
R Owner/CEO/President 
n Manager 
IT Specialist 
Other (Please specify): 
3. Choose the industry that best describes your organization: 
F] Accounting 
F-I Computers/IS/IT 
n Professional 
Construction/Real Estate 
Education 
Manufacturing 
Non-profit 
Misc Services 
F] Other (Please specify): 
R Entertainment 
Financial 
Healthcare 
Marketing 
Retail 
Telecommunications 
El Food Service 
R Wholesaler 
4. Is your company connected to the Internet? 
RYes RNo 
If yes, what type is your Internet connection? 
56kbps F-1 DSL 
ISDN F] Cable modem 
E] Other (Please specify): 
5. Please indicate the dependence of your company on the information technology 
systems: 
F1 Not at all dependant 
F] Somewhat dependant 
F1 Totally dependant 
6. What operating systems do you use? (Mark all that apply) 
R Microsoft Windows 9x, Me 
Fý Microsoft Windows NT, 2000, XP 
F-I Linux 
i 
UNIX 
Macintosh 
Novell Netware 
R Don't know 
R Other (Please specify): 
7. How many Information Technology (IT) administrators does your company 
employ? 
F-1 None 
I 
2 
3+ 
8. Who is responsible for the IT security at your company? 
R IT administrator 
F-1 Security officer 
R Other (Please specify): 
Does this person have any formal IT security qualifications? 
0 Yes F] No 
9. Does your organisation have a dedicated IT security budget that is separate from 
the overall IT budget? 
n Yes n No 
Section 2: Securitv 
10. Does your company have a documented security plan or policy? 
Yes F] No M Don't know 
ýý 16k, 
11. How are the members of staff made aware of the contents of the IT security 
plan? (only relevant ifyour answer to Question 10 was "Yes'q 
n Via a staff handbook 
F-I Specific document distributed to staff 
Contract or letter of employment 
On joining or during induction 
Through ongoing training 
Employees are not made aware of any security plan 
Other (Please specify): 
12. Please indicate if the following activities are implemented: 
Security Item Implemented? 
Physical security (i. e. access badges, keys to secure areas [: ]Yes nNo [: ]Don't know 
or server rooms) 
Firewalls (software or hardware) are installed on all E: ]Yes [: ]No E]Don't know 
external network connections 
Intrusion Detection System or other forms of network EjYes [: ]No EjDon't know level protection 
Anti-Virus software for servers and workstations installed EjYes E]No [: ]Don't know 
and periodically updated 
Operating System Patches and Updates are checked and EjYes EjNo EjDon't know 
installed periodically 
Pas 
i 
sword Policies requiring minimum lengths and E]Yes E]No EjDon't know 
periodic changes are in place and enforced 
Network user accounts to control access to network EjYes E]No E: ]Don't know 
resources 
Uninterruptible Power Supplies for critical IT equipment EJYes EJNo E]Don't know 
are installed and tested 
Wireless security (ex: WEP) is in place* E]Yes F]No E]Don't know 
*o Mark here if no wireless technology used 
Disaster recovery plan in place and tested [: ]Yes EjNo nDon't know 
13. How confident are you of your security? 
R Not at all Confident 
F] A bit worried Extremely Confident 
Section 3: Risk Analysis 
14. Has an inventory of assets been conducted (data, confidential info, servers, 
anything that needs protection)? 
n Yes 
F] No 
n Don't know 
15. Has a threat analysis been conducted to identify internal or external threats to 
company assets? 
R Yes 
F] Internal threats only 
R External threats only 
F] No 
F] Don't know 
16. Does your organization perform IT risk management? (i. e. identifying assets - 
threats and subsequently securing them). 
R Yes F-1 No 
If yes, how often? 
F-1 Once a year 
F-1 Once every 2-3 years 
F-I Other (Please specify): 
17. If you carry out IT risk analysis, is it provided in-house or by a third-party? 
F-1 In-house n Third-party 
18. If you conduct in-house risk analysis, who is responsible for this task? 
19. Do you use any risk analysis software tool? 
M Yes M No 
ý-, 61hi, 
If not, do you use any other method like BS7799/ISO 17799 to secure company 
assets? 
20. In case you do not perform IT risk analysis, please state the reasons why not. 
E] Lack of budget 
F] Lack of expertise 
El Lack of awareness 
R Disruption 
Ej Other (Please specify): 
21. If you had the option, what would you upgrade as far as your organization's IT 
security is concerned? (please select only 1) 
F1 Security Administrator 
Risk Analysis 
More Security technologies / countermeasures 
Employ security training / awareness 
22. If you were convinced that risk analysis is a necessary procedure in order to 
successfully secure your organisation's network, how much would you be 
prepared to spend on appropriate tools to assist the task? 
F-1 fo-f 100 
f-101 -f 1000 
f, 1001 - 0000 
More than f 3000 
23. Please use this space to provide us with any additional comments you may have: 
Appendix C: PRAM evaluation lab 
Section 1: The Lab 
You have been handed a CD containing 4 RA tools, 3 commercial and I under 
development 
In this lab you are required to perfonn the following steps: 
1. Devise a scenario of a small or medium sized organization you are supposedly 
managing. 
2. Select one of the three commercial RA tools and perform a RA on your 
organization, then do the same for PRAM, the RA tool under development 
3. Answer the questionnaire provided therefore evaluate the suitability of the tools 
for SMEs 
For any questions during the progress of this lab please ask the lab supervisors 
- Devise a scenario Step 1. 
Place yourself in the position of a manager or someone significantly involved in the 
operation of a SME. Ideally, select an organization that you have worked for in the past 
and you know its purpose, functions and IS requirements. 
Write the scenario down; describe the organization and its IT assets as well as the 
security requirements, in a way similar to the example scenario in Appendix 1. Please use 
the space provided to you in Appendix I to write down your scenario. 
If you are unsure, and only then, you may use the scenario provided to you in the 
Appendix. 
Step 2: Perform the RA 
Bearing in mind that you are in a position within your organization where the task of 
analyzing the IT security risks faced, selecting the appropriate controls and implementing 
them to safeguard your IT assets is a task which falls to you and only. 
Select one of the commercial RA tools provided that you wish to use, that may be either 
the Buddy System, Cobra or MRSAT. Then install it on your system, run it and perform 
an assessment based on the scenario you devised in section 1. 
During the process of the RA keep notes (using the sheet provided to you in Appendix 2) 
of elements you find positive in this approach to RA and other elements that you consider 
negative and which might deter you Erom using such a tool. 
After you complete the assessment and before proceeding to use the PRAM prototype, 
make sure you have a good look at the results provided to you at the end by the tool you 
have selected and used. Install the prototype version of PRAM on your system, then use 
it to perform an RA on the same scenario you used previously. Again you are encouraged 
to use the sheet provided to you in Appendix 2 
When using PRAM keep in mind that it is a prototype and not a fully operational 
commercially available product like the previous you used. Therefore PRAM's database 
is not as complete as that of the previous. 
However, the purpose of this lab is for you to consider the usability, functionality and 
effectiveness of the two approaches you have used and which one would be more suitable 
for use by an SME manager or user with no IT security expertise, and maybe no 
significant IT knowledge at all. Therefore what you are required to consider here is which 
process is more suitable for this user: 
Easier to use 
Faster 
" Provides more assistance in understanding what controls are more appropriate for 
your organization and why 
" Assists with the selection of controls 
" Assists with the implementation of these controls 
" Provides support to the user in responding to events and re-evaluating 
effectiveness of the implemented security 
Important: Feedback 
Some period of time after the initial RA, you decide to upgrade your organizations IT, 
you therefore add some applications, remove some others and you also need to address a 
threat that keeps occurring even with the controls you have implemented. You need to: 
For the RA tool you have used consider how this update can be reported and 
addressed 
Consider what functionality your RA tool provides in re-assessing the selected 
controls that are judged to be insufficient since this threat keeps occurring. 
Step 3: Complete the evaluation questionnaire provided to you 
Answer the questionnaire provided to you on the following section. 
Th )articipation in this evaluation 
Section 2: Evaluation Questionnaire 
Part 1: User Infonuation 
1. Please state your age: 
2. Have you been employed by an organization before? 
F] Yes 
n No 
Was your position (Please tick as appropriate): 
n IT related? 
F] Management/Owner 
F-I Other 
3. Do you have practical Infon-nation security experience? 
4. Have you used RA tools before? If yes, please state which. 
Part 2: The Risk Assessment Tools 
Use of tool 
5. V; Mch of the commercial RA tools have you chosen to use? 
6. Wlich was easier to use by a non-trained (in RA) user? 
F-1 PRAM 
M Other 
7. Which had the most 'user friendly' interface? 
F-1 PRAM 
F-I Other 
8. Which approach did you prefer - profiling or the other you used (questionnaire)? 
Profiling of assets (PRAM) 
Questionnaire-based 
Why? 
9. Which approach provided more assistance in judging which controls are more 
appropriate for your organization and what controls you should select if you could 
not afford all of them? 
[: 1 PRAM 
F] Other 
10. Did you find the ALE and ROI financial considerations important to be included 
in a RA tool? 
F-I Yes 
F-I No 
Output 
11. Which provided with the most useful output to the user? 
F-1 PRAM 
Fý Other 
12. Which gave the most helpful information on how controls should be 
implemented? 
F-1 PRAM 
R Other 
13. Which output would be more useful to illustrate the threat and justify security- 
related expenditure to the management? 
PRAM 
Other 
U- 
reedback 
14. What do you think of the provision of feedback and assistance after the end of the 
RA? 
F-I Unnecessary 
F-I Useful 
M hnperative 
Final thoughts 
15. Overall which tool did you find more appropriate and helpful for use by an SME, 
i. e. an organization with limited budget to deploy countermeasures and limited IT 
security expertise within? 
F] PRAM 
Fl Other 
16. Which of the tools you evaluated would you actually use in a real life situation? 
F-1 PRAM 
F] Other 
Why? (State below): 
17. If you were managing your organization would you use such a tool to identify 
threats and select controls? 
F-I Yes 
F71 No 
Which? (State below): 
18. What would potentially deter you from adopting such a tool? 
n Ease of use 
Time it takes to perform 
Other (State which): 
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLE SCENARIO 
Medium-sized organization 
Medium- sized Medical Center 
Sector: Healthcare 
Organization Size: 60 
IT Size: 60Pc, I Olaptops, 10 pdas 
Applications: Office, web, databases 
Internet Connection: DSL 
IT Budget (per year): 15000 
Organization Budget (per year): 500000 (through services to patients) 
Networking LAN 
Website Transactional (Displays information only) 
Security Requirements 
Organization spans over a small building with about 30 rooms, access to the building is 
fairly controlled. However patients/emergencies can be overlooked there is high degree 
of people in and out. 
The organization does not consider themselves to eb at a great IT security risk, however 
unlikely, any breach could have dear consequences since customer (patient) records is 
highly confidential and protected by a number of legislations. It is highly confidential 
information 
It is however imperative that this information is highly available at any time especially to 
key hospital staff. 
Even though information is highly confidential, security cannot be 'intrusive' since 
authorized people require easy access both to the building as well as the information and 
because of high numbers of customers in and out. 
Main concerns: 
Availability of information at any time is crucial 
Breach of confidentiality could cause high fines i. e. financial losses 
Rrf-. qr, b of Tntegritv mav Drove crucial Datient records should never be unauthorized 
tempered with 
Theft of expensive equipment 
YOUR TEST SCENARIO: 
(Please use the space bellow to write down the scenario you will be using) 
APPENDIX 2: YOUR VIEW OF THE RA TOOLS YOU USED 
Commercial RA tool used (Please state which bellow): 
9 Advantages 
o Disadvantages 
* Comments 
PRAM RA prototype: 
Advantages 
Disadvantages 
Comments 
Appendix D: Participants Quotations from their responses to 
the lab questions 
(Complete List) 
MRSAT 
Advantages 
"Comprehensive report" 
"Help service provided explaining terms" 
"Fairly all-encompassing" 
"Graphical output" 
"More suited for business in terms of paperwork" 
Disadvantages 
"Too many questions been asked" 
"No progress bar showing the process status" 
"Laborious and heavy to use" 
"Would confuse those without a clear picture of their environment" 
"Too many confusing questions" 
"Requires in depth technical knowledge to be able to answer most of the 
questions" 
"Report was vague and almost useless" 
Cobra 
Advantages 
"Provides the option to the user to set the level of security" 
"Easy to use" 
"Can provide parts of the report" 
Disadvantages 
"Not enough inform ation/help given" 
"Does not mention cost/expenditure to deploy the controls" 
"It is difficult to understand what could be achieved by the tool" 
"Takes long time to complete the questions" 
"Report presentation (Graph) is not quoted with captions properly" 
"Advise too short, no links to get further infon-nation" 
Buddy System 
Advantages 
"Lots of Information" 
Disadvantages 
"All the threats are not mentioned" 
"Too complicated" 
"Ugly design" 
PRAM 
Advantages 
"Easier to be completed since it doesn't take long time" 
"More user friendly (Not boring! )" 
"The risk measurement planning" 
"Profiling technique gives an idea especially to the non-trained user about the 
applications in the organisation that require attention" 
"Estimated costs very useful for financial planning" 
"User interface is good" 
"Scalability, less time to complete" 
"Ease of use" 
"Design" 
"Good description of the controls" 
"Easy to use, easy to ammend" 
"Easy to see the response to input values" 
"It is clear to follow step by step" 
"Box message: good point to advise the user 
"Good content, up to date example with new threats" 
"Liked a lot the profiler, very easy to use, I think it can match the needs of SME" 
"The score module is clean and easy to run" 
"Overall simplicity" 
"User friendly, self-explanatory" 
Disadvantages 
"Not enough help function provided" 
"Too many functions in one window" 
"Perhaps not listing too many controls" 
"Output doc lacks supporting graphs and justification" 
"It may be hard to find quickly the solutions in the Assess threats module" 
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